

An Analysis of Counterterror Practice Failure: The Case of the Fadlallah Assassination Attempt  
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Introduction

On March 8, 1985, a car full of explosives detonated in the Bir al-'Abd quarter of Beirut, close to the apartment building where Ayatollah Mohammed Hussayn Fadlallah, the "spiritual guide" of Hezbollah lived. As a result of that car bomb, more than 80 persons were killed and 200 people were wounded, but Fadlallah escaped the bloodletting unharmed. While this counterterror assault was carried out by "local operatives" recruited by the Lebanese intelligence agency G-2, it happened within the continuously evolving framework of an American "preemption" counterterror program that took shape within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after the U.S. embassy annex building in West Beirut was attacked by the Islamic Jihad Organization on September 20, 1984. The botched attempt to kill Fadlallah, in which the U.S. government was involved with the Lebanese and to a lesser degree the Saudi government, further besmirched an already badly tarnished American reputation in Lebanon, and helped Hezbollah rally sympathetic supporters in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East around anti-American and broader anti-western sentiments.

The Fadlallah assassination attempt is a crucial failure in the sphere of counterterror to examine for several reasons. First, at a functional level, it illustrates what can go awry for a program of "preemptive" counterterror even though the notion of "preemptive attack," itself based on the notion of "anticipatory self-defense," is arguably legitimate under international law provided that *jus in bello* ("justice in war") criteria are followed.<sup>ii</sup> Second, the Fadlallah affair, as well as the broader counterterror program of "preemption," demonstrated how the absence of consensus within the US government for a policy initiative can reduce its overall legitimacy, and thereby in effect facilitate vacillation and hesitancy in the policy's implementation.<sup>iii</sup> Third, the Fadlallah event underscored the effects of a condition that Allison describes as the "pulling and hauling" dynamics of bureaucratic politics, where institutions pit their interests in fierce competition over lead agency status and work in full blown fashion to protect their institutional approach, resources, prestige, and the vested interests of upper crust decision-makers.<sup>iv</sup> In the Fadlallah affair, such "bureaucratic politics" were discernable in strains and tensions between the US Department of State, the Defense Department, the CIA, and the White House Executive Branch. There was also a poor fit between American policymakers' expectations in Lebanon, which presupposed and derived from a wide ranging set of previously assumed opinions, and what was possible to achieve. That disconnect, coupled with the intense degree to which those assumptions and resultant expectations were found across bureaucracies and even within them, contributed to a lack of cogent policy direction in Lebanon which was ultimately reflected in the Fadlallah assassination attempt.

An analysis of this assassination attempt and the organizational dynamics which underpinned it, therefore deserve a carefully reasoned review because similar dynamics could influence more contemporary counterterror practice choices. Hence, this case study makes an important contribution to the work of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). In addition, as we try to confront intricate patterns of family and clan interconnections within the context of less hierarchically structured terrorist groups today, it is crucial that we learn lessons from the Fadlallah affair. Indeed, American policy makers continue to confront similar types of interconnections especially in countries where such relational ties and the behaviors those ties spawn, are found overlaid against ethnic and regional "fault lines" including in combat areas such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

U.S. policy in Lebanon in the early 1980's revolved around the central notion that support for the Maronite Christian government was the linchpin to success. Perhaps the most dominant theme in policy was the desire to buttress this government and in the process to craft an American firewall to promote US national interests in Lebanon, and to bolster American influence in a region of the world that still suffered from the shock waves of the 1979 Iranian revolution. In doing so, policy makers sought to constrain the ambitions of the ruling elite in Iran and Syria who promoted their own national security interests through what Ranstorp calls "the triangular relationship" between themselves and Hezbollah.<sup>v</sup> In a similar vein, US policy makers were concerned about the encroachment of Soviet influence and the advance of Soviet geopolitical interests in Lebanon by means of Soviet proxies, namely Syria and Libya. At the same time, as some have suggested, the Reagan administration viewed American predominance in Lebanon as a vehicle to deter what amounted to destabilizing Israeli actions in the country, prominently a series of military actions against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) both prior to the 1982

War in Lebanon, and following the establishment of the “security zone” in the south of the country in the wake of the 1982 conflict.

What follows is a brief description of the four central PNSR touchstone questions as they relate to the Fadlallah event.

1) Stratagems - “Did the U.S. Government generally act in an ad hoc manner or did it develop effective strategies to integrate its national security resources?”

The underlying theme of this case study revolves around the ad hoc nature of United States government policy in Lebanon in general, and in the narrower sense, the ad hoc nature of the operation to kill Ayatollah Fadlallah. That operation was carried out by Lebanese G-2 “local operatives” within the context of the US “preemption” counterterror program which was crafted by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCI) William Casey. An absence of consensus among upper crust foreign policy officials about the “preemptive” counterterror attack program in the broader sense, and possibly the plan to kill Fadlallah in particular, contributed to the ineffectiveness and ultimate failure of this essentially reactive attempt to confront terrorist assaults carried out against U.S. interests in Lebanon.

What seems significant is that there were inefficiencies at several layers of the planning phase of this counterterror practice program and by extension this operation that were ultimately insurmountable. First, there were strains and tensions associated with an absence of consensus on the counterterror program within the Executive Branch where ferocious competition between groups of upper crust policy makers on both sides of the issue unfolded. Equally important, there were profound and lasting differences of opinion between the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State, and in some cases even full blown disagreements about the utility of counterterror assassination within those organizations.

It remains unclear whether or not the actual choice of Fadlallah as a target and the plan to kill him had its sources and origins in the White House or the local operatives involved, as accounts vary.<sup>vi</sup> Certainly, there was no dispassionate analysis of the role that Fadlallah played in Hezbollah’s tactical decisions, namely the planning and execution of terrorist assaults. In a similar vein, the decision to target Fadlallah was seemingly based on the ideological fervor and convictions of certain US officials who sought to craft an American firewall in Lebanon without proper consideration of the inherent nuances and intricacies associated with such a project.<sup>vii</sup> As a result, the approach was not guided by a carefully reasoned set of counterterror measures consistent with American foreign policy interests in Lebanon and other areas of the Middle East. Instead, the program revolved around reactive counterterror practices with an almost singular focus on “hard-line” actions to confront Islamic revivalist extremist terrorist assaults. That underlying approach was therefore destined for acute failure. Indeed, as Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen, Paul Pillar and Martha Crenshaw all stress, without overall congruence between counterterror terror practices and broader foreign policy objectives based on solid analysis, severe political setbacks are likely.<sup>viii</sup>

2) Implementation - “How well did the agencies/departments work together to implement those ad hoc or integrated strategies?”

Ambassador Robert E. Oakley, U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counter-terrorism (1984-1986) reports that the notion of killing Fadlallah was spawned within the framework of the “preemption” counterterror program, which was spearheaded by Casey. Oakley relates that Lt. Colonel Oliver North, a member of the National Security Council staff, essentially hatched the “preemption” program with the support of Rear Admiral John Poindexter (Deputy National Security Advisor 1983-1985), National Security Advisor Robert C. McFarlane, and DCI Casey. Due to the absence of consensus among major political stakeholders across national security agencies and in the White House about the propriety, utility and overall effectiveness of a US government plan to kill figures such as Fadlallah, there was extremely poor interagency planning and coordination for the program.

In the absence of final U.S. approval for the assassination of Fadlallah, recruited “local operatives” apparently became restless and attempted to carry out the mission on their own.<sup>ix</sup> At a tactical level, the plan seemed to be largely put together by the Lebanese government and perhaps to a lesser degree, the Saudi government. There were thus substantial U.S. oversight responsibility breakdowns that failed to capture the likelihood of independent

action even though two quality assessments conducted by the CIA and U.S. Special Forces were made to evaluate the capacity of those “local operatives” to follow commands and to otherwise demonstrate military discipline. The content of those assessments remain shrouded in uncertainty and the organizational politics process by which those assessments reached top echelon decision-makers remains unknown. Flaws in tactical oversight and management responsibilities, which ultimately failed to prevent local operatives from undertaking the mission on their own, probably resulted from broader bureaucratic strains and tensions over US involvement with the plan.

3) Analysis - “What variables explain the strengths and weaknesses of the response?”

Numerous factors contributed to the essentially ad hoc nature of American foreign policy in Lebanon in the wake of the political instability, social unrest, and terrorist assaults seen in the country in the early 1980’s and, consequently, the debacle of the Fadlallah affair itself. First, the Reagan administration had a makeshift and incomplete set of objectives that were in basic conflict with the political realities of Lebanon. Second, the corrosive effects of “bureaucratic politics” were evident, as major players within and between national security agencies wrestled with the implications of U.S. government support for killing individuals such as Fadlallah, not only for American geopolitical interests, but also for the vested interests of particular bureaucracies. “Bureaucratic politics” effects were exacerbated in profound ways by the ideological fervor of certain major players, making the prospect of consensus even more remote and resulting in a dysfunctional system where small groups of political advisors to President Reagan were in fierce competition for presidential approval of their point of view.<sup>x</sup> Third, there were organizational inefficiencies associated with the U.S. National Intelligence Officer (NIO) structure, the absence of satisfactory ties between carefully reasoned analysis and policy recommendations, and the dependence on “hard-line” counterterror practice approaches against Fadlallah. As a result, there was no proactive effort to gauge Fadlallah’s day to day involvement with the operational side of Hezbollah, which led American officials to focus almost singular attention on Fadlallah rather than on chief tacticians such as Imad Mughniyah and Hussayn al-Musawi.

4) Appraisal - “What diplomatic, financial and other achievements or costs resulted from those successes and failures?”

The costs of this counterterror debacle to the United States government were high and damage occurred at several levels. First, the attempt to kill Fadlallah besmirched an already badly tarnished US reputation in Lebanon and in other parts of the Middle East. The enormous distance between American pronouncements about democracy and fair play and the emergent reality of the Reagan administration’s strong support for the heavy handed Lebanese Maronite Christian government was put into even sharper relief, damaging the U.S. image. Compounding the matter even more for the American reputation, the Lebanese government with which the U.S. was working, had powerful ties to the Phalange movement which was responsible for the Sabra and Shatilla massacres of Palestinians in 1982, and which also had links to the Israeli government. Seen from another angle, the United States lost a good portion of the moral high ground it had acquired in the wake of the U.S. embassy bombings in Beirut, the slew of kidnappings in Lebanon that in some cases evolved into murder, and the truck bomb detonation of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut. Resulting anger and other similar sentiments about American foreign policy inconsistency at the time, as James Larry Taulbee suggests, was made all the worse by the Reagan administration’s concurrent and extensive support of the Contras in Nicaragua, who themselves carried out terrorist assaults against Nicaraguans.<sup>xi</sup>

Second, the Fadlallah affair served as a “situational” or “middle-run” contributing factor to inspire additional terrorist assaults against U.S. interests. To be sure, some of those terrorist assaults likely had only indirect or “contextual” links to the Fadlallah affair, such as the hijacking of TWA flight 847 which occurred a little over three months after the Bir al- ‘Abd Fadlallah bombing, and the May 25, 1985 attempt to kill the Emir of Kuwait. However, a few terrorist assaults, such as the March 17, 1985 abductions of British citizens Gordon Nash and Brian Levick, who were apparently misidentified as Americans, and the kidnapping of U.S. journalist Terry Anderson on March 16, 1985, evidently had more direct interconnections to the Bir al- ‘Abd bombing.<sup>xii</sup> The attempt to kill Fadlallah also undermined the physical security of Americans in acute fashion, Lebanese citizens who were Jewish, Maronite Christians, and persons otherwise deemed to be insufficiently loyal to Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Likewise, because Israel was implicated in the Bir al-‘Abd bombing, the physical safety of Israelis and Israeli interests in southern Lebanon were imperiled.

Stratagems

Analysis of the strategy the Reagan administration used to cope with the continuously evolving threat of Islamic revivalist extremist terrorist attacks in Lebanon involves several dimensions. In delineating those dimensions, this analysis will explore: (1) the central notion that the American “preemption” counterterror program in Lebanon was crafted against the backdrop of a U.S. foreign policy that was ad hoc and reactive in nature, lacking any coherent or generally recognizable blueprint for action; (2) the effects and source of conflict among US policy makers on the subject of the Fadlallah operation; (3) the background of Lebanese politics; and (4) the incongruence between “preemption” counterterror policy in theory and how the “preemptive attack” against the “spiritual guide” of Hezbollah in the guise of Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), actually unfolded.

### American Foreign Policy in Lebanon

The Fadlallah assassination attempt was crafted within the context of an absence of consensus within the Reagan administration about what goals to pursue in Lebanon. David Kennedy and Leslie Brunetta suggest that this conflict was generated and sustained by varying opinions about the capacity of the Reagan administration to “unify Lebanon” under American hegemonic influence.<sup>xiii</sup> One example of departments disagreeing about the direction of U.S. policy towards Lebanon revolves around the Reagan administration’s proposal to craft a broader strategic cooperation agreement with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in 1983 as a way to confront political instability and social unrest in the country that was attributed to increased Soviet influence within Syria. That issue pitted the interests of Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who was in favor of this agreement, against the interests of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger who had “doubts” about it, presumably within the context of competing American and Israeli national interest agendas in Lebanon and consequently, overall efforts to enhance more full blown American influence in that country.<sup>xiv</sup> These authors explain that the ultimate policy direction taken by the Reagan administration essentially to craft an American firewall in Lebanon was influenced by Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Special Envoy Philip Habib who believed that the civil war in Lebanon raging at the time could be managed and controlled by American political predominance in the country.<sup>xv</sup> In fact, one of the underlying structural flaws of the Reagan administration’s organization, as is pertained to Middle East policy, was the enormous capacity of Habib to promote his vision of Lebanese policy and thereby in effect break the comity of bureaucratic protocol which would have essentially relegated Habib’s opinion about U.S. Lebanon policy to one among a cacophony of voices.

