Future Defense Industry Scenario - Sheila Ronis

INTRODUCTION:
In this future scenario, Chinese aggression towards Taiwan provides the impetus for Sino-U.S. military confrontation. During the beginning stages of conflict, the technologically superior and network-centric United States military is quickly devastated. The damage was not inflicted by conventional weapons, but was instead caused by electronic connectors – small, seemingly harmless connective devices used to join electrical circuits together, which are absolutely critical to everything using power. By activating imbedded programming in these electronic connectors, the Chinese are able to neutralize the defense, attack, and navigation capabilities within every system on U.S. ships, submarines, and aircraft. Because Beijing controls two-thirds of the world’s supply of these connective devices, the Chinese are able to infiltrate, deliberately and strategically, the U.S. military and industrial base and target four of the military’s primary weapons systems.

The purpose of this scenario is not to convince the reader that information and technological warfare with China are inevitable, but to expose flaws and weaknesses within the national security apparatus. This hypothetical case calls attention to potential dangers of not addressing current weaknesses in our defense industrial base and global supply chain. It also highlights the importance of evaluating assumptions and questioning the meaning of events in order to better prepare for the future.

STRATEGY:
For the last 30 years, through mergers, joint ventures, outright acquisition and industrial espionage, the Chinese have gained access to and control of sensitive technologies. This is especially true in the electronics industry. In this scenario, China’s control of electronic connector production, combined with the ability of Chinese manufacturers to provide a multitude of components for at least four critical weapons systems (both of which are realities) allows for extensive infiltration of the U.S. industrial and military supply base. The infiltration was made even easier because virtually all ocean-borne shipping servicing the industrial base supply chain was Chinese-owned, providing multiple opportunities to control or deny movement of components and permitting the Chinese to disrupt the supply chain at will.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The military and economic elements of national power are ineffectively managed and integrated in this scenario. The major players in this type of situation include the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Transportation, and the interagency Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process. All these actors, as well as Congress, influence how and where our weapon systems should be manufactured and how their supply chains should be managed. Unfortunately, the monitoring of the supply chain proves insufficient and issues like “electronic connectors” go unnoticed because they are considered commodities. Because no one is responsible for the “big picture,” no one is in the position to identify dangerous patterns as they emerge. In fact, there are no U.S. government personnel dedicated exclusively to overarching strategy with a long term view. In addition, high-impact, low probability contingencies are of little interest to busy politicians who have no immediate incentive to express concern or initiate change.

EVALUATION:
The contracting supply chain consists of tiers. The higher the tier, the closer the supplier is to the finished product. Depending on the number of times a given component goes from one supplier to another, the number of tiers increases. The production process can consist of as many as ten tiers, but currently the United States only documents prime and subcontractors to the fourth tier. Beyond that, it is next to impossible to develop additional supplier identification data. The Department of Defense does not require component origins identification beyond the third tier, making maintaining cohesion and program security within the manufacturing and supply base extremely problematic. In addition, in 1991 the Defense Department’s Strategic Acquisition Initiative made it a requirement for U.S. defense contractors to look first to COTS (Commercial Off-The-Shelf) products when developing new technology and upgrades. The motivation for using COTS components is that they will reduce overall system development costs and save development time since they can be bought instead of being manufactured from scratch.

RESULTS:
Gradual reductions in standards and shortsightedness have created extensive security systems compromises. National security vulnerabilities are literally built into our offensive, defensive and detection systems as economy and competitiveness, not security and performance, are the overarching parameters of Department of Defense supplier participation. In addition, the atmosphere created by the COTS mandate within the U.S. supplier base has led many to ignore the Berry Amendment, which calls for specialty metals critical to national security to be sourced only in the United States.

CONCLUSION:
This scenario is not about fantasy or prediction but practical reasoning and logical deduction. The root causes for failure are real, not imaginary. Weaknesses in our defense industrial base supply chain, dependency on third-party vendors, continual disregard for the Berry Amendment and lack of foresight regarding the interplay between global economy and national security are making the United States unnecessarily vulnerable to a wide range of potential dangers. Even though the threats that will emerge in the future are likely beyond our current commitments and contemplations, it would be a mistake to limit our ideas about the future by the narrow experiences of our past. While it can be dangerous to hold rigid beliefs about tomorrow, preparedness requires seeing possibilities before they become obvious and making wise decisions today.




