INTRODUCTION:
After the voters of East Timor overwhelmingly voted to separate from
Indonesia in a referendum on August 30, 1999, anti-independence
militias linked to the Indonesian government launched a campaign of
terror. Initially, U.S. officials looked to Indonesian authorities to
halt the violence, but it soon became clear that the Indonesian
government could or would not do so. Although the Australian and
American governments both endorsed deploying an international
peacekeeping force to restore order in the territory, the allies were
initially unable to agree on an acceptable bilateral division of labor.
In the end, the U.S. government contributed limited but important
transportation, intelligence, communications, and logistics assistance
as well as a modest number of American military personnel to the
peacekeeping force, the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET).
This contingent deployed in late September and rapidly restored peace
to the territory.
The case of East Timor is an example of successful international
peacekeeping achieved with a minimal commitment of U.S. assets. The
American government’s response to the events in East Timor also serves
as a useful study of Washington’s difficulties in developing coherent
strategies in situations where U.S. national security interests are
considered minimal.
STRATEGY:
Washington first encountered difficulties developing a cohesive
strategy due to a lack of attention to the issue by senior U.S.
leaders, which made it difficult to unify the agency response. As a
result, the Australians received discordant messages from their
American interlocutors. After the Australians made clear their
dissatisfaction with the lack of clear U.S. support regarding an issue
that they perceived as of vital interest for their country, President
Clinton and his key advisers established a clear strategy—combining
pressure on Indonesia with support for Australia—and effectively
mobilized the bureaucracy behind it.
INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
During the pre-crisis period, U.S. government agencies pursued
disparate agendas based on their varying core missions and areas of
focus. The State Department was preoccupied with ensuring Indonesia’s
transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the Department of the
Treasury attempted to promote economic reforms in the country and
manage the concurrent Asian financial crisis, while the Defense
Department continued focus on improving relations with the Indonesian
military. After the President and other senior U.S. leaders developed a
coherent strategy, however, the diplomatic, military and economic
bureaucracies proved effective at implementing it. In particular, the
agencies pursued a successful integrated effort to compel a reluctant
Indonesian government to permit the deployment of INTERFET on its
territory and provided sufficient, though limited, assistance to the
Australian-led military intervention.
EVALUATION:
U.S. government
decision-making structures generally functioned efficiently only after
senior leaders became engaged and took charge of the bureaucracy by
empowering their key subordinates. Limitations on resources and
capabilities, and a preoccupation with crises elsewhere (especially
Kosovo), explain the initial U.S. hesitancy to intervene in the East
Timor crisis. In this case, neither U.S. civilian nor U.S. military
agencies suffered from inadequate resources, authorities, and
operational capabilities, primarily because Australia took charge of
the military response and the United Nations as well as other countries
made important contributions. This multidimensional effort meant that
Washington had to provide only modest support. Although members of
Congress initially resisted allocating money and troops to quell
violence in East Timor given its seemingly peripheral concern to core
U.S. security interests, congressional leaders, like their executive
branch colleagues, eventually rallied behind the intervention after
Australian officials had defined the issue as a decisive test of the
U.S.-Australian security alliance.
RESULTS:
Washington’s
original reluctance to commit heavily to a military intervention in
East Timor resulted in a short-term deterioration in U.S.-Australian
relations and perhaps led to a greater level of post-referendum
violence than might otherwise have occurred. Despite initial
difficulties, the U.S. strategy regarding the East Timor crisis was
largely successful. U.S. government agencies effectively mobilized
diplomatic and economic pressure against the Indonesian government and
subsequently provided vital support for Australia’s lead role in
INTERFET. These policies ended the civil strife in East Timor,
facilitated the territory’s transition to independence, and ultimately
strengthened U.S.-Australian ties.
CONCLUSION:
Four key
conclusions emerge from the analysis of U.S. policy making toward the
East Timor crisis. First, U.S. government agencies initially
encountered difficulties developing a coherent preventive strategy,
which caused needless confusion in Australia. Second, implementation
proceeded smoothly after President Clinton and other senior U.S.
government officials decided on an integrated strategy and empowered
subordinates to carry it out. Third, both the early weaknesses and the
ultimate strengths that characterized the U.S. response resulted
primarily from the fact that the American interests and resources
engaged in East Timor proved to be modest. Finally, U.S. credibility
and American-Australian security relations experienced short-term
deteriorations but sustained no significant lasting damage.
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