The direction of the administration’s policy of support for the Maronite Christian government, which featured an obtuse American presence that for many echoed American involvement in Lebanon in 1958, replete with all of its problems, was not supported by carefully reasoned analysis of the intricacies and nuances of Lebanese politics.<sup>xvi</sup> Instead, the administration’s approach was heavily influenced by Habib whose, “...strategy was to accord diplomatic priority to brokering an Israeli disengagement agreement with Lebanon. He believed that Syria would withdraw almost as a matter of course once Israel did...Once the Syrians and Israelis were home, Habib thought, Lebanon could be reunited under a Gemayal presidency supported by a revitalized LAF. It would be a great American victory.”<sup>xvii</sup> In essence, what Habib sought was a closely knit alliance between the United States, the Lebanese government of President Amin Gemayal, and the government’s military, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), to promote American geopolitical considerations.

Two American sponsored events during this time essentially reified that policy and highlighted some of the profound problems associated with Habib’s vision. The first event was the Reagan administration’s decision to spearhead the deployment of a United Nations sponsored Multi-National Force (MNF) to Lebanon in 1982. Ostensibly, this action sought to facilitate a PLO withdrawal to Tunis, but deployment of the MNF was perceived to be and was in fact supportive of President Amin Gemayal’s Kataeb party. The Reagan administration standpoint was therefore clearly contrary to the neutrality and similar themes that were rhetorically at the heart of that UN backed mission. In support of American geopolitical interests, the US led MNF favored the Christian front at the expense of other political stakeholders in Lebanon.<sup>xviii</sup> That act of perceived American favoritism, dovetailed nicely with regional anger about past American meddling in and encroachment on Lebanon’s sovereignty, particularly American involvement in the Lebanese political fray in the 1950’s and the 1958 invasion of Lebanon by U.S. Marines during the presidency of Camille Chamoun.<sup>xix</sup>

The second event, that essentially confirmed the dominance of Habib’s vision and the capstone in U.S. policy, was the American sponsored May 17 Agreement of 1983 which was designed to remove both Syrian and

Israeli forces from large portions of Lebanon. The agreement itself had little effect insofar as it was rejected outright by Syrian President Hafaz el Assad and the Israelis would not implement it without the Syrians making the first move. What seems significant here is that the agreement demonstrated the U.S. government's overestimation of its capacity to impose its agenda on a continuously evolving and highly unstable political environment, itself rent apart by the effects of religious, ethnic, and other social fissures in Lebanese society, not the least important of which were fissures within ethnic and religious groups based on family and clan divisions.<sup>xx</sup>

#### The "Preemption" Counterterror Program in Lebanon

It was against the backdrop of civil war in Lebanon, US efforts to promote American predominance in that country, and a slew of terrorist assaults carried out by Islamic revivalist extremists, that the Fadlallah operation originated. It emerged from a continuously evolving "preemption" counterterror program that took shape within the CIA "less than three weeks" after the US embassy annex building in West Beirut was attacked by Hezbollah in 1984.<sup>xxi</sup> Indeed, Bob Woodward reports that this broader program was essentially an initiative of DCI Casey.<sup>xxii</sup> In effect, there was generally recognizable agreement within the White House, especially from Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who was known as "a very hard charger" on counterterror practices, about the underlying need for a preemption strategy to confront and prevail against terrorists. As Oakley relates, "after the Marine barracks and then the American embassy had been blown up [in 1983], there was a very strong feeling in Washington, 'we can't just sit back and wait for them to do it again.'<sup>xxiii</sup>

Notwithstanding consensus on the need to confront terrorism, there were strains and tensions found across and within national security agencies about exactly what preemption should look like. Those underlying tensions were associated with differences of opinion about varying counterterror assault options. While Shultz and McFarlane were in favor of a counterterror program that targeted individual terrorists with lethal force, there was significant opposition from Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, who believed that American forces in general, and the CIA in particular, should not work to assassinate terrorist chieftains or activists.<sup>xxiv</sup> Compounding the matter even more, there was also no agreement about the need for "preemptive attacks" against terrorist leaders found within the CIA. Even within the upper echelons of the Agency, there were disagreements about whether or not to endorse the use of lethal force in select circumstances. For example, Casey and CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin favored such "preemptive" counterterror practices, while Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) John N. McMahon expressed unequivocal disapproval of the strategy.<sup>xxv</sup> Concerns about the program revolved around the fear that implementation of that strategy would violate Executive Order 12333, an order which prohibited assassinations and was originally issued in the wake of the 1976 Church Committee findings by President Gerald R. Ford.<sup>xxvi</sup>

In its original format, the phraseology of Executive Order 12333 that imposed a ban on "political assassination" amounted to an exceedingly narrow interpretation of proscribed behavior thereby in effect allowing for assassinations that were non-political in nature and the provision of U.S. support to persons undertaking such activity. Subsequently, the Carter administration worked to make the ban against assassination even more stringent insofar as the word "political" was taken out of the Executive Order language with the end result that all assassination and support for the foregoing was prohibited. As Jonathan Fredman relates, the Reagan administration essentially embraced the same set of constraints on assassination as did the Carter administration.<sup>xxvii</sup> What is significant here is that Fredman seems to suggest what amounted to a gray area with respect to Executive Order 12333's boundaries for assassination, specifically for those who do not follow the "laws of war" which by extrapolation, must also include terrorists. For Fredman, "...the E.O. prohibition per se will not apply in this type of situation."<sup>xxviii</sup> The author elaborates further when he concludes, "...many covert actions appropriately may be compared to military operations, and in those cases the law of war supplies the terms of reference."<sup>xxix</sup>

As previously mentioned, that almost singular focus on the legal dimensions and ramifications of this counterterror attack program by the Reagan administration had roots in the recent past. In the 1980's, policy makers' thinking with respect to constraints on CIA activities were influenced by critical events in the 1970's. In the wake of the "imperial presidencies" of Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon, a resurgent U.S. Congress demonstrated an almost singular focus on efforts to wrest foreign policy decision making away from the Executive Branch.<sup>xxx</sup> Accordingly, Congressional leaders in 1975 crafted the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, otherwise known as the Church Committee, with the underlying aim of investigating alleged CIA spying operations taking place within the United States and alleged CIA efforts to

thwart the Warren Commission's investigation of President John F. Kennedy's murder.<sup>xxxvi</sup> Interestingly enough, the Church Committee displayed an enormous capacity to work in effective and sustained ways with the White House and CIA, by contrast to the Pike Committee in the House of Representatives that was itself charged with investigating the CIA budget, the capacity of the CIA to predict seminal world events between 1965-1975, and CIA "covert activities."<sup>xxxvii</sup> At a substantive level, the final report of the Church Committee was in fact a gatekeeper to a more wide ranging set of issues explored than originally planned, and included an appraisal of CIA links to political assassination taking place abroad.<sup>xxxviii</sup>

In 1976, the Church committee hearings uncovered unbridled CIA activities done at the behest of policymakers, including attempts to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro and President Salvador Allende of Chile.<sup>xxxix</sup> The CIA was complicit in the death of Allende, which paved the way for the ascension of President Augusto Pinochet, whose egregious violations of the Chilean people's human rights have been well documented. In illuminating such nefarious activities, the Church committee hearings signaled another fledgling trend toward the reassertion of Congressional prerogatives in foreign affairs and oversight of covert operations.<sup>xl</sup> As detailed later, that shift in institutional relationships affected U.S. counterterror actions, albeit it in indirect ways.

For Casey and like-minded officials the legal and moral justifications of "preemptive attack" in preventive counterterror practices were found in the notion of "anticipatory self defense," which is not only enshrined within the jurisprudential standard of *jus ad bellum* or "justice of war" but is also interpreted by some to be codified in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. This Article guarantees "...the inherent right of individual or collective self defense..."<sup>xli</sup> Seen from that angle, in April 1984 President Reagan signed a "presidential finding" otherwise known as National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)138 that made it possible to cobble together the rudiments of such a "preemption" counterterror practice program.<sup>xlii</sup> In relying on international law to make the case for "preemptive" counterterror actions, while simultaneously flaunting such law in other actions, Casey acted in accordance with the central notion that in the larger world of action, international law is subordinate to geopolitical considerations.<sup>xliii</sup> Indeed in the case of the Fadlallah assassination attempt, what seems significant is irrespective of the fact that more than 80 civilians were killed and 200 others were injured, which itself violates the juridical norm of "discrimination," the use of an indiscriminate weapon at a residential facility, violation was also a flagrant infraction of international law. An argument can be made that the U.S. was partially culpable, as that act, even though it was done without final US approval, was nonetheless carried out within the context of a U.S. counterterror program itself under U.S. oversight.<sup>xliiii</sup>

### The Broader Contours of Lebanese Politics - Political Background

This section provides an overview of the civil war in Lebanon and the fractured nature of Lebanese politics against which the American plan to promote the Christian Maronite government was based. In the process, delicate webs of interconnections between major political actors that were highly susceptible to disruption by terrorist assaults are highlighted. A grasp of these dynamics is essential in understanding that the preemptive attack counterterror program served two functions: to respond to terrorist assaults carried out by Islamic revivalist extremists, and in the broader sense, to provide a stability mechanism to ensure the preservation of a Maronite dominated political system.

At the heart of Lebanese politics in the early 1980's was the National Pact of 1943, which institutionalized a delicate system of "confessional politics" whereby Maronite Christians predominated over the political landscape. In this system, national political posts such as the offices of the President and Prime Minister, were skillfully broken down based on the religious and ethnic composition of the major political stakeholders in the country. For example, the presidency was reserved for a Maronite Christian by contrast to the Prime Minister who had to be a Sunni Muslim. In turn, key posts were then allotted to those stakeholders.<sup>xli</sup> While the underlying aim of this system was to promote stability and ensure political participation from major stakeholders, it eventually became a political system where distinct groups, delineated from one another by religious and ethnic affiliations, were essentially and permanently "locked in" or "locked out" of specific levels of power .

For several decades, the Lebanese system of "confessional politics" continuously evolved with efforts to balance the interests of Christian, Shia, Sunni, and Druze stakeholders. However, Lebanese politics remained shackled by the codified separation of religious groups and by the system's acute susceptibility to foreign political intervention.<sup>xli</sup> For example, when the pro-Western Lebanese President Camille Chamoun faced political instability

and social unrest in 1958, Chamoun called for U.S. intervention based on the Eisenhower Doctrine and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, inviting the subsequent deployment of U.S. Marines to his country.<sup>xlii</sup> Indeed, Harris characterizes the experience of 1958 as “a dry run” for foreign actions that began eighteen years later with the start of Lebanon’s civil war.<sup>xliii</sup>

The general contours of two broad “camps” in Lebanon, each in fierce competition with the other, became increasingly discernible in the middle to late 1970’s.<sup>xliiv</sup> One group, known as the Lebanese Front was an overarching political framework crafted in 1976 that worked to promote the “conservative” political agenda of Lebanese politics which essentially corresponded in demographic terms to the Christian populace.<sup>xliv</sup> The Lebanese Front, with Pierre Gemayal’s Maronite Christian Kataeb party at its helm, was comprised of several preexisting Christian parties that also included the National Liberation party (NLP) of former President Camille Chamoun, the Zghorta party, and “partisans” of the President at the time, Sulayman Faranjiyya.<sup>xlvi</sup> In addition, the Front was associated with a wealth of affiliated “paramilitaries” which had a set of interconnections to both the Kataeb Party and the NLP.<sup>xlvii</sup>

A second, more “leftist” group galvanized around the underlying theme of changing the political status quo, a status quo which favored a political system dominated by Christian Maronite political groups.<sup>xlviii</sup> The Lebanese National Front was crafted by Druze chieftain Kemal Jumblatt as an overarching “mostly Muslim” political framework in 1969.<sup>xlix</sup> It articulated the interests of an eclectic array of political organizations such as the Communist Party, the Syrian sponsored Syrian Social Nationalists (SSSN), the Baathist party, and Jumblatt’s own Progressive Social Party (PSP) which itself promoted the political agenda of the Druzes. In addition, Palestinian-Arab “rejectionist” terrorist organizations, such as Dr. George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a PFLP “splinter group,” the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) of Naif Hawatameh, and “Nasserite” groups also fell under this broader “leftist” organization.<sup>1</sup>

Against this backdrop, Syrian President Hafez el Assad worked in the political fray as a balancer of these two sides. Because he sought to keep the “leftist” coalition from becoming too powerful, Assad was often generally supportive of the Christian “conservative coalition,” even though elements of that bloc had varying degrees of political affinity towards Israel. At the same time, he worked to support the “leftist” coalition, but never to the point where the “leftist” coalition would become too powerful, thereby in effect precluding a situation where Israel would engage Beirut militarily and in the process jeopardize the Israeli-Syrian de-facto understanding about “spheres of influence” in Lebanon.

In the meantime, the Lebanese Shi’ites, most of whom lived in southern Lebanon, occupied the furthest margins of society and were shackled under systematic economic and political discrimination. As a result, the Amal or “Hope” organization, a group originally designed to protect Shiites against Palestinian abuses was formed by Musar al- Sadr, himself a charismatic figure who would disappear mysteriously in 1978 while on a trip to Libya. Amal continued to flourish in effective and sustained ways for a time after al-Sadr’s disappearance and was now under the aegis of Nabi Berri, but its cohesion was short-lived. Internal rivalries and the 1982 emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon soon split Berri’s organization into two factions: Amal, and Islamic Amal, with Shaykh Hussayn al-Musawi at the helm. Both factions of Amal however, would pass into eclipse as Hezbollah with its profound and lasting support from Iran and Syria grew to become the premier Shiite political resistance organization in Lebanon.

