Project on National Security Reform -

Historical case studies are an essential element of the study. They are intended to inform proposals for reforming U.S. government interagency support for national security activities by identifying trends, recurring issues, challenges and solutions to complex operational demands in the past. The following is a list of case studies conducted under the Project. Under the direction of Richard Weitz of the Hudson Institute, these case studies have been selected to illustrate the enduring nature of interagency challenges and to explore how the United States responds to crises that have significant non-military dimensions.

INTRODUCTION:
Strategic integration of American psychological-political activities during the Cold War—including public diplomacy—fluctuated markedly. The U.S. government’s ad hoc public diplomacy initiatives were too often pursued in isolation from larger national security strategy and poorly coordinated with other agencies. Yet, in the early 1950s and 1980s, presidential initiative sustained a largely effective White House-centered interagency effort; in particular, American psychological-political programs were critical to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, persisting weaknesses in the U.S. approach resulted in missed opportunities and sub-optimal exploitation of this tool

In light of recent events, which highlight the importance of information activities in support of a “long war,” it is important to revisit the historical lessons of American public diplomacy and related activities during the Cold War. Since no single organization can have a bureaucratic monopoly in this area, moreover, establishing a unified public diplomacy message requires interagency collaboration. The U.S. government struggled with this challenge throughout the Cold War, making this case an excellent issue for analysis by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).

STRATEGY:
The Truman and Eisenhower administrations pursued an aggressive psychological-political strategy against the Soviet bloc. Authoritative documents such as NSC-68 identified ideological struggle with the Soviets as a vital arena in the emerging competition. With a few exceptions, however, future administrations allocated public diplomacy only a small a role in strategy formation. The Reagan administration revived the prominence accorded to public diplomacy during the high Cold War. The strategic framework of the Reagan administration’s public diplomacy effort featured, among other things, direct engagement with Soviet propaganda and disinformation, democracy promotion, and revitalization of U.S. international broadcasting.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
With some adjustments, the information organizations established under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations—especially Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and the United States Information Agency (USIA)—would remain through the end of the Cold War. Yet, Cold War-era public diplomacy coordination bodies were for the most part transient and largely ineffective The disconnect between public diplomacy and broader U.S. Cold War strategy became apparent in 1956, when the RFE’s Hungarian-language broadcasts arguably encouraged violent resistance against the Soviet occupying forces, despite U.S. policy against directly supporting the uprising. In spite of a brief renaissance during the Kennedy administration, public diplomacy thereafter drifted increasingly to the margins of government policy. This trend was reversed under President Reagan, for whom public diplomacy was an integral and valuable tool of national strategy. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 77 created a new interagency framework for coordinating and managing national security-related information.

EVALUATION:
If psychological-political activities are treated as a functionally distinct area of staff or interagency work, they risk becoming increasingly isolated from mainstream national security policymaking. This occurred to some extent even under the Reagan NSDD 77 interagency apparatus. However, the inclusion of an excessive number of actors and organizations in the psychological dimension of national security often results in a diffusion of responsibility and authority, which likewise leads to marginalization of public diplomacy. This seems to have been the case after the mid-1950s

It has long been a contentious issue for public diplomacy practitioners whether U.S. government broadcasting should aim simply to provide objective information, or instead seek to project American influence by proactively shaping information for particular foreign audiences . Due to this fundamental lack of clarity over the public diplomacy mission, U.S. information agencies have never been able to develop a single agreed vision, sense of purpose, body of principles, or set of doctrines. U.S. public diplomacy efforts throughout the Cold War were also consistently hampered by the poor state of education and training in the field.

RESULTS:
Public diplomacy did contribute to some historical successes, notably in the role it played in the final collapse of the Soviet system, but the shortcomings of American public diplomacy almost certainly resulted in wasted opportunities to achieve national objectives. Except for two brief periods, public diplomacy has been regarded by policymakers as a marginal component of national security policy and accordingly as a relatively low priority in terms of staffing and funding. Congress has generally evinced a low level of understanding and support of the public diplomacy function.

CONCLUSION:
On the basis of this study, one must conclude that public diplomacy activities were often ad hoc, detached from larger U.S. national security strategies, and ill-coordinated with other agencies. These characterizations can be attributed to several factors including: lack of bureaucratic weight of the dedicated public diplomacy agencies; little understanding of (and not infrequently, disdain for) the public diplomacy function throughout the national security bureaucracy and in the Congress, especially at senior leadership levels; unresolved tension regarding mission objectives; and cultural resistance both within and outside government to a strategic or proactive approach to official communication efforts. At other times, briefly in the early 1950s and again in the early 1980s, strong presidential interest in public diplomacy and related capabilities sustained an impressive, if not wholly effective, White House-centered effort.

INTRODUCTION:
Human trafficking has become increasingly recognized as a vital U.S. national security concern. Trafficking in persons has been linked to organized crime, drug trafficking, migrant smuggling, and terrorist financing—making it a problem for the conduct and implementation of U.S. policies in all those areas. The United Nations estimates that 12.3 million people are forced into labor or sexual servitude at any given time. The United States is both a source and destination for trafficked persons, with as many as 20,000 people annually trafficked into the country.