  Major Reports
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The NCIX and the National Counterintelligence Mission - Michelle Van Cleave
Managing U.S.-China Crises - Richard Weitz
Choosing War: An Analysis of the Decision to Invade Iraq - Joseph J. Collins
Response to Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919 - John Shortal, Center of Military History
Public Diplomacy and Psychological Operations (Cold War) - Carnes Lord, Naval War College
CORDS and the Vietnam Experience - Richard W. Stewart, Center of Military History
1964 Alaskan Earthquake - Dwight A. Ink
East Timor, 1999 - Richard Weitz
The Interagency, Eisenhower, and the House of Saud - Christine R. Gilbert
Human Trafficking in the 21st Century - Daniel R. Langberg
America's Rejection of the Ottawa Treaty - Dennis Barlow
Japan after WWII - Peter F. Schaefer and P. Clayton Schaefer
Somalia: Did Leaders or the System Fail? - Christopher J. Lamb with Nicholas J. Moon
Iran-Contra Affair - Alex Douville
U.S. - Central Asian Engagement - Evan Minsberg
Interagency Paralysis: Stagnation in Bosnia and Kosovo - Vicki J. Rast and Dylan Lee Lehrke
U.S. Interagency Efforts to Combat International Terrorism Through Foreign Capacity Building Programs - Celina B. Realuyo and Michael B. Kraft
Future Defense Industry Scenario - Sheila Ronis
U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement - Patrick Mendis and Leah Green
Failures at the Nexus of Health and Homeland Security: The 2007 Andrew Speaker Case - Elin Gursky and Sweta Batni
The Crisis in U.S. Public Diplomacy: The Demise of USIA - Juliana Geran Pilon and Nicholas J. Cull
The Banality of the Interagency: U.S. Inaction in the Rwanda Genocide - Dylan Lee Lehrke
The Vice President and Foreign Policy: From "the most insignificant office" to Gore as Russia Czar - Aaron Mannes, University of Maryland
The Asian Financial Crisis: Managing Complex Threats to Global Economic Stability - Rozlyn Engel
Building and Maintaining the Gulf War Coalition - Ryan Arant
The 2002 Coup Attempt against Hugo Chavez - Tristan Abbey
The Carter Administration and the Iranian Hostage Crisis Rescue Mission - Jay Bachar
The 1998 Bombings of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania: The Failure to Prevent and Effectively Respond to an Act of Terrorism - Allison Bukowski
Countering Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, 2002-2008 - Jamie Boulding
The 2003 U.S. Intervention in Liberia - Henrik Bliddal
Pre-9/11 Intelligence and the Creation of the Director of National Intelligence - Jessie Daniels
"Improvising Furiously": The Effort to Train Iraq's Police - Thomas Dybicz
U.S. Counter-Terrorism Operations in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, Post-2001 - Paul Delventhal
The U.S. Role in the Northern Ireland Peace Process - Jessie Daniels
U.S. Strategy in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict - Irina Ghaplanyan
U.S. Interagency Response to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami - Carlene Gong
The Andean Initiative and the Transnational Social Contract, 1989-1994 - Daniel Gibbons
The Reagan Administration's Response to the Crisis in Lebanon - Aref N. Hassan
Establishing U.S. Africa Command - Kimberly Nastasi Klein
SALT I: A Lesson in Security Policy - Matthew P. Jennings
U.S. Response to the 2001 Anthrax Incidents - Erin C. Hoffman
Integrating Civilian and Military Efforts in Provincial Reconstruction Teams - David Kobayashi
Losing Iran: The Accidental Abandonment of an Ally through Interagency Failure - Jesse Paul Lehrke
The Berlin Blockade: A First Test for the National Security Act - Sebastian Lederer
The Counternarcotics Effort in Afghanistan - Matthew Korade
U.S. Public Diplomacy in the Middle East after 9/11 - Justin Logan
The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), NSPD 44, DOD Directive 3000.05 - Christopher D. Mallard
HIV/AIDS Mitigation Efforts in Africa and U.S. National Security Policy: An Analysis of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) - Devin J. Lynch
The Role of the National Security Adviser and NSC in the Establishment of Relations with the People's Republic of China - Todd Lorimor
Balancing Democracy Promotion and the Global War on Terror in Pakistan - Don Rassler
Countering Terrorist Financing - Christopher J. Lamb with Alexandra A. Singer
Reversing the Revolution: U.S. Intervention in Guatemala in 1954 - Carolyn R. Schintzius
Reaction to Sputnik under the Eisenhower Administration - Brett Swaney
Bay of Pigs Debacle: Failed Interaction of the Intelligence Community and the Executive - Taylor V. Smith
Brinkmanship in the Straits: The 1995-1996 China-Taiwan Missile Crisis - Hsueh-Ting Wu
The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - Jessica D. Tacka
North Korea's Nuclear Programs and American Policy Formation - Alexander von Rosenbach
The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Close Call Avoided by Successful Strategizing - Rebecca White
Operation Urgent Fury: The 1983 U.S. Intervention in Grenada - Joseph Washecheck
Civil-Military Coordination and the 1994 Intervention in Haiti - William K. Warriner
U.S. Response to Humanitarian Disaster: Hurricane Mitch in Central America - David Wrathall
The Kennedy Administration and American Military Assistance to Laos - Christine Gilbert
Promises and Pitfalls of the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace - Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos
Global Warming and National Security - Tianchi Wu
The Suez Crisis: Fighting the Cold War in the Middle East - Marianna I. Gurtovnik
The Bush Administration's Democracy Promotion Efforts in Egypt - Edmund LaCour
The 1970s Energy Crisis and National Energy Policy Creation - Dylan Lee Lehrke
U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Meets the Pakistani Weapons Program - Edward A. Corcoran
An Analysis of Counterterror Practice Failure: The Case of the Fadlallah Assassination Attempt - Richard Chasdi
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