Case Study Rountable Series
Asian Financial Crisis (1997–1998)
By Roz Engel, Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy
Thursday, October 18, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Hudson Institute, Inc.
1015th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC, 20005
In July 1997, the Thai baht crashed. In time, the crisis went global. Within the next few years, Russia, Brazil, and Argentina all experienced currency troubles of their own, which many observers believe had their origins in the Asian Financial Crisis. Unlike more traditional conflicts, however, when Asian currencies tumbled there was no “enemy,” no one state or non-state group to blame for the misery. Nations did not face a classic national security problem—and traditional national security solutions would not suffice. Ending the crisis required coordinated international action. The effort of the American interagency team to lead the response to the crisis highlighted the failures of international financial policy and their implications for U.S. national security. Responses to the crisis also offer insights into the roles and missions of the agencies involved and the framework required for developing and executing interagency strategy, policies, and competencies to meet similar challenges in the future.
Alaskan Earthquake Disaster Recovery
By Dwight Ink, President Emeritus, Institute of Public Administration
Thursday, October 4, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Hudson Institute, Inc.
1015th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC, 20005
On Good Friday, March 27, 1964, the most severe earthquake ever recorded in North America (9.2 on the Richter scale) struck Alaska, damaging over 50,000 square miles and impacting 60% of the state’s population. The rebuilding complexities presented by earthquake actions, combined with the short Alaskan construction season, led most observers to predict abandonment of much of the Alaskan population by cold weather. However, the unprecedented approaches taken by the President, the unusual leadership role of a senior senator, the strong response of cabinet members, and the unorthodox management strategies developed by career leaders entrusted with directing the rebuilding, combined to produce a successful outcome applauded by the citizenry.
Iran/Contra
By Alex Douville, Director of Policy Studies, Center for the Study of the Presidency
Thursday, July 19, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20002
The Reagan Administration took for granted the power of the President and his Executive Branch as sole executor of U.S. foreign policy. Due to the President’s leadership style and the passage of legislation like the Boland Amendments, which limited funding and restricted covert operations, power not only to develop but to execute policy was shifted from the historic power brokers, the heads of the Departments of State and Defense, to the National Security Advisor (NSA) and the NSC Staff. Consequently, inexperienced entities with fluid command structures and unstructured authority were tasked with developing and carrying out the President’s foreign policies. The ramifications stemming from this led directly to the Iran-Contra affair, which heavily impacted the national security system of the United States.
International Interagency Response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami
By Gary Anderson, Science Applications International Corporation
Friday, July 13, 2007 at 10:00 a.m.
Science Applications International Corporation
1710 SAIC Drive
McLean, Virginia, 22102
The 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean spawned a massive global humanitarian response. Various issues arose associated with the transition from relief to reconstruction in four countries which were the primary recipients of U.S. relief efforts (Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives). The study is divided into a historical summary of the disaster, a general discussion on humanitarian relief operations, challenges associated with international interagency coordination, U.S. interagency issues, and observations on potential lessons learned and recommended improvements.
CORDS and the Vietnam Experience
By Richard W. Stewart, Chief Historian of the U.S. Army Center of Military History
Thursday, June 14, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20002
“CORDS was an experiment in placing all the interagency assets involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager but then placing that civilian within the military hierarchy as a Deputy Commander of MACV. This bold move provided the pacification support effort nearly unfettered access to military resources, personnel, and logistics. CORDS was an innovative attempt to build and operate a truly effective interagency headquarters, blending civilian and military agencies and personnel, focused on one mission: smoothing the flow of U.S. pacification support to the government of South Vietnam.”
The National Response Plan and Hurricane Katrina
By John R. Brinkerhoff, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)
Thursday, June 7, 2007 at 9:00 a.m.
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C., 20036
The consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the failure of the levees protecting New Orleans constitute the worst natural disaster ever in the United States. Press accounts and current conventional wisdoms label FEMA as incompetent, unprepared, and unable to deal well with the effects of these two hurricanes. This case study examines one facet of the overall effort, which is the response phase that lasted twelve days from 26 August 2005 to 6 September 2005. It focuses specifically on how well the National Response Plan (NRP) served as a process for coordinating Federal efforts.
Propaganda and Psychological Operations (Cold War)
By Professor Carnes Lord, Professor of Military and Naval History, Naval War College
Thursday, May 17, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20002
Military psychological operations were at best a marginal feature of US psychological-political activity throughout the Cold War. Handicapped from the start by the distrust of the PSYOP function and its practitioners that was (and remains) widespread in the conventional military, US Army and Air Force PSYOP elements have generally played a modest role in support of US troops on the battlefield and managing civilian populations in combat zones. During the Vietnam War, the peculiar requirements of counterinsurgency warfare led to the creation of a unique organization, the Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), which brought together military PSYOP and public affairs officers with civilians from USIA and other agencies.
Response to the Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919
By Dr. John Shortal, Center of Military History
Thursday, April 26, 2007 at 2:00 p.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C., 20002
From 1918-1919, the deadliest influenza pandemic in history struck the United States, killing 675,000 out of a population of 105 million. This case study examines the federal government?s response, specifically its inability to contain, track, and prevent the spread of the disease. The disease struck in three separate waves, yet each time the federal government failed to develop a coherent strategy to handle the disaster. The emergence of avian influenza demonstrates that such an epidemic remains a possibility. If a similar pandemic were to occur in the United States today, 90 million people would be sick, 45 million would receive out patient care, 10 million would be hospitalized, and two million would die. In this event, we hope to deliberate on and apply the lessons learned from the 1918-1919 pandemic to discuss recent legislation on pandemic flu preparedness.
Lecture:
Homeland Security Breakfast Series: National Security Reform
With James R. Locher III, Executive Director of the Project on National Security Reform
Friday, May 11, 2007 at 8:00 a.m.
Reserve Officers Association
One Constitution Avenue N.E.
Washington D.C., 20002
9/11, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Hurricane Katrina have provided compelling evidence of the brokenness of the national (including homeland) security interagency system. These, however, are only the most recent examples of a longstanding problem. The interagency system is incapable of timely, effective integration of the diverse expertise and capabilities of the many departments and agencies that contribute to national security. Policy formulation, planning, and execution have suffered, sometimes catastrophically.
To correct this deficiency, the nonpartisan Project on National Security Reform envisions sweeping changes in the executive and legislative branches. Its centerpiece is a National Security Act of 2008, replacing many provisions of the National Security Act of 1947. Mr. Locher will discuss the urgent need for national security reform, problems in interagency performance, and the Project’s plan and approach.