Hezbollah, otherwise known as the “Party of God,” is essentially an Iranian artifact whose origins trace an arc to the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. From the start, Hezbollah benefited from enormous political, financial, and military support from Iran’s leaders who sought to confront Israel and the West primarily by means of terrorist assaults. In many cases those terrorist assaults were carried out by Hezbollah’s Special Security Apparatus (SSA) which focused on specialized assaults including attacks on Americans in Lebanon in the 1980’s.<sup>li</sup> In the broader sense, Hezbollah served to promote resistance to the West with its ideas and presence in the Middle East, and served to breathe life into the central notion of a Middle East characterized by an Islamic revivalist state or confederation of such states. Indeed, underlying Syrian support for Hezbollah provided it with critical infrastructure for military equipment and financial flows from Iran and equally important, worked to President Assad’s advantage because it gave Assad new leverage to manipulate the interests of both “conservative” and “leftist” political camps in Lebanon. In addition, Hezbollah essentially served as a Syrian proxy to carry out terrorist assaults or refrain from doing so in accordance with Assad’s appraisal of his geopolitical position vis a vis the Israelis. In its fledgling phases, Hezbollah’s paramilitary units were trained by and otherwise relied heavily on Iranian “Revolutionary Guards”

known as Pasdaran who were primarily located in the Biq'a Valley of Lebanon at the time.<sup>lii</sup> Having said that, it should be emphasized that control over Hezbollah by the Iranians was always makeshift and incomplete, and as a result, certain Hezbollah cells had an enormous capacity to operate in independent fashion.<sup>liii</sup>

### The Case of Preemptive Attack in Lebanon: Translation from Theory to Practice

As previously mentioned, the counterterror "preemptive attack" program in Lebanon was an effort to confront a host of terrorist assaults against American interests in the Middle East undertaken by Islamic revivalist extremists in the early 1980's. Those terrorist assaults generated and sustained political instability and social unrest in Lebanon and in the process, threatened to undermine the Reagan administration's support for the country's Maronite Christians. A number of terrorist assaults sought to both destabilize the American position and thereby in effect advance Iran's revivalist agenda and power. Iranian involvement was fueled by a foreign policy that sought to spread the Iranian revolution in effective and sustained ways. American support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), and overall anti-American sentiment was inspired by a series of past events, including the U.S. backed coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, nearly thirty years of continuous American support for the autocratic Iranian Shah, and the U.S. opposition to the 1979 Khomeini Revolution. Equally important, other terrorist assaults served as vehicles by which important Lebanese clans and families sought to advance personal political agendas, that in this case revolved around the capture of seventeen Iranian supported al-Dawa extremists who were imprisoned by Kuwaiti authorities after several terrorist assaults occurred in Kuwait in late 1983. What follows is a description of pivotal terrorist events intrinsic to an understanding of why American government officials at least contemplated taking action against Fadlallah.

In the early 1980's, Hezbollah, in the guise of the Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO), began a series of seemingly endless abductions. These acts, that in some cases evolved into outright murder, almost exclusively targeted Europeans and Americans; this pattern was a hallmark of terrorist assaults both before and after the March 8, 1985 attempted assassination of Ayatollah Fadlallah. Terrorist assaults prior to the Fadlallah assassination attempt included, but were not limited to, the abduction of Professor David Dodge, the interim President of the American University of Beirut (AUB) who was taken hostage on July 19, 1982; the January 1984 murder of Professor Malcolm Kerr, President of the University of Beirut; the February 1984 abduction of Dr. Frank Regier, an American University of Beirut Professor of Electrical Engineering; the abductions of Reverend Benjamin Weir and Jeremy Levin of CNN in March 1984; and the abduction of Father Lawrence Jenco in January 1985.<sup>liv</sup>

For American foreign policy makers, the abduction, torture, and eventual murder of CIA Bureau Station Chief William Buckley in March 1984 was unequivocally a watershed event. Buckley was housed in the Shaykh Abdullah barracks prison that was staffed by Iranian "Pasdaran" guards in the Biq'a Valley of southern Lebanon. Robert Baer suggests that this terrorist event may have had the most profound and lasting implications for U.S. policy in Lebanon. Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to say that the capture and eventual death of Buckley and the need to respond to it, contributed to U.S. policy makers, an almost singular focus in Lebanon on Hezbollah and its "spiritual leader," Fadlallah. The Fadlallah emphasis was galvanized by a basic lack of understanding at the time regarding the role of family and clan involvements in terrorist assaults.<sup>lv</sup>

The fact that numerous other terrorist attacks were perpetrated by groups with underlying interconnections to Hezbollah helped maintain the U.S. focus on Hezbollah. Several terrorist assaults carried out around this time by two groups known as the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems and the Khaybar Brigades (Lebanese Branch) worsened the political situation in Lebanon. Compounding the matter even more was that those terrorist groups were at the very least, associated with Hezbollah in some fashion, if not in fact "front groups" for Hezbollah outright.<sup>lvi</sup> Terrorist assaults perpetrated by the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems prior to the Fadlallah assassination attempt included the 1984 abduction of Mr. Jonathan Wright, a reporter for the Reuters news service. It is probably close to the mark to say that the killers of several Lebanese Jews such as Ra'ul Mizrachi, and Murad Jamous, were at least known to Hezbollah, if not in fact formal members.<sup>lvii</sup> In other terrorist assaults against Lebanese Jews, that included abductions and murders, there is tantalizing and persuasive evidence that the perpetrators were formal members of Hezbollah who worked under the guise of yet another Hezbollah "front group," namely the Organization of the Oppressed on Earth.<sup>lviii</sup>

In addition to this string of kidnappings and subsequent abductions that would help generate and sustain the "arms for hostages" operation, otherwise known as the "Iran-Contra" affair, the Reagan administration was faced

with five terrorist events of such fundamental importance that they sent shock waves through the administration's entire Middle East policy. The first of these was the calamitous bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut by Islamic Amal and Islamic Jihad-Hezbollah activists on April 18, 1983.<sup>lix</sup> For Baer, "even by Beirut standards, it was an enormous blast, shattering windows for miles around. The *USS Guadalcanal*, anchored five miles off the coast, shuddered from the tremors."<sup>lx</sup> The demolition of the U.S. embassy killed sixty three persons, including renowned CIA national intelligence chieftain Robert Clayton Ames and several other upper echelon CIA officials. At the same time, scores of additional people were injured.<sup>lxi</sup> In addition, other top U.S. personnel died in the blast including USAID deputy director William R. McIntyre and U.S. embassy economic analyst Frank T. Johnson.<sup>lxii</sup> That bombing also eliminated an entire coterie of top flight Middle East CIA analysts whose loss may have also profoundly affected the American decision to go after Fadlallah, rather than a chieftain more involved in the day to day operational workings of Hezbollah, such as Imad Mughniyah.<sup>lxiii</sup>

Subsequently, Hezbollah, in the guise of the Islamic Jihad Organization, carried out a second landscape changing terrorist assault, which involved the nearly simultaneous detonations of explosives at the United States Marine Corps and the French multinational peacekeeping force encampments on October 23, 1983 in Beirut. In that assault, the terrorists used an even more powerful bomb against the U.S. Marine barracks than had been detonated at the American embassy some six months before.<sup>lxiv</sup> Those explosions resulted in the deaths of close to three hundred American Marine Corps and French peacekeepers.<sup>lxv</sup>

Nearly three weeks later, on December 12, 1983, the United States embassy in Kuwait was the target of yet another terrorist offensive. Within an hour of the US embassy explosion, other detonations occurred at the Kuwaiti airport, two Kuwaiti production facilities, and the French embassy.<sup>lxvi</sup> The assault against the U.S. embassy, and almost assuredly the other assaults of that day, were carried out by the Islamic revivalist extremist group al-Dawa al-Islamiyya or "The Islamic Call," an organization with origins in Iraq, and which, like Hezbollah, received support from the Iranian government.<sup>lxvii</sup> In the wake of those terrorist assaults in Kuwait, Kuwaiti government officials arrested seventeen al-Dawa al-Islamiyya activists. Many of those al-Dawa activists had clear family links to key terrorist group participants in the Lebanese landscape such as Husayn al-Musawi of Islamic Amal and Imad Mughniyah, who himself had pronounced ties both to al-Fatah and to Hezbollah.<sup>lxviii</sup> Nearly a decade later in a fortunate turn of events, most if not all of the so-called "al-Dawa 17" made their escape in the wake the enormous confusion generated and sustained by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.<sup>lxix</sup> As will be detailed later, those family and clan interconnections and the seeming inability of American analysts to pick up on their importance would become crucial elements for understanding why Fadlallah was targeted by American backed assassins.

A fourth major terrorist assault, this one in 1984, further illustrated the powerful ties between Islamic revivalist extremists in Lebanon, the Hezbollah organization, and political events elsewhere in the Middle East. The new U.S. embassy annex building in Lebanon, pulled out in the East Beirut suburb of Aukar in the wake of the April 1983 bombing of the previous U.S. embassy, was itself a target of a terrorist assault on September 20, 1984. As in 1983, the 1984 Aukar operation was executed by a suicide bomber who belonged to the Islamic Jihad Organization. While some 20 persons were killed and 35 persons were injured, the 1984 bombing was a much smaller detonation device than the apparatus used to obliterate the U.S. embassy in 1983; indeed one estimate indicates that the bomb consisted of about 400 pounds of TNT.<sup>lxx</sup> That bombing occurred only six months prior to the assassination attempt against Ayatollah Fadlallah who at this juncture, had been clearly identified by intelligence reports as at the heart of the terrorist assaults directed against U.S. interests in the Middle East.<sup>lxxi</sup>

The last terrorist attack under consideration here, namely the hijacking of a Kuwaiti jet aircraft, occurred only three months before the attempt to kill Fadlallah. On December 4, 1984, a scheduled flight between Kuwait and Pakistan was interrupted by Islamic Jihad Organization "associates" who commandeered the aircraft and ordered it to fly to Teheran. The underlying aim of this hijacking was to compel Kuwaiti officials to release the seventeen al-Dawa activists captured by the Kuwaiti government the previous year. To be more specific, it is safe to assume the terrorists hoped to elicit pressure for the release of those al-Dawa prisoners from the Reagan administration (in much the same way as the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June 1985 engendered a political discourse about how the Israelis ought to free sizable numbers of Palestinian prisoners transferred to Israel from Lebanon in exchange for American hostages). As the December hijacking unfolded, two American officials from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) were shot and killed on the airport tarmac in Teheran, one within the plane and the other nearby. The crisis only ended on December 10, 1984 when Iranian security forces were able to wrest control of the aircraft away from the Islamic Jihad Organization linked terrorists.<sup>lxxii</sup> For U.S. decision makers, this

event showcased the honeycomb-like interconnections between Hezbollah and its affiliates, and in the process, illuminated the increasing lethal danger the terrorist group posed to Americans beyond the borders of Lebanon.

## Implementation

### The Plan to Murder Fadlallah

It should be recognized that there are intrinsic limitations to this section of the analysis as there is little information available about the specific events which occurred within U.S. national security organizations in the run-up to the Fadlallah assassination attempt. What is significant here and certain is that Lt. Colonel Oliver North hatched the broader counterterror “preemption” program with the support of McFarlane, and Poindexter within the Executive Office of the White House and, together with Casey, these officials all pushed hard to get presidential approval for the program.<sup>lxxxiii</sup>

To be sure, Casey was an invaluable ally to have in attempts to get approval for that program. Ambassador Oakley relates that Casey had a profound and lasting influence over President Reagan as Reagan and the DCI had been close friends and had longstanding ties that traced an arc back to personal and professional connections in California.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> Those personal ties helped to spur on the counterterror program and overwhelm other perspectives about how to deal with what was increasingly seen as a fundamental problem in the Middle East, namely Fadlallah and Hezbollah. In fact, Oakley depicts a series of political alliances between small numbers of upper crust foreign policy decision-makers in the Executive Office who were in ferocious competition with one another over whose point of view about the program and in the narrower sense the Fadlallah assassination plan, would ultimately prevail.<sup>lxxxv</sup>

In the meantime, Casey had already begun to build the cornerstones of the counterterror program. In a remarkably detailed account, Bob Woodward relates how Casey and then Saudi Ambassador to the United States Prince Bandar, met and made plans to galvanize the financial underpinnings of the program. According to Woodward, that transaction involved a three million U.S. dollar “transfer” of Saudi Arabian money to a U.S. government Swiss bank account.<sup>lxxxvi</sup> Indeed, Woodward asserts the US and Saudi governments (with Prince Bandar bin Sultan at the helm on the Saudi side) planned to involve an ex operative of the British SAS to help train local operatives with close ties to Lebanese intelligence to articulate further and develop the assassination attempt.<sup>lxxxvii</sup>

Woodward and Babcock detail three counterterror units in Lebanon were cobbled together with the help of the Lebanese, the Saudis and “other foreigners” to eliminate terrorists under certain select circumstances “as a last resort” and with the use of a minimal amount of force.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> It should be noted however that according to Oakley, the CIA Station Chief in Beirut worked in conjunction with other CIA officers to implement the Fadlallah operation which Saudi Arabian officials were not a part of.<sup>lxxxix</sup> Scripted accounts vary, but at least one report lists Captain Yusuf Khadij of Lebanese Intelligence as a primary interlocutor between the United States and Lebanese governments regarding the plan to kill Fadlallah.<sup>lxxx</sup> Another account reports that of the three assassination teams noted above, a first team came to the United States and received two weeks of counterterror practice training in January 1985, while a second team received training in the United States in March of that year. Prior to that time, in October 1984, a Lebanese representative apparently met with McFarlane, presumably to finalize the program’s framework. The composition of that first group consisted of two Lebanese Muslims and four Christians.<sup>lxxxxi</sup> Consistent with his view about the overall “preemptive attack” counterterror practice framework, Secretary of Defense Weinberger voiced strong opposition to the plan to kill Fadlallah.<sup>lxxxii</sup> In addition, then Lieutenant General Colin Powell, who was a senior aide to Weinberger, also voiced concern about the prospect of an American backed effort to kill Fadlallah.<sup>lxxxiii</sup>

It is critical to reiterate that the extent and scope of what officials in Washington knew about the Fadlallah operation in tactical terms still remains uncertain and it remains unclear how much American direction influenced the actual planning and execution of the assassination attempt. Unequivocally, the official U.S. position has affirmed that Lebanese “rogue elements” took it upon themselves to craft and implement the Fadlallah assassination. Conversely, the Lebanese version of events contrasts sharply with that assessment. Indeed, a Lebanese source involved in the attack asserts that U.S. officials gave tacit support and approval insofar as certain U.S. officials were fully aware of the continuously evolving plan to kill Fadlallah and did nothing to stop it.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> What seems clear is that those “rogue elements” did have connections to “G-2” otherwise known as the Lebanese intelligence service,

which itself was inextricably bound up with the U.S. intelligence community.<sup>lxxxv</sup>

The logistics framework of the Fadlallah event trace an arc back to both the CIA and the Department of the Army within the U.S. Department of Defense. Ambassador Oakley reports that quality assessments of those counterterror units were made by the U.S. government on two occasions, once by U.S. Special Forces advisors, and once by the CIA. In both instances, “discipline” standards of operation were found to be unacceptable thereby in effect precluding direct U.S. provision of money and armaments to those units. Oakley recalls the generally recognizable feeling that, “we can’t count upon...G2 and who they recruit to have the sort of discipline which we think is essential to conduct a really targeted operation.”<sup>lxxxvi</sup> In the wake of the failed assassination, Casey hastily dismantled the entire counterterror program framework.<sup>lxxxvii</sup> What that entailed was to, “... simply shut off all contacts with the Lebanese G-2 at this point.”<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Evidently, the third team of Lebanese intelligence officers chosen for the “preemptive” counterterror practice program never received U.S. training as their schedule was interrupted by Casey’s complete shutdown of the project.<sup>lxxxix</sup>

After the botched attack against Fadlallah, reaction was swift and fierce, both within local and international spheres. In Lebanon, Fadlallah claimed in a July interview that a series of arrests of conspirators associated with or part of that “local operative” group were made by Hezbollah.<sup>xc</sup> It was clear that Ayatollah Fadlallah, whose work and position pitted the interests of Shiites and Iran against those of the West, was now a target of counterterror actions and the common wisdom in the Middle East was that Israel was to blame. In the international sphere, Israel was afflicted with profound and lasting political damage, and in short order it experienced both terrorist attacks against civilian targets, and Arab insurgent attacks against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in Lebanon. Indeed, to make Saudi involvement in the attack appear more opaque, Prince Bandar bin Sultan himself was at the source of leaked rumors that Israeli operatives carried out the Bir al- ‘Abd bombing.<sup>xcii</sup> The terrorist assaults against Israel that followed the Bir al- ‘Abd attack occurred over several months and had “contextual” if not “direct” interconnections to that event. Notwithstanding that, terrorist assaults against U.S. citizens and interests also happened in the wake of the Bir al- ‘Abd attack. In turn, those terrorist actions are detailed further below.

