Last night, PBS hosted a superb one-hour show on the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The program, entitled  The War Briefing, featured a variety of  national security experts (including many of my colleagues here at the Center for a New American Security) and military leaders talking about how we got to where we are in Afghanistan - and how best to move forward.  Not surprisingly, a good portion of the show focused on the number of troops - or the lack of - to service the existing and growing requirements of high-altitude combat.

The topic of a surge in troops for Afghanistan also was raised in a story today in The Washington Post by Ann Scott Tyson. In this article, U.S. officers argue for an additional 20,000 troops - with a large portion of the request geared towards supporting personnel - to shore up the infrastructure needed to wage war in this distant and austere land.

And yet, many defense experts say that absent a U.S. strategy for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, adding more troops will do nothing. As one expert said, "Why add more troops? What will they do? Where will they go? What is their mission?  We do not have a strategy that tells us how best to use our blood and treasure."

Recently, I had a chance to visit American military forces in Afghanistan.  On a remote Special Operations base, I had a chance to chat with the Army Green Berets and Navy SEALs that have been entrusted with pursuing our unconventional fight. Over a cup of coffee in a Joint Operations Center (JOC), I asked one of these warriors about the need for additional forces in Afghanistan. I stated the conventional wisdom in Washington is that absent a strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, adding more troops is a fool's errand.

The combat veteran of Iraq, Afghanistan and other more classified assignments and - believe it or not - the beltway, said that he could not disagree more. "I get the D.C,-based argument, but I caution that one should not conflate the two issues of an absent strategy and a troop surge - security in itself is a good thing, and more troops equal more security."

I liked his answer: more troops = good; a strategy = good.  But at this juncture, when security is starting to lapse, do not make adding more troops contingent on getting that strategy right.

And yet, that does bring us to the 800 lb gorilla in the room: where is the strategy? After seven years of war, the U.S. still does not have a strategy for resolving conflicts in Pakistan and Afghanistan. And thats what makes me support the work of the Project on National Security Reform.

Many of the questions its posed as a reason for restructuring our national security system can be applied to U.S. policy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. What mechanisms do we need as part of a non-partisan machinery that will enable us to better craft a regional approach to a regional problem?

The next Presidential administration - regardless of which candidate wins the election next week - is going to have to get serious about creating a long-term plan for Afghanistan.  But they are also going to have to be equally serious about creating the national security apparatus that will prevent future situations like the one in which we currently find ourselves.

Roger D. Carstens is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. He recently retired from the Army as a Lieutenant Colonel.