### Analysis

The plan to assassinate Ayatollah Fadlallah was tainted with a disconnect between policy recommendations and analysis, in this case the policy decision to set up a counterterror attack hit team and the absence of dispassionate analysis about Lebanese politics and the consequences of political assassination. Indeed, the Fadlallah affair, as a U.S. response to terrorism, essentially mirrored the reactive approach that characterized broader US policy in Lebanon as previously detailed. Several explanatory factors at different levels of analysis, contributed to this inadequate connection between policy recommendations and analysis with regard to both the U.S. “preemptive” counterterror attack program in the broader sense, and the Fadlallah assassination attempt in particular.

### Organizational Politics

For the Fadlallah event, little is known about how intelligence information flows on Lebanese operatives and their activities were channeled into and across different U.S. government bureaucracies. What is known is that both the Department of Defense, by means of U.S. Special Forces advisors, and the CIA evaluated Lebanese operatives’ standards of operation, including their capacity to display the “discipline” needed to act only when ordered to do so by the Lebanese government and by extrapolation, the Americans.<sup>xciii</sup> Clearly, American counterterror officials experienced fundamental problems in efforts to monitor and provide oversight to the “local operatives” involved in the March 8, 1985 assassination attempt. Yet somewhat paradoxically, CIA and U.S. Special Forces advisors did not seem able to convey urgency to U.S. political leaders that those “local operatives” could or would act on their own. In ways that echo the organizational politics dynamics that were associated with reporting “bad news” from the ground up in Vietnam to the Johnson White House, it seems plausible that upward and cross bureaucracy information flows were makeshift and incomplete in terms of depicting how fraught with peril the existing situation was with those “local operatives” in charge of the counterterror program. Although no authoritative interpretation of events is available, it appears likely that communication stalled because of the pockets of fierce resistance to the operation found within and between bureaucracies and the fear of reporting “bad news.” Put another way, it seems plausible that a more accurate report of the dismal state of “local operative” affairs would have generated and sustained a hornet’s nest of trouble given the predominant degree of support for the program in the White House and that reality served as a powerful disincentive for comprehensive articulation of the problem.

## Bureaucratic Politics

What seems significant is that sharp differences of opinion about the preemptive counterterror practice program in general and perhaps the Fadlallah operation in particular, led to an absence of consensus about overall counterterror policy direction which was worsened by the structural dynamics of bureaucratic politics. These dynamics seem to fall readily within the sphere of what PNSR calls “interagency decision mechanisms.” At a structural level, Graham Allison’s conceptualization of the “pulling and hauling” of bureaucratic politics is plainly evident in scripted accounts of American government agencies that worked to evaluate both the Lebanese political fray in the early 1980’s and to appraise the best means to promote U.S. geopolitical considerations amidst the turmoil.<sup>xciii</sup> The fierce in-fighting between groups of upper crust U.S. foreign policy decision-makers, as colorfully reported by Oakley, reflected aspects of “bureaucratic politics” as U.S. government actors sought to advance their individual perspectives in policy.<sup>xciv</sup> While only conjecture, it seems plausible that this “where you sit depends on where you stand” phenomenon otherwise known as “Miles’ Law” and articulated by Allison, may have translated into strong support by the CIA for the program in response to the death of Robert Clayton Ames, William Buckley and others, and strong support by Secretary of State George Shultz because of the wholesale destruction of two U.S. embassies in Beirut. At the same time, the strong disapproval of this program by key U.S. Department of Defense officials such as Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger may have reflected the acute vulnerability conventional forces, even in the role of “peacekeepers” would have faced, especially in light of the Hezbollah attacks against the U.S. Marine barracks and French military compound.<sup>xcv</sup>

Having said that, broader information about the workings of those bureaucratic institutions in 1983 is also useful for this analysis precisely because the dynamics in place in 1985 were similar if not virtually identical to those elicited by the interactions of those institutions two years earlier.<sup>xcvi</sup> What also seems significant here is how ideological fervor exacerbated the effects of bureaucratic politics and made consensus nearly impossible.<sup>xcvii</sup> If there is a lesson to be drawn from the experience of the Fadlallah affair in this regard, it is that in addition to the routine set of strains and tensions between bureaucracies associated with the decision-making process, emotionally laden issues such as terrorism in the Middle East increase the pressure on individuals. In these situations that pull at the heartstrings of emotion, if pragmatists are not able to scope out dispassionate standpoints in effective and sustained ways, and introduce greater flexibility into the system, conflict can become nearly insurmountable. At the functional level, it is clear the bureaucratic ties between the White House, the Department of Defense and the Department of State, as embodied in Cabinet secretaries and their staff, were frayed in regard to areas of fundamental disagreement in certain areas of Middle East policy such as the overall prospect and utility of an American firewall in Lebanon, and certainly with respect to the prospect of U.S. political assassination as a counterterror measure.

By the same token, there were also a relatively poor set of working relationships between the Executive Branch’s National Security Council (NSC) and the coterie of CIA analysts at work on Middle East affairs that seemed in large part to reflect fierce competition between those two agencies. For example, a rigid set of guideposts that were instituted by the NSC were in place that essentially compelled the CIA never to delve into the policy recommendation side of analysis, but only to work to articulate and illuminate the data trends necessary for policymakers. Plainly, these Executive Office standard operating procedures (SOP’s) helped eliminate flexibility into the system and in the process helped to introduce system inefficiencies. As Kennedy and Brunetta relate, “policymakers, especially those in the White House who were the CIA analysts’ premier clients, tended to value above all else their right to make policy decisions without intelligence backchat. The Intelligence Community, in their view, was their servant, not their overseer.”<sup>xcviii</sup> Put another way, it appears likely that CIA appraisals about the need to back an attempt to kill Fadlallah, or by contrast CIA analysis regarding the necessity of supporting an alternate attempt to kill another Hezbollah chieftain, would have encountered fierce resistance from other U.S. political stakeholders in the decision making process, who viewed CIA involvement as a violation of bureaucratic protocol.

Patterns of bureaucratic culture also played out in the larger world of action beyond the comity of bureaucratic protocol. For example, CIA analysts in the early 1980’s experienced more difficulty acquiring meaningful access to White House policymakers than did their Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) counterparts, namely the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Bureau of Intelligence Research (INR) respectively. Staff at DIA and INR seemed to be able to elicit significantly more freewheeling and “informal” relationships with policymakers than did CIA analysts, with more fruitful results for DIA and CIA staff that

ensued.<sup>xcix</sup> While the reasons for that remain shrouded in uncertainty, one possible explanation over and beyond the role and effects of standard operating procedures (SOP's) revolves around what Charles Kegley calls the "human" elements of non-rational decision-making. In this case, what was generally recognizable as the frayed relations between the CIA and the White House policymaking elite might have presupposed and derived from "ripple effects" associated with the reaction by other policy makers to close personal ties between Reagan and Casey, a reaction amplified even more by Casey's forceful actions in both Lebanon and Nicaragua.<sup>c</sup>

In addition, the fact that Habib had special access to Secretary of State Shultz and to President Reagan distilled down to a fundamental break of protocol and SOP. This break was fraught with peril insofar as one person, namely Philip Habib, had inordinate influence over U.S. Lebanon policy. Indeed, Habib's enormous capacity to bypass other decision-making apparatus and thereby in effect influence the overall process stemmed from his effective and sustained access to Secretary of State Shultz and President Reagan.<sup>ci</sup> Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Bing West relates, "it was not an interagency process. It was basically Habib reporting back to the White House and to Shultz and the interagency process trotting along behind."<sup>cii</sup> To be sure, Habib's influence may well have resulted partially from what Jerold Rosati describes as President Reagan's preference for a "White House centered system." According to Rosati, this system "...was much more of a cabinet-style government which, nonetheless, remained White House centered because of the dominant role played by Reagan's White House staff."<sup>ciii</sup> Habib, who was a Reagan appointee with his own policy preferences, had the type of inordinate influence that elicited profound and lasting frustrations from other U.S. officials who were at least equally "in the know" regarding Lebanon.

It seems clear that Habib's underlying notion of American hegemony in Lebanon may have constituted the basis for what Irving Janis calls "group-think" dynamics where a small group of upper crust policymakers are collectively driven to pursue a foreign policy agenda while underestimating the enemy, overestimating their own capacities, and disallowing any dissenting opinion.<sup>civ</sup> Furthermore, the Reagan administration's very narrow information flows provided to the highest levels of government essentially by one person most probably worked to distort further the picture of the range of viable options available and thereby in effect enhanced "group-think" dynamics.

If structural impediments to effective and sustained cooperation between the NSC and the intelligence community and the predominance of influential figures in policy making prevented flexibility and cooperation in the political system, those problems were compounded by inefficiencies associated with the U.S. National Intelligence Officer (NIO) position, and at times the political circumstances of the NIO official in charge. In the broadest sense, the NIO position, established during the Ford administration, was designed to serve as an effective interlocutor between the Executive Branch and the Intelligence Community. At a functional level, an NIO would chronicle regional area findings to the DCI himself.<sup>cv</sup> For the time period under consideration here, Robert Clayton Ames worked as Middle East NIO until his death in the U.S. embassy truck bomb detonation in 1983, while Graham E. Fuller assumed that position in the wake of that bombing. In the case of Lebanon, when those NIO's, each with extensive Middle East expertise were at the helm, both worked to facilitate effective and sustained relationships between the intelligence community and policy making bureaucracies.<sup>cvi</sup>

However, though in theory the NIO was crafted to facilitate good working relationships between the Executive Branch and the Intelligence Community, the increase in strains and tensions between the intelligence and White House bureaucracies contrasted sharply with the operational environment envisioned when the NIO position was constructed. By the time of Reagan, these interagency strains and tensions had made the NIO's task a ticklish one and one increasingly difficult. Kennedy and Brunetta suggest that the NIO's work involved "inherent contradictions" with inefficiencies as the ineluctable conclusion. Those "inherent contradictions" essentially put an NIO on the horns of a dilemma: on the one hand the NIO had to keep analysts from knowing too much about the policy process as NSC rules about the relationship between policymakers and intelligence analysts required, while at the same time the NIO had to make certain that policymakers did not know too much about highly "sensitive" national security information. It follows that a delicate system allowed the NIO the opportunity to influence public policy outcomes. It remains unknown whether or not such potential political influence on the part of the NIO affected the interagency dynamics that themselves influenced the U.S. government decision to at least tacitly support an attempt to kill Fadlallah. However, the inability of the NIO to soften mistrust and other similar sentiments within and between bureaucracies certainly contributed to an absence of consensus about the Fadlallah affair and that almost certainly contributed to the vacillation and hesitancy the U.S. government displayed in pursuit of the plan. In

turn, it was that indecisiveness itself that spurred on those “local operatives” to act on their own and try to kill Fadlallah at his home.

Impediments to a comprehensive CIA appraisal of underlying American objectives in Lebanon, coupled with the deaths of Robert Clayton Ames and his associates in 1983, may also have had profound and lasting influence on analyses of Hezbollah’s internal dynamics. The lack of an exclusive CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Lebanon in the early 1980’s was a glaring omission that likely forced analysis of political conditions in Lebanon into “catch up” mode. Moreover, when a cross intelligence agency SNIE was eventually issued in October 1983, it had almost singular focus on state actor involvement in Lebanon, not the role of sub-national actors, such as terrorist groups. For example, the SNIE showcased appraisals of President Hafaz el Assad’s enormous capacity to endure in Lebanon and the very low probability that he would be compelled to alter his predominant role in Lebanese politics.<sup>cvi</sup>

Corresponding to the SNIE’s special focus on state actor involvement that was wide of the mark, U.S. planners emphasized the use of conventional weapons to confront unconventional warfare. While the use of conventional weapons is appropriate against standing armies of nation-states, they are largely ineffective in “small war” environments where the use of terrorist assaults are the hallmark of what Brian Crozier describes as “weapons of the weak.”<sup>cvi</sup> For example, the decision by the Reagan administration to shell the Shuf mountains with increasingly heavier rounds, culminating in the use of the *USS New Jersey’s* sixteen inch guns, only increased antipathy against the Americans because the shells had the effect of destroying civilian property while simultaneously leaving the terrorists themselves largely unscathed. This is not a new problem insofar as the United States has had a tortured historical legacy when it comes to confronting unconventional warfare. Still, organizational learning on this point has been slow and there is no available evidence to suggest that a systematic effort was made by the Reagan administration to “win hearts and minds” in Lebanon, namely with the use of positive incentives to affect the perceptions of the United States among terrorist organization constituency groups.<sup>cix</sup>

Hence, almost singular attention to nation-state level dynamics within U.S. institutions may have contributed to a decision by policy makers to downplay policy recommendations that reflected the intricacies of non-state actor dynamics especially in the case of the fledgling Hezbollah movement. In turn, that orientation may have provided a foundation for subsequent plans to take Fadlallah’s life as a palliative remedy to terrorism. In the process, the Reagan administration clearly de-emphasized crucial intricacies and nuances within the currents of the Hezbollah movement. To be more specific, what was not well understood at the time were the family and clan political agendas that operated within the context of broader Hezbollah demands and aspirations, which were themselves shaped to a large degree by the Iranian clergy and other ruling elite.

#### What Was Missed - The Role of Family and Clan within Hezbollah

What seems especially significant about the nearly simultaneous terrorist assaults against the United States Marine Corps and French peacekeeper force compounds in Beirut, and that third critical terrorist assault against the U.S. embassy in Kuwait, was the role of the “master terrorist” behind those terrorist assaults, Imad Mughniyah.<sup>cx</sup> Robert Baer, Mike Davis, and Robin Wright all report that Imad Mughniyah spearheaded those operations with the underlying aim of advancing certain Iranian geopolitical interests. Indeed, effective and sustained assistance to the Iranians was a hallmark of the Mughniyah legacy.<sup>cx</sup> To underscore that point, writers such as Baer tie Mughniyah directly to the abductions of William Buckley, Father Lawrence Jenco, CNN “bureau chief” writer Jeffrey Levin, and Reverend Benjamin Weir.<sup>cxii</sup>

Magnus Ranstorp, an expert on Hezbollah, reports that family and clan interests overlaid against the national and sub-national interests of political stakeholders in Lebanon converged with the geopolitical interests of nation-states such as Syria and Iran, to determine political outcomes, inclusive of terrorist assaults. In his discussion about the Hamadi and Mughniyah families, Ranstorp makes the ineluctable conclusion that, “the fact that these two clans have been continuously pinpointed by the authorities...underlies...the importance of the Lebanese clan system as a basis for Hizb’allah’s organizational structure and activity....”<sup>cxiii</sup> The prominent role that Hussayn al-Musawi of Islamic Amal played in the US embassy bombing of 1983, and the predominant role that Imad Mughniyah played in the terrorist assaults on the MNF compound illustrated clearly how family interconnections worked to influence terrorist assaults.

What were those family interconnections and what was the political agenda? At the heart of the matter was that after the December 1983 attacks in Kuwait against the United States embassy, the Kuwaiti airport, two production facilities, and the French embassy, the Kuwaiti government arrested seventeen al-Dawa activists who were working to promote Iranian interests.<sup>cxiv</sup> According to various accounts, three of those al-Dawa activists were Lebanese and had clear family links to key terrorist group participants. One detainee was Mustafa Badr al-Din, otherwise identified as Elias Foud Saab, who was the cousin and the brother in law of Hezbollah chieftain Imad Mughniyah. In addition, one or two family members of Islamic Amal-Hezbollah chieftain Shaykh Hussayn al-Musawi were also part of that al-Dawa group.<sup>cxv</sup>

To be sure, the detonation of explosives at the U.S. embassy in Kuwait and elsewhere in that country should have put those family dynamics into sharp relief as those acts were plainly undertaken within the context of the continued imprisonment of al-Dawa activists.<sup>cxvi</sup> Indeed, Judith S. Yaphe reports that “Hezbollah and al-Dawa were close and remain so.”<sup>cxvii</sup> Equally important, these later terrorist assaults in Kuwait also showcased the importance of clan and family agendas within the traditional domain of Hezbollah and beyond in other geographical locales.<sup>cxviii</sup> The United States Department of State essentially corroborated the central importance of family in the determination of the Hezbollah political agenda when in 1985 it implicated “the al-Musawi family” for its role in the continued confinement of U.S. hostages, who were taken captive in Lebanon in the early to mid 1980’s.<sup>cxix</sup>

If Ranstorp’s premise that family and clan take on crucial roles in society, and by extrapolation in terrorist events is correct, then the story of Imad Mughniyah is worth telling if only briefly because it illuminates the permeable boundaries of Lebanon’s terrorist groups at the time showcases how certain persons in positions of authority might have influenced terrorist assaults by means of their own experiential knowledge. Mughniyah, a Shia Muslim, was raised in ‘Ayn-Al-Dilbah, a southern suburb of Beirut that was afflicted with acute economic blight, which is a condition that Albert J. Reiss and Jeffrey A. Roth might describe as a structural systematic problem at the “macro-social” or “societal” level of analysis.<sup>cxx</sup> As a young adult, Mughniyah had powerful ties to al-Fatah and in due course he served in Yasser Arafat’s elite Force 17.<sup>cxxi</sup> Baer affirms the underlying importance of family and clan ties when he concludes that within the Hezbollah organization, “everyone was either related by blood, had fought together in Fatah or hailed from the ‘Ayn-Al-Dilbah neighborhood.”<sup>cxxii</sup>

Baer makes the tantalizing point that even though al-Fatah and the PLO were essentially nationalist-irredentist terrorist organizations, Yasser Arafat had powerful links to al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, otherwise known as the Muslim Brotherhood, that began when he was an engineering student in Cairo, Egypt. It follows that Yasser Arafat’s pragmatic world view, replete with contact points between secular and Islamic revivalist extremist groups, closely parallel what Nassar and others have suggested was the more “amorphous” and less doctrinaire political ideology of the PLO, and in the narrower sense, al-Fatah.<sup>cxxiii</sup> Plainly, the interface between the world of secular nationalist struggle and the Islamic revivalism of the Muslim Brotherhood was a good fit for Mughniyah from a personal standpoint, and from a professional standpoint as well, as it gave him access to Hezbollah and perhaps equally important, gave him ties to the al-Dawa or “the Awakening” party in Kuwait that also had strong political clout in geographical locales such as Iraq.<sup>cxxiv</sup>

It also seems reasonable to suggest that Imad Mughniyah’s capacity to work in the pursuit of the interests of nation-states such as Iran, and sub-national actors such as the PLO, Hezbollah and other similar organizations such as the al-Dawa party in Kuwait, initially helped make it more difficult for counterterrorism analysts to isolate and identify him as the major actor he was, especially when counterterror officials at the time were more accustomed to what Ian Lesser calls the “old terrorism” of the Cold War. For Lesser, “old terrorism” was characterized by terrorist groups with readily discernible hierarchical structural shapes and relatively clear interconnections to the nation-states that supported them.<sup>cxxv</sup> The failure on the part of U.S. counterterror officials to observe the inter-group dynamics of terrorist organizations in Lebanon and the greater Middle East, which plainly transcended the common wisdom that cooperation between so called “secular” and Islamic revivalist extremist groups was not possible, made counterterror analysis one-dimensional and extremely static insofar as the dynamic nature of change and alliances could never be fully comprehended. The most compelling set of questions, which follow from all of the foregoing, is why this complex set of relationships was not known. For Oakley, it was not a matter of the acumen of the analysts involved, and for him, a large part of the explanation probably revolves around the 1983 deaths of U.S. NIO Robert Clayton Ames and several other top US intelligence analysts.<sup>cxxvi</sup>

## Appraisal

The underlying aim of this section is to isolate and identify the effects of the attempt to kill Fadlallah on U.S. foreign policy. To this end, the analysis is broken down into a description of effects that fall into both “short-run,” and “middle-run” time intervals. For the United States and Israel, there were a host of “short-run” political and military consequences, while in the case of France, there were no clearly discernible effects linked to that assassination attempt. Even though French facilities were targeted by terrorists in Kuwait after the attempt to kill Fadlallah was made, those terrorist assaults, as well as those that preceded the Fadlallah affair, primarily stemmed from Islamic antipathy towards French support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, and the historical legacy of the French in the Middle East. Having said that, certain terrorist assault kidnappings in Lebanon against French citizens that followed in the wake of the Bir al-’Abd car bomb detonation probably had some “contextual” ties to the assassination attempt.

In the case of the United States, the extensive political damage that resulted from its violations of the “laws of war” helped to reduce further American credibility in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, as public backlash grew apace. As previously mentioned, the assassination attempt diminished the moral high ground the United States had acquired in the wake of the U.S. embassy bombings in Beirut, the slew of kidnappings that in some cases evolved into murder, and the truck bomb detonation of the U.S. Marine Corps headquarters in Beirut.

In addition, the “short-term” effects of the attempt to kill Fadlallah reverberated powerfully throughout the larger system of Middle East politics. Even though there is no evidence available to suggest that the attempt made by Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) activists to kill the Emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabar al-Ahmad Al Sabah, was linked to the attempt to kill Fadlallah, the attempt to kill the Emir to free the al-Dawa 17 was made only a little over two months later on May 25, 1985.<sup>cxvii</sup> While only conjecture, one interpretation of events is that had the attack succeeded in killing the Emir, the IJO could have claimed that counterterror efforts to target Fadlallah not only elicited the operation to kill the Kuwaiti Emir, but also had created enormous pressures among the Hezbollah rank and file to generate even more devastating actions if the al-Dawa 17 were not freed by Kuwaiti authorities. Of course, terrorist assaults to compel the release of the al-Dawa detainees were now commonplace, but the targeting of someone with the Emir’s status, and the proximity of the time frame here at least give reason to pause and consider its relations to the Bir al-’Abd bombing. While whether or not Kuwaiti interests suffered as a direct result of the bombing is up for debate, the capacity of alliances to serve as flash points and even catalysts for terrorist assaults was illuminated with the increased susceptibility of Kuwaiti interests overall to terrorist attacks in the 1980’s. To be more specific, key alliances between Kuwait and Iraq, and between France and Iraq within the context of the Iran-Iraq war, helped to stoke the burners of Islamic revivalist extremist terrorist assault campaigns. Indeed, in the broader sense, those terrorist assaults focused on French and Kuwaiti interests, but they would also prioritize American targets as well. As described above, the kidnappings of Gordan Nash and Brian Levick, both mistaken for Americans, and the kidnapping of U.S. journalist Terry Anderson, all had more direct connections to the attempt to kill Fadlallah, while other terrorist assaults such as the hijacking of TWA flight 847 almost assuredly had “contextual” or indirect interconnections.

Another set of “short-run” effects involved underlying damage to the American political elite. These effects can be broken down to appraise the costs suffered by upper echelon decision-makers in bureaucracies charged with national security affairs and the political costs that accrued to the upper crust of the foreign policy decision-making establishment in the Executive Branch. What seems significant here is the major losses for the elite level stemming from an absence of consensus, not only over the wisdom of backing efforts to kill Fadlallah, but over broader goals to pursue in Lebanon. Indeed, the scope and depth of policy conflict between analysts and policy makers created conditions for failure both within the realm of tactics, plainly inclusive of the Fadlallah assassination attempt, and within the sphere of broader geopolitical interest articulation. In other words, it seems clear that the failure to articulate clear cut goals in Lebanon and the failure to cope with the fledgling Hezbollah movement were inextricably tied together. What one can therefore infer is that political failure accrued for those bureaucratic elites who supported or otherwise endorsed the counterterror operation. To be sure, the absence of consensus found in the upper crust of foreign policy advisors in the Executive Branch contributed to overall confusion about Middle East policy and questions of counterterror practice competency.

A third set of “short-run” consequences revolved around security conditions for Americans in Lebanon, the Middle East and elsewhere. Even though Americans in the Middle East were vulnerable prior to 1985, security conditions deteriorated after the bombing. The attack against Fadlallah amplified feelings among Middle Easterners

that Americans were not only taking sides in an ostensibly peacekeeping role, but that American national interests in Lebanon were pursued at the expense of Shia political stakeholders with time honored and legitimate demands, aspirations, and grievances. Consequently, a spate of terrorist assaults with “contextual” links to American interests ensued. Undoubtedly the most prominent of those terrorist assaults was the hijacking of TWA flight 847, which was spearheaded by Imad Mughniyah and Mohammed Ali Hamdi in an effort to compel the release of the seventeen al Dawa prisoners held by Kuwaiti authorities. In fact, that assault on TWA flight 847 occurred only a little over three months after the bombing in Bir al-‘Abd.

A fourth consequence of U.S. support for the attack against Fadlallah was that the physical security of other nationals was profoundly undermined in Lebanon and Israel. In Lebanon for example, the attempt to kill Fadlallah had deleterious consequences for those who were considered opposed to Hezbollah, and even perhaps for those who did not demonstrate sufficient sympathy and other similar sentiments for the Islamic revivalist extremist cause. It would probably be fair to say that the Reagan administration, in its role as provocateur, caused enormous security problems for many ordinary Lebanese who were supporters, tacit or otherwise, of the Christian Maronite government, including those who were Jewish, and those who were otherwise opposed to Islamic revivalist extremist concerns.

Indeed, endorsement of the penultimate “hard-line” counterterror practice, namely political assassination, especially against an extremely high profile figure such as Fadlallah, could not have been more counterproductive and costly in that regard. As previously mentioned, “non-elites” in Israel were directly affected by this botched assassination attempt, as at least three terrorist assaults with interconnections to the Bir al-‘Abd car bomb blast happened in short order in the wake of the blast.<sup>cxxxviii</sup> The acute backlash from the bombing was made worse still because Fadallah himself was a poor choice of target since, by contrast to Imad Mughniyah for example, Fadlallah was not involved in the day to day tactical operations of Hezbollah. Although there is no authoritative explanation as to why Imad Mughniyah was not targeted for death at the time, U.S. officials’ poor understanding of the role of family and clan dynamics within Hezbollah probably played a pivotal role in this fundamental misjudgment. At the same time, while only conjecture, it may be the case that Imad Mughniyah’s ties to Yasser Arafat and the PLO might have also militated against an attempt on his life precisely because his death or injury might have caused acute problems in the Reagan administration’s peace process efforts with the Israelis and the Palestinians.

Finally, in the case of “middle-run” effects, Hezbollah’s gains, both in terms of recruitment and generally recognizable sympathy and other similar sentiments elicited, constituted a net loss for American geopolitical considerations. Further, a resulting increase in the strength of already powerful ties between Hezbollah terrorist chieftains and “hard-line” Iranian clergy in the Iranian government essentially constituted a profound, if not lasting “middle-run” failure for the Reagan administration.<sup>cxxxix</sup> To sum up, the political costs of this “preemption” counterterror program, as well as its financial costs in terms of the three to five million U.S. dollars spent on the operation, and with respect to the imputed costs associated with hardening potential targets in the wake of the Fadlallah debacle was enormous.<sup>cxxx</sup> Most important of all, the loss of life and the human suffering that can be linked directly or otherwise to this botched endeavor remain profound and lasting.

### Final Reflections

In the course of this analysis of the Fadlallah affair, several lessons that presuppose and derive from different facets of this failed foreign policy initiative have been illuminated. First, U.S. policy in Lebanon in the broader sense and the Fadlallah attempt were interconnected. The reactive nature of efforts to kill Fadlallah in the absence of more proactive and nuanced counterterror efforts, closely paralleled the broader ad hoc and reactive nature of the Reagan administration’s policy in Lebanon. In other words, perspectives about larger macro-political decisions with respect to Lebanon and the Fadlallah affair seemed to be inextricably tied together.

Second, there appeared to be a disconnect between thoughtful and proactive analysis and policy implementation that was reflected in several dimensions of that assassination attempt. Those areas, which were in many cases linked to one another include: 1) a seeming inability or unwillingness to consider the family and clan dynamics interwoven into the operational structure of the Hezbollah movement which worked against efforts to tackle the complexities of terrorism; 2) the glaring omission of more “soft-line” counterterror alternatives to be used in conjunction with “hard-line” options and reliance on conventional weapons to fight what amounted to a political battle to “win hearts and minds”; and 3) an insufficient appreciation of how policy initiatives, themselves poorly

thought out, could affect overall strategic objectives in Lebanon and the Middle East. Seen from the angle of counter-terrorism, what seems most critical to reiterate here is the role of family and clan interconnections and political agendas with profound and lasting influence for terrorist assaults perpetrated by the Hezbollah movement.

Third, the analysis reveals the influence of a host of bureaucratic politics, organizational issues, and inter-group dynamics at work. Those inter-group dynamics found among a small group of upper crust foreign policy decision-makers appears to have effaced the process and outcome of efforts to promote political assassination as an instrument of counterterror policy. At both the level of the “preemptive” attack program and at the level of the Fadlallah attempt in particular, it seems clear that the prospect of consensus, remote as it was, was made all the more remote by fierce competition between and within bureaucracies over this penultimate “hard-line” counterterror strategy. The interactions between these bureaucracies was further inhibited by structural weaknesses in the NIO framework which had “inherent contradictions” that undermined policymakers and analysts seeking more complete information flows about pivotal events.<sup>cxxxix</sup> In turn, certain bureaucratic protocols, especially those put into place by the NSC regarding the legitimate domain of CIA and other analysts and the ad hoc role of Special Envoy Philip Habib, probably worked to inhibit more complete and diverse intelligence analysis.

Furthermore, broader structural factors reflective of the continuously evolving relationship between the Executive Branch and Congress were at work that exacerbated strains and tensions between those policymakers in favor of the “preemptive attack” program and those policymakers in opposition. As previously mentioned, the role of a resurgent U.S. Congress, itself characterized by an almost singular focus to wrest foreign policy decision making away from the Executive Branch and acutely concerned about CIA activities both at home and abroad, put enormous pressure on policymakers to abide by the legal constraints against “assassination” and the constraints against support to persons undertaking such actions. Compounding the problem even more, “gray areas” associated with the delicate balance between “...the inherent right of individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs...” enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter and these prohibitions, and the lacunae those tensions necessarily created, caused enormous strains and tensions that pulled in different directions during the course of policy formation.<sup>cxxxix</sup> Finally, the horrors associated with the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks, the destruction of two U.S. embassies in Beirut that resulted in the deaths of US NIO Robert Clayton Ames and many others, the abduction and murder of CIA station chief William Buckley and the slew of kidnappings and murder of other U.S. citizens in Lebanon, all pulled at the heartstrings of emotion and worked to ratchet up the pressure to respond to Hezbollah terrorism while simultaneously taking Executive Order 12333 provisions into account.

Equally important, the human element associated with the ideological fervor of members of the NSC for example, served to exacerbate bureaucratic politics effects indirectly, worsening political fissures within and between institutions. The ideological fervor exhibited by persons such as Lt. Col. Oliver North, with his underlying belief that U.S. physical security and national interest trumped many fundamental legal obligations under international law, could only have exacerbated clarion calls for “preemptive” action even more. By contrast, such zeal also elicited parallel calls for restraint by officials with more carefully reasoned appraisals such as Ambassador Robert E. Oakley and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Richard L. Armitage.<sup>cxxxix</sup> In that regard, Ambassador Oakley reports that “Armitage and I worked very closely together, bilaterally at the NSC operations planning group (OPG), chaired by North on several occasions.”<sup>cxxxix</sup>

It may also be the case that the almost singular focus on Fadlallah reflected “group-think” processes that revolved around the need to isolate and identify an increasingly visible symbol of Islamic revivalist extremist terrorist assaults in Lebanon. In addition to short-run political gain motivations, part of the focus on Fadlallah on the Lebanese side or the American side or both, might have reflected a comfort level with the time honored and long standing notion of hierarchal terrorist group organization. In essence, the prevailing but erroneous assumption might have been that Hezbollah was a more hierarchal organization with one man, namely Fadlallah issuing orders to commit terrorist assaults from the top. An intrinsic part of that problem was the inability of U.S. counterterror analysts to shift their way of thinking about what Lesser calls “old” notions of terrorism, namely a condition replete with a host of interconnections to nation-states primarily found in both the Warsaw Pact countries of eastern Europe and to North Korea, and the emergent reality of more independent terrorist groups with looser or more circuitous ties to nation-states. Indeed, a fundamental problem with the analysis of the Reagan administration at the time distilled down to an almost singular focus on analysis of nation-state policies and nation-state interactions at the expense of sufficient attention paid to the increasingly important role of non-state actors, inclusive of terrorist groups. In the broader sense, that shortcoming reflected a fundamental misread of the “change” in the international political system

since 1945, namely the increasing importance and growth space of non-state actors.<sup>cxxxv</sup>

The entire process was wide of the mark, as it essentially resulted not only in the choice of the wrong target, but a choice of target certain to elicit enormous political and paramilitary backlash. What is even worse is that Imad Mughniyah and those like him were killers without remorse or hesitancy, and efforts to target such tacticians would almost certainly have resulted in some preservation of human life and reduction in human suffering. Hopefully, work to isolate and identify the explanatory effects of the Fadlallah affair will assist those who work to craft counterterrorism policy in our contemporary world where terrorism and counterterrorism practices have moved to the forefront of the foreign policy discourse.

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<sup>ii</sup> Louis Rene Beres. 1990. "Confronting Nuclear Terrorism." *The Hastings International and Comparative Law Review*. 14(1),130; Louis Rene Beres. 1988. "Terrorism and International Law." *Florida International Law Journal*. Vol. 3 No. 3 (summer), 293; Christopher C. Joyner. 1988. "In Search for an Anti-Terrorism Policy: Lessons from the Reagan Era." *Terrorism*. 11 (1): 29-42; Gregory F. Intoccia. 1985. "International Legal and Policy Implications of an American Counter-Terrorist Strategy." *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 14 (1): 121-146; Grant Wardlaw. 1988. "State Response to International Terrorism: Some Cautionary Comments." In *Current Perspectives on International Terrorism*, (Eds.) Robert O. Slater and Michael Stohl, Basingstoke, England: MacMillan, 235; United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations, 24 October. T.S. no. 993, 59 Stat 1031; Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, and Anthony D'Amato. (Des.) 1990. *Basic Documents in International Law and World Order*. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 16-31.

<sup>iii</sup> Frederic S. Pearson and Martin J. Rochester. 1998. *International Relations: The Global Condition in the Twenty First Century- Fourth Edition*, New York: The McGraw Hill Companies, Inc; Charles Lindblom. 1980. *The Policy Making Process 2nd Edition*. Englewood Cliffs: NJ: Prentice Hall.

<sup>iv</sup> Graham T. Allison. 1971. *Essence of Decisionmaking: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 176, 83, 162-181; Robert J. Art. 1973. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." *Policy Sciences*. (4) 467-487.

<sup>v</sup> Magnus Ranstorp. 1997. *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis*. London: MacMillan, 198, 188-189, 130, 138, 159, 198, 185, 92; Elizabeth Picard. 2002. *Lebanon: A Shattered Country: myths and realities of the War in Lebanon- Revised Edition*. Holmes & Meir; William W. Harris. 1997. *Faces of Lebanon: Sects, Wars and Global Extensions*. Princeton, NJ.: Markus Weiner, 307.

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<sup>vi</sup> Bob Woodward 1987. *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 396; Ambassador Robert Oakley, Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, interview June 25, 2008.

<sup>vii</sup> Woodward 1987, 396.

<sup>viii</sup> Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen. 1989. *Final Warning: Averting Disaster in the New Age of Terrorism*. New York: Doubleday, 121-122; Paul R. Pillar. 2001. *Terrorism and US Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 28; Martha Crenshaw. 2004. "Terrorism, Strategies and Grand Strategies." In *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: understanding the new security environment, readings and interpretations third edition*. (Eds.) Russell D. Howard, Reid L. Sawyer, and Natasha E. Bajema. New York, McGraw Hill Publishers, 444-459; Boaz Ganor 2005. *The Counter-terrorism Puzzle*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 41. Roger N. McDermott. 2004 (February) *Countering Global Terrorism: Developing The Anti-Terrorist Capabilities on Central Asian Militaries*. Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Institute, v, 7-8; Ian O. Lesser. 1999. "Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy." In *Countering The New Terrorism*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation ,126; J. Paul de Taillon. 2002. *Hijacking and Hostages: Government Response to Terrorism*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 78.

<sup>ix</sup> Oakley interview, June 25, 2008.

<sup>x</sup> Ibid.

<sup>xi</sup> James Larry Taulbee. 1985. "Retaliation, Deterrence, Terrorism and the Reagan Administration." *Defense Analysis*. Vol. 4, 281-283; James Larry Taulbee Department of Political Science, Emory University, personal correspondence, March 5, 2008; John Prados 1996. *President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World War II Through The Persian Gulf*. Chicago, IL: Elephant Paperbacks, 381.

<sup>xii</sup> The term "situational" to describe "middle-run" factors is Reiss and Roth's a term. Albert J. Reiss, Jr. and Jeffrey A. Roth (Eds.) 1993. *Understanding and Preventing Violence*. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 291-326; Ranstorp 1997, 94; Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 1985. Islamic Jihad Claims Responsibility for Kidnappings." FBIS V.18 Mar 85; "Lebanon"; City source: *Paris AFP*; Publish Date: March 17, 1985; Document Id: NC171949, page G1; Augustus Richard Norton. 2007. *Hezbollah: A Short History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 74. In addition, Watson, Horrock and Hajjay of *Newsweek* report that Aidan Walsh of the UN and Arnaud Borel, a photographer from France were abducted some time after May 12, 1985 in the erroneous belief those two persons were Americans. Russell Watson, Nicholas M. Horrock and Abdul Hajjay. 1985. "Fighting Terror With Terror."

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*Newsweek*, 27 May, p. 32.

<sup>xiii</sup> David Kennedy and Leslie Brunetta. 1994. "A case study: Lebanon and the intelligence Community." *Studies in Intelligence*. Volume 37, No. 5, 49; Woodward 1987, 393.

<sup>xiv</sup> Bernard Gwertzman. 1983. "Reagan Approves More Cooperation With the Israelis." *New York Times*. 29 November, 1, 2; *US Congressional Record* - House H 763-H765. "Weinberger's Rejection of Strategic Cooperation Contrary to Our National Interest." - Address by U.S. Representative Tom Lantos (D) California, March 2, 1983. For Lantos, Weinberger's point of view revolved around, "...the political turmoil surrounding Israel's armed intervention."; John M. Goshko. 1983. "U.S. and Israelis Expand Strategic and Political Ties." *Washington Post*. 30 November, 1, 2; David Thomas. 1983. "Weinberger missing good bet on Israeli intelligence, military says." *Miami Herald*, 3 March, 13-A; Amos Perlmutter. 1983. "Lebanon: Can It Be Pieced Together Again?" *Strategic Review*. Winter (3 March) pp. 44-49; John M. Goshko. 1983. "U.S. and Israelis Expand Strategic and Political Ties." *Washington Post*, 30 November, 1-2.

<sup>xv</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994; Woodward 1987, 393.

<sup>xvi</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994.

<sup>xvii</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994.

<sup>xviii</sup> Ranstorp 1997, 53; Davis 2007, 80-83; Harris 1997, 176; Norton 2007, 7; Prados 1996, 378.

<sup>xix</sup> Picard 2007, 126, 74-75; Robert Baer. 2002. See *No Evil: The True Story of A Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism*. New York Publishers, 104. Interestingly enough, within the context of the PLO "exodus" from Lebanon, Baer suggests a set of interconnections between al-Fatah and the "Beirut bombing" might exist.

<sup>xx</sup> Larry Diamond. 1990. "Nigeria: Pluralism, Statism and the Struggle for Democracy." In *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*. (Eds.) Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 401-409; Harris 1997, 153.

<sup>xxi</sup> *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "More on Beirut Bombing." FBIS v. 15 May 85; "Lebanon," City source: *Paris AFP*, Publish Date: May 15, 1985; Document Id: NC151157, p. G-1; Woodward and Babcock 1985, A-25; Ottaway 1985, A-31; Prados 1996, 379-380.

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<sup>xxii</sup> Woodward 1987, 393-394; Woodward and Babcock 1985, A-26; Ottaway 1985, 31; Prados 1996, 379-380.

<sup>xxiii</sup> Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, interview, June 25, 2008.

<sup>xxiv</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994, 42, 45; Jerel A. Rosati. 1993. *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*. Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace & Company, 168.

<sup>xxv</sup> Woodward 1987, 393-394.

<sup>xxvi</sup> Baer 2002, 91; Jonathan M. Fredman. 1997. "Covert Action, Loss of Life, and Prohibition on Assassination." *Studies in Intelligence*, 15-25; *Studies in Intelligence* 1998. "Erratum: Covert Actions, Loss of Life, and the Prohibition on Assassination." *Studies in Intelligence*, 119-120; Colonel W. Hays Parks. 1989. "Memorandum on Executive Order 12333 and Assassination - Memorandum of Law" DAJA-1A (27-1A), Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army (2 November) ([http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/ig/Div\\_Intell\\_oversight/Supporting%20Documents/EO%2012333.pdf](http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/ig/Div_Intell_oversight/Supporting%20Documents/EO%2012333.pdf)).

<sup>xxvii</sup> Fredman 1997, 15-16, 18.

<sup>xxviii</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>xxix</sup> Ibid., 23.

<sup>xxx</sup> Rosati 1993; L. Britt Snider. 1997. "Sharing Secrets With Lawmakers: Congress As a User of Intelligence." Center for the Study of Intelligence. Central Intelligence Agency (February); Gerald K. Haines 1999. "The Pike Committee Investigations and the CIA." *Studies in Intelligence*, 81-91.

<sup>xxxi</sup> Haines 1999, 81; Snider 1997, 7-9.

<sup>xxxii</sup> Haines 1999, 83-84.

<sup>xxxiii</sup> Snider 1997, 7-9.

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<sup>xxxiv</sup> Rosati 1993, 204-207, 322; Woodward 1987, 56, 293, 380; Neil C. Livingstone. 1990. "Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Pre-emption and Retribution." In *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*. (Ed.) Charles W. Kegley, Jr., New York: St. Martins Press, Inc., 223-224; Haines 1999, 81-91; Snider 1997, 7-9; Fredman 1997, 15-16.

<sup>xxxv</sup> Rosati 1993.

<sup>xxxvi</sup> United Nations. 1945. Charter of the United Nations, 24 October. T.S. no. 993, 59 Stat 1031; Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, and Anthony D'Amato (Eds.) 1990. *Basic Documents in International Law and World Order*. St. Paul, MN. West Publishing 16-31.

<sup>xxxvii</sup> Taulbee 1985, 281-283, Woodward 362; Woodward and Babcock 1985, A-26.

<sup>xxxviii</sup> Professor Louis Rene Beres, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN.

<sup>xxxix</sup> United States Department of State 1910. Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Regulations, 26 January. TS no. 539, 36 Stat. 2277 Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, and Anthony D'Amato (Eds.) 1990. *Basic Documents in International Law and World Order*. St. Paul: West Publishing, 129-136.

<sup>xl</sup> Picard 2002; Helena Cobban. 1984. *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 63-64.

<sup>xli</sup> Harris 1997, 134-135, 137-145, 151, 157, 161; Cobban 1984, 63-64; Ted Robert Gurr. 1989. "Political Terrorism: Historical Antecedents and Contemporary Trends." In *Protest, Rebellion, Reform. Vol. 2 of Violence in America* (Ed.) Ted Robert Gurr. Newbury Park, CA: Sage; Ted Robert Gurr. 1989. "The History of Protest, Rebellion and Reform in America: An Overview." In *Protest, Rebellion, Reform Vol. 2 of Violence in America*, (Ed.) Ted Robert Gurr, Newbury Park, CA; Sage; Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff. 1994. *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 82-95.

<sup>xlii</sup> Harris 1997, 134-135, 137-145.

<sup>xliii</sup> Harris 1997, 144.

<sup>xliv</sup> Picard 2002, 103, 107-109, 114, 117, 128, 135-137, 139; Harris 1997, 152-154, 157, 161-

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164, 166, 174.

<sup>xlv</sup> Picard 2007, 107-109; Harris 1997, 157, 163-164, 186, 103.

<sup>xlvi</sup> Picard 2007, 102-103, 108-109, 118, 128, 131, 126; Harris 1997, 157, 163-164, 166, 186, 103.

<sup>xlvii</sup> Harris 1997, 157, 166; Picard 2007, 100, 102-103, 107, 117; Ranstorp 1997.

<sup>xlviii</sup> Picard 2007, 107-108.

<sup>xlix</sup> Picard 2007, 108; Norton 2007, 17-18.

<sup>1</sup> Picard 2007, 2007, 98, 107-108; Harris 1997, 98, 117; Cobban 1984, 48. Such “Nasserite groups” included the Sunni based Murabitun of Ibrahim Qulayat and others. In essence, Cobban reports that DFLP and PDFLP are virtual analogues, even though the date commonplace to note for DFLP formation is 1969.

<sup>ii</sup> Ranstorp 1997, 184-185; Charles Winslow. 1996. *Lebanon: War and Politics in a Fragmented Society*. New York: Routledge, 286-287; Carl Anthony Wege. 1994. “Hizbollah Organization.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 17: 151-164; Richard J. Chasdi. 2002. *Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1994-1999*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 299-304, 395n89.

<sup>iii</sup> Baer 2002.

<sup>iiii</sup> Ranstorp 1997, 18-159; Wege 1994, 157-158; Amir Taheri. 1994. “Iran Lacks ‘Absolute Control’ Over Foreign Cells Groups.” (“Despite Financial Support and Ideological Sympathy, Iran Does not Exercise Absolute Control Over Extremist Organizations; Priorities of Both Parties Vary According to the Influence of Political Factors.”), JPRS-TOT-94-033-L, Publish Date: 07/30/1994, City source: London Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Document Id: Odi0j7f01swbge.; Norton 2007; Chasdi 2002, 301, 396n100

<sup>liv</sup> Baer 2002, 74, 79, 100-1-1; Norton 2007, 73; *Facts on File*. 1984. “Saudi Seized, US Educator Slain.” Volume 44, Number 2253, 20 January, 29; *Facts on File*. 1985. “US Hostage Escapes.” Volume 45, 2309 22 February 115; Answer.com. “Iran-Contra Affair.” (<http://answers.com/topic/iran-contra-affair>); Frontline. “Target America: terrorist attacks on

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Americans, 1979-1988 The attacks, the groups, and the U.S. response.” (<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html>); William Claiborne. 1983, “Shiite Group Issues New Threat.” *Washington Post*, 23 December, 20; Philip Taubman. 1984. “Shiite Group Tied to Beirut Blasts.” *The New York Times*, 31 January, 4.

<sup>lv</sup> Baer 2002, 79, 77, 73-74; Woodward 1987, 395; Prados 1996, 379; Oakley interview June 25, 2008.

<sup>lvi</sup> Ihsan A. Hijazi. 1987. “Beirut Sources Say Israel Talks With Kidnappers.” *New York Times*, 11 February (on-line); Ihsan A. Hijazi. 1987. “Beirut Islamic Group Again Warns of US Attack.” *New York Times* 12 February, A-8; Baer 2002, 100-1-1. To be sure, a close reading of FBIS scripted accounts plainly suggests that the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems, the Khaybar Brigades (Lebanese Branch), and Hezbollah were most likely analogues. For example, while Jonathan Wright was abducted by the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims he was kept a prisoner in the Biq’a Valley in conditions that closely parallel the time frame and conditions of Hezbollah-Pasdaran facilities described by Robert Baer. Moreover, according to one scripted account, “he [Levin] said he was not bitter toward his captors, believed to be members of the Islamic Jihad (Holy War), a shadowy Lebanese terrorist group.” *Facts on File*. 1985. “US Hostage Escapes.” Volume 45, No. 2309, 22 February, 115; Russell Watson with Rod Nordland 1985. “Unchained at Last.” *Newsweek*, 25 February (<http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/us/Inacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=ssh-20...>). For some, but certainly not all, the set of interconnections between Hezbollah and the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems is more definitive. Others inform us a set of interconnections between the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems and the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO). For example, See Renee C. Redman. “Defining Torture: The Collateral Effect on Immigration Law of the Attorney General’s Narrow Interpretation of ‘Specifically Intended’ When Applied To United States Interrogators.” *New York Annual Survey of American Law*, ([www.law.nyu.edu/pubs/annualsurvey/documents/62\\_N.Y.U.\\_Ann.\\_surv.\\_Am.\\_L\\_465\\_2007.pdf](http://www.law.nyu.edu/pubs/annualsurvey/documents/62_N.Y.U._Ann._surv._Am._L_465_2007.pdf)), 475n60; Ranstorp 1997, 63. In the case of the Khaybar Brigades and Hezbollah, that set of interconnections seems relatively straightforward as scripted accounts chronicle the abductions of Brian Levick and Gordan Nash as carried out by Islamic Jihad, and both persons were seemingly detained by the Khaybar Brigades. See *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. “AFP: Three Kidnap Victims To Be Released ‘Shortly’.” FBIS V.27 Mar 85, “Lebanon”: City source: *Paris AFP*; Publish Date: March 24, 1985, Document Id: NC261236, p. G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. “Islamic Jihad Claims Responsibility for Kidnappings.” V.18 Mar 85; “Lebanon”; City source: *Paris AFP*; Publish Date: March 17, 1985; Document id: NC171949, p. G-1.

<sup>lvii</sup> *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* 1985. “French Woman Released: 4 Jews Kidnapped.” FBIS V.1 Apr 85, “Lebanon”; City source: *Paris AFP*; Publish Date: March 31, 1985, Document id: NC312105, p.G-4; Nayla Razzouk. 1998. “Tiny Jewish Community Lives on in Beirut.” *Agence France-Presse*, (website: “The Jews of Lebanon,” <http://thejewsof>

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lebanon.org/me/?m=200706); *Facts on File*. 1985. "US Hostage Escapes." Volume 45, 2309, 22 February, 115; *Facts on File*. 1985. "Israel Sees Security Zone Success." Volume 45, Number 2354, 31 December, 971; Baer 2002, 100. In essence, Baer provides corroborative evidence of that when he tells us that Dr. Elie Hallak, a Lebanese Jew kidnapped sometime after the attempt to kill Fadlallah, was a Hezbollah prisoner in the Biq'a Valley.

<sup>lviii</sup> *Facts on File*. 1985. "Israel Sees Security Zone Successes." Volume 45, No. 2354, 31 December, 971.

<sup>lix</sup> Mike Davis. 2007. *Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb*. New York, Verso, 79; Norton 2007, 74; Prados 1996, 378-380; Thomas Powers. 2002. *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda*. New York: New York Review of Books, 277.

<sup>lx</sup> Baer 2002, 63-67; Davis 2007, 80-83.

<sup>lxi</sup> Baer 2002, 67; Davis 2007, 81; Woodward 1987, 244-247; Prados 1996, 378.

<sup>lxii</sup> *Facts on File*. 1983. "US Embassy in Lebanon Devastated by Bomb Blast." Volume 43, No. 2214, 22 April.

<sup>lxiii</sup> Ambassador Robert Oakley, interview, June 25, 2008.

<sup>lxiv</sup> Davis 2007, 83, 206n21; Baer 2002m 72; Norton 2007, 6.

<sup>lxv</sup> *Facts on File*. 1983. "Car Bomb Blasts Rock Kuwait." Volume 43, No. 2248, 16 December, 943; *Facts on File*. 1983. "Over 200 US Marines Killed in Beirut Suicide Bomb Attack." Volume 43, No. 2241, 28 October, 809, 813; Baer 2002, 72; Prados 1996.

<sup>lxvi</sup> *Facts on File*. 1983. "Car Bomb Blasts Rock Kuwait." Volume 43, No. 2248, 16 December, 943; Prados 1996, 379; USA Today. 1983. "Blast Hits U.S. Embassy in Kuwait." *USA Today* 12 December, 1, 2.

<sup>lxvii</sup> *Facts on File*. 1984. "Islamic Jihad Still Cloaked in Mystery." Volume 44, No. 2290, 5 October, 724; *Facts on File*. 1984. "Six To Hang for 1983 Bombings." Volume 44, No. 2263, 30 March, 235; Ranstorp 1997, 26-27; Norton 2007, 71-72, 161; *Facts on File*. 1983. "Car Bomb Blasts Rock Kuwait." Volume 43, No. 2248, 16 December, 943; Davis 2007, 68, 91. Al-Dawa al-Islamiyya, that was crafted in 1968, presupposed and derived from the tortured historical

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legacy of the Shi'a experience in Iraq, and had suffered repression at the hands of the Baathist party in Iraq. Accordingly, it had an almost singular focus on attacks against Iraq within the context of the broader Iran-Iraq war that was fought between September 1980 to 1988. To be more specific, at least one scripted account suggests that the terrorist assaults against the U.S. embassy in Kuwait in 1983, and by extrapolation, further attacks that followed against Kuwaiti targets, reflected the support that Kuwaiti officials provided to President Saddam Hussein of Iraq in his fierce struggle against Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran. At the same time, as Ranstorp reports, al-Dawa al-Islamiyya terrorist assaults against French interests in Lebanon and Kuwait also revolved around French support for President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. It should be noted that Norton, by contrast to Ranstorp, reports that 1958 was the year al-Dawa was crafted.

<sup>lxxviii</sup> Baer 2002, 107, 92, 122; Davis 2007, 68, 91; Ranstorp 2007, 91-92; *Facts on File*. 1984. Kuwait: Six To Hang For 1983 Bombings." Volume 44, No. 2263, 30 March, 235; *Facts on File*. 1984. "US Hostage Freed in Lebanon." Volume 45, No.2339, 20 September, 694; *Facts on File*. 1985. "Killing of US Hostage Claimed." Volume 45, No. 2343, 18 October, 774-775. Dr. Judith S. Yaphe, Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute For National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, interview, February 20, 2008. Both Yaphe and Ranstorp report that Kuwaiti officials had originally looked for twenty five persons, and had caught seventeen, fourteen of whom were Iraqi al-Dawa al-Islamiyya members, by contrast to three activists who were Lebanese. In time that set of arrests would work to generate and sustain a series of retaliatory terrorist assaults by Mughniyah and others, including the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in 1985, and years later, the hijacking of a Kuwaiti aircraft on April 5, 1988, to generate and sustain enormous political pressure on the Kuwaiti government to release those al-Dawa activists. The Lebanese activists included Mustafa Badr-al-Din, also identified by Ranstorp as Elias Foud Saab, who was the cousin and brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyah. In addition to al-Din, a "relative" or two of Shaykh Hussayn al-Musawi, the terrorist chieftain of Islamic Amal, also belonged to that Lebanese contingent.

<sup>lxxix</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. 1991 "Terrorist Review b3" 27 June 1991. Counterterrorist Center (declassified) Director of Central Intelligence CTC "Approved for release Date June 1999," 5. CIA FOIA ([http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse\\_docs\\_full.asp](http://www.foia.cia.gov/browse_docs_full.asp)).

<sup>lxxx</sup> *Facts on File*. 1984. "Suicide Bomb Blast Hits US Embassy in Lebanon." Volume 44, No. 2288, 21 September, 685-686; *Facts on File*. 1984. "US Identifies Embassy Bombers." Volume 44, No. 2291, 12 October, 757; Baer 2002, 107; Davis 2007; Prados 1996, 379.

<sup>lxxxi</sup> Woodward and Babcock 1985, A-1, A-26; Ottaway 1985, A-31.

<sup>lxxxii</sup> *Facts on File*. 1984. "Iran Hijack Drama Ends After Two Hostages Are Killed." Volume 44, No. 2300, 14 December, 921-922.

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- lxxiii Ambassador Robert B. Oakley interview, June 25, 2008.
- lxxiv Ambassador Robert B. Oakley interview, June 25, 2008
- lxxv Ibid.
- lxxvi Woodward 1987, 396.
- lxxvii Woodward 1987, 395-396; Davis 2007, 91; Powers 2002, 276-277.
- lxxviii Woodward and Babcock 1985, A-1, A-26; Taulbee 1985, 283; Prados 1996, 379-380.
- lxxix Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, personal correspondence, August 5, 2008.
- lxxx *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "Army Denial Called 'False'." FBIS V.20 May 85, "Lebanon," City source: (*Clandestine*) *Voice of the Mountain*, Publish Date: May 20, 1985; Document Id: NC200645, p. G-2; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "Army Command Refutes 'Fabricated Reports'." FBIS V. 20 May 85, "Lebanon," City source: Beirut Voice of Lebanon, "Lebanon," Document Id: NC200612, p. G-2.
- lxxxi *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* 1985. "More on Beirut Bombing." FBIS v.15 May 85, "Lebanon," City source: AFP Paris, Publish Date: May 15, 1985; Document Id: NC151157, p. G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "Kuna Cites Al-Safar on US Role in Bombing." FBIS v.15 May, "Lebanon," City source: *Kuwait Kuna*, Publish Date: May 15, 1985. Document Id: LD151056, p. G-1.
- lxxxii Ambassador Robert B. Oakley interview, June 25, 2008
- lxxxiii Professor James Larry Taulbee personal correspondence, March 5, 2008; Michael R. Gordon. 1986. "NSC Being Restructured to Give More Focus to Coordinating Policy." *New York Times*, 22 December A-1, A-17.
- lxxxiv Taulbee 1985, 281-283; Russell Watson, Nicholas M. Horrock, and Abdul Hajaj. 1985. "Fighting Terror With Terror." *Newsweek* 27 May.
- lxxxv Woodward 1987, 396-397. Ottaway 1985, A-31. At the same time, Ottaway points out that

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US intelligence appraisals also presupposed and derived from the intelligence division of the Maronite Christian paramilitary known as the Lebanese Forces (LF) under the aegis of Dr. Samir Ja'Ja.

<sup>lxxxvi</sup> Oakley interview, June 25, 2008

<sup>lxxxvii</sup> Woodward and Babcock 1985, A-1, A-26; Prados 1996, 379-380.

<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, personal correspondence August 5, 2008.

<sup>lxxxix</sup> *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* 1985. "More on Beirut Bombing." FBIS v. 15 May 85, "Lebanon," City source: *AFP Paris*, Publish Date: May 15, 1985; Document Id: NC151157, p. G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "Kuna Cites Al- Safar on US Role in Bombing." FBIS v. 15 May, "Lebanon," City source: *Kuwait Kuna*, Publish Date: May 15, 1985. Document Id: LD151056, p. G-1.

<sup>xc</sup> As'ad Haydar. 1985 "Al-Mustaqbal Interviews Shi'ite Leader Fadlallah." FBIS V. 8 Jul 85; "Lebanon," City source: *Paris al-Mustaqbal*; Publish Date: July 6, 1985, p. G-3.

<sup>xcii</sup> Woodward 1987, 397.

<sup>xciii</sup> Oakley interview, June 25, 2008.

<sup>xciv</sup> Allison. 1971, 176.

<sup>xcv</sup> Oakley interview, June 25, 2008; Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 2007. *World Politics: Trends and Transformation Eleventh Edition*. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 55-91; Robert J. Art. 1973. "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique." *Policy Sciences* 4 (4): 467-490.

<sup>xci</sup> Allison 1971; Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis second edition*. New York: Addison Wesley Education Publishers, Inc, 307. My special thanks to an anonymous reviewer at the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) for pointing out this important path to take in the analysis.

<sup>xcvi</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994.

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<sup>xcvii</sup> Oakley interview, June 25, 2008.

<sup>xcviii</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994, 39-40, 44-46.

<sup>xcix</sup> Ibid., 47, 41

<sup>c</sup> Kegley 2007, 69-71.

<sup>ci</sup> Allison 1971, 83; Art 1973.

<sup>cii</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994.

<sup>ciii</sup> Rosati 1993.

<sup>civ</sup> Irving Janis. 1972. *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*. Boston; Houghton Mifflin; James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff. 1997. *Contending Theories of International Relations: a comprehensive survey*. New York: Longman, 491.

<sup>cv</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994., 39-40, 44-46.

<sup>cvi</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994, 39-40, 44-46; Prados 1996, 378, 380.

<sup>cvii</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994, 50.

<sup>cviii</sup> Brian Crozier. 1960. *The Rebels: A Study of Post War Insurrections*. Boston: Beacon Press.

<sup>cix</sup> Bruce Hoffman.2004. "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq" OP-127-IPC/CMEPP Santa Monica, CA: Rand Research Division, pages 1-18; Richard J. Chasdi. 1999. *Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1968-1993*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books; Richard J. Chasdi, 2002. *Tapestry of Terror: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1994-1999*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books; Bruno S. Frey. 2004. *Dealing With Terrorism - Stick or Carrot?* Northhampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.; Eric Pace. 1983. "U.S. Navy Enters Lebanon Fighting, Shelling Hill Site." *The New York Times*, 9 September, A-1-2; Fred

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Hiatt.1983. "Use of 16-Inch Guns Authorized on Dec.3." *Washington Post*. 15 December, 40.

<sup>cx</sup> Robin Wright. 2001. *Sacred Rage*, 270, as found in NationMaster.com. "Encyclopedia Lebanon Hostage Crisis." (<http://www.nationamaster.com/encyclopedia/Lebanon-Hostage-Crisis>), 6, 14n7.

<sup>cx<sup>i</sup></sup> Dr. Judith S. Yaphe, interview, February 20, 2008; Davis 2007, 83, 86; Ray R. Anderson, Robert F. Seibert and Jon Wagner. 1998. *Politics and Change in the Middle East: Sources of Conflict and Accommodation 5th ed.* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 64-67; Norton 2007, 73. Norton reports that the Iranian government had makeshift and incomplete command over Islamic revivalist extremists in Lebanon. For Norton, "there was no 'kidnapping-central,' but a cabal of militants, some certainly linked to Hezbollah, others to various gangs and groups....Although Iran did not exercise direct control of the kidnappers, its revolutionary regime did exert strong ideological influence..."

<sup>cx<sup>ii</sup></sup> Baer 2002, 92.

<sup>cx<sup>iii</sup></sup> Ranstorp 1997, 64, 54.

<sup>cx<sup>iv</sup></sup> *Facts on File*. 1983. "Car Bomb Blasts Rock Kuwait." Volume 43, No. 2248. 16 December, 943; Prados 1996, 379.

<sup>cx<sup>v</sup></sup> Ranstorp 1997, 91-92; *Facts on File*. 1984. "Kuwait: Six To Hang For 1983 Bombings." Volume 44, Number 2263, 30 March, 235. *Facts on File*. 1984. "US Hostage Freed in Lebanon." Volume 45, Number 2339, 20 September, 694; *Facts on File*.1985. "Killing of US Hostage Claimed." Volume 45, No. 2343, 18 October, 774-775; Baer 2002; Dr. Judith S. Yaphe, Distinguished Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, interview, February 20, 2008; US Department of State. 1988. "Imad Mugniyeh: The Biography"; "Collection: Terrorism and U.S. Policy, 1968-2002"; "Item Number: TE00945; source: Digital National Security Archive; "Location of Original: National Security Archive. Terry Anderson Documents. Box 1. Undated Documents"; (<http://narchive.chadwyck.com/markedList/displayPrintRecord.do?markedList=fullrec&ItemID=CTE009...>).

<sup>cx<sup>vi</sup></sup> Baer 2002, 112. To be sure, it is possible to extend the analysis to include the predominant role of the Hamadi group itself involved in the hijacking of the Boeing 727 TWA 847 aircraft in June 1985.

<sup>cx<sup>vii</sup></sup> Dr. Judith S. Yaphe, interview, February 20, 2008.

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<sup>cxviii</sup> Ranstorp 1997, 64.

<sup>cxix</sup> *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "Al-Musawi Denies Link With Kidnapped Americans." FBIS V.5 August 85, "Lebanon," City source: *Beirut Al-Nahar*, Publish Date: August 2, 1985, Document Id: NC050841, p. G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "Muslim Party Leader on Kidnapped Americans." FBIS V. 2 Aug 85, "Lebanon," City source: *Kuwait al-Watan*, Publish Date: July 31, 1985, Document Id: GF011448, p. G-1.

<sup>cxx</sup> Baer 2002; Reiss and Roth 1993, 299-305.

<sup>cxxi</sup> Baer 2002, 99, 117, 131.

<sup>cxxii</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>cxxiii</sup> Baer 2002, 98-99, 128; Davis 2007; Kevin Peraino. 2008. "The Fox Is Hunted Down." *Newsweek*, 25 February, 40-42; Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy. 1990. *Inside the PLO: Covert Units, Secret Funds and the War Against Israel and the United States*. New York: William Morrow, 65; Richard J. Chasdi 1999. *Serenade of Suffering: A Portrait of Middle East Terrorism, 1968-1993*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 125, 99, 129n90, 98-103; Cobban 1984; Jamal R. Nassar. 1991. *The Palestine Liberation Organization: From Armed Struggle to the Declaration of Independence*. New York Praeger Publishers.

<sup>cxxiv</sup> Baer 2002, 92, 98-100, 114, 128; Ranstorp 1997.

<sup>cxxv</sup> Lesser 1999, 126-127, 142, 140; Baer 2002.

<sup>cxxvi</sup> Ambassador Robert B. Oakley interview, June 25, 2008.

<sup>cxxvii</sup> *Facts on File* 1985. "Kuwait: Emir Escapes Car-Bomb Attack. Volume 45, No. 2325, 14 June, 43. In turn, that scripted account reports that the Islamic Jihad Organization accused the CIA of trying to kill Fadlallah to discredit it.

<sup>cxxviii</sup> *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "Hezbollah Vows to Expel US, Eradicate Israel." FBIS V. 14 Mar 85; "Lebanon," City source: *Beirut Voice of Lebanon*; Publish Date: March 13, 1985; Document Id: NC131745, page G-4; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*

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1985. "VOAL: Katyusha Rocket Strike Metullah 22 Mar." FBIS V.22 Mar 85; "Lebanon," City source (*Clandestine Voice of Arab Lebanon*; Publish Date: March 22, 1985; Document Id: NC220725, page G-2; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service* 1985. "Islamic Jihad Claims Copenhagen Explosions." FBIS V. 23 July 85, "Lebanon," City source: (*Clandestine Radio Free Lebanon*; Publish Date: July 22, 1985, Document Id: NC22142, page G-1; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "Bomb Explodes Near Embassy In Bangkok: No Damage." FBIS V.12 Aug 85; "Israel," City source: *Jerusalem Domestic Service*; Publish Date: August 11, 1985; Document Id: TA111795, page 11. Those terrorist assaults include a threat by Hezbollah to "eradicate Israel" on March 13, 1985, a rocket attack by Hezbollah, in the guise of the Martyr Shaykh Raghīb Harb group, against the Israeli town of Metulla on March 22, 1985, and an assault by the so-called Martyr Thana' Muhaybili group on the Israeli town of Misgav 'Am on April 22, 1985. In addition, one of two targets in a Copenhagen terrorist assault carried out by Islamic revivalists on July 22, 1985 involved a Jewish place of worship, while Israel's embassy in Bangkok, Thailand was assaulted on August 11, 1985.

<sup>cxxix</sup> Ranstorp 1997.

<sup>cxxx</sup> Woodward 1987, 396; *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*. 1985. "More on Beirut Bombing." FBIS V.15 May 85, "Lebanon," City source: *Paris AFP*; Document Id: NC151157, page. G-1.

<sup>cxxxi</sup> Kennedy and Brunetta 1994.

<sup>cxxxii</sup> Charter of the United Nations , 24 October. T.S. no. 993, 59 Stat. 1031; Burns H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, and Anthony D'Amato. 1990. (Eds.) *Basic Documents in International Law and World Order*. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 23.

<sup>cxxxiii</sup> Ambassador Oakley interview, June 25, 2008; e-mail correspondence with Ambassador Oakley, August 5, 2008

<sup>cxxxiv</sup> Ibid.

<sup>cxxxv</sup> Lesser 1999; Kegley 2007; Frederic S. Pearson and Martin J. Rochester. 1998. *International Relations: The Global Condition in the Twenty First Century*. Boston: McGraw Hill.