The U.S. Government’s response to human trafficking over the past decade serves as an interesting case study for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) because it presents a complex, multifaceted, and transnational challenge that does not fall neatly into the jurisdiction of any single executive branch organization. It involves nearly 30 offices in at least seven major U.S. Government (USG) departments and agencies, some of which have traditionally had more limited national security responsibilities. Addressing the trafficking problem requires an integrated government response, which thus far has been lacking.

STRATEGY:
To the extent that a U.S. strategy to combat trafficking in persons exists, it is rooted in the Clinton Administration’s 1998 International Crime Control Strategy (ICCS). The broad approach outlined in the ICCS is still commonly referenced today. More than a decade later, however, the document offers little in terms of practical guidance to the departments charged with developing multi-layered anti-trafficking strategies, plans, and processes. As a result, anti-trafficking strategies remain poorly integrated across the U.S. national security system. Individual agency strategies and plans still operate in general isolation. Coordinated, or at the minimum, compatible strategies exist only on an individual, and often ad-hoc, basis.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
In recognition of the complexity presented by this national security challenge, various interagency mechanisms—including task forces, policy groups, and fusion centers—have been formed since human trafficking gained increased attention in the United States in the late 1990s. While these instruments have facilitated coordination to a degree, by providing forums for agencies to collaborate, their success has been severely inhibited by a lack of authority in areas such as funding, strategy development, and the designation of department and agency roles and responsibilities; all of which ultimately reside within home agencies.

EVALUATION:
In the absence of a national-level framework, department-level goals, strategies, plans, and processes are developed within the context of each individual agency’s broader mission. This process leads to poorly integrated anti-trafficking strategies since they are not based on any external or higher level guidance. Successful coordination across agencies, through either ad-hoc or formal mechanisms, occurs only on a case-by-case basis. Most commonly, U.S. policies in this area suffer from information-sharing challenges, interagency rivalries, and other obstacles that derive from the disparate perspectives on human trafficking that exist at the level of the individual departments.

RESULTS:
During the past decade, there has been significant improvement in the U.S. Government’s ability to address the challenge of human trafficking, but the magnitude of the problem continues to grow due to surging demand. An inability to devise and implement an integrated approach to anti-trafficking costs the nation valuable time and resources. Generally, the U.S. response to trafficking is reactive, with success dependent on individual cases and personal relationships. Disparate agency strategies and visions inhibit comprehensive assessments of and improvements in U.S. anti-trafficking initiatives. Insufficient clarity regarding USG roles and responsibilities for anti-trafficking efforts has led to confusion on the part of U.S. officials, host-nation counterparts, and trafficking victims alike.

CONCLUSION:
An integrated USG approach is needed to counter a threat as complex as human trafficking. An analysis of the USG response to this national security challenge over the past decade reveals a lack of an integrated strategy to guide implementation of a government-wide approach to combating trafficking. As a result, cross-agency coordination in executing department level strategies and plans is often ad-hoc. Several interagency mechanisms have been created to assist with coordination, but these processes are constrained by a lack of authorities in key areas. The result has been a primarily reactive USG response, with coordination depending heavily on the circumstances of individual cases, confusion over anti-trafficking roles and responsibilities, and an inability to effectively evaluate and improve on existing anti-trafficking programs.

INTRODUCTION:
In 1956, U.S. policy makers saw American objectives in the Middle East foundering in the face of Arab nationalism and Soviet influence. To resuscitate the government’s agenda, President Eisenhower looked to Saudi Arabia and spearheaded an effort to make King Saud a preeminent leader and ally in the Middle East. Though overshadowed by the Suez Crisis and the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, this endeavor was a notable part of the U.S. regional security strategy and also marked a critical turning point in Washington’s relationship with the House of Saud. For these reasons, Eisenhower-era policy making towards Saudi Arabia is an interesting case for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). Furthermore, an analysis of the King Saud strategy also offers insight into the much-debated Eisenhower national security apparatus while illustrating lessons on interagency strategy development and implementation in a challenging, yet critical, theater for U.S. national security policy.

STRATEGY:
By 1956, U.S. officials had become disillusioned with the political leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and generally frustrated by the failure of U.S. strategies in the Middle East. In this context, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed reorienting U.S. regional policies, which the President endorsed in March 1956. Dulles’ approach established the basis of the administration’s policy towards the Saudi government, but Eisenhower himself directed the Department of State to consider promoting King Saud to regional leadership. In subsequent months, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israel’s invasion of Egypt, and other difficulties confirmed the President’s commitment to promoting the Saudi leader’s status. Ultimately, Eisenhower hoped King Saud would lead the Middle East away from anti-American currents of Arab nationalism and toward the Western camp.

INTEGRATION:
To advance Saud’s regional clout and friendly alignment, the President directed the Department of State to delineate ways of building up and currying favor with the King. To this end, the administration integrated the elements of national power relatively well. Over the course of 1956-1957, Eisenhower dispatched two ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, engaged in extensive personal diplomacy with the King, and solicited a National Security Council report on how Islam could be used to further American Cold War aims. Dulles enlisted the support of regional embassies and information agencies in boosting Saud. The Department of State also hosted a Saudi state visit. Furthermore, under Eisenhower’s authority, the Department of Defense renewed its lease of Dharan airfield in Saudi Arabia, the International Cooperation Agency granted the Saudi kingdom economic assistance, and officials in diverse agencies coordinated a substantial sale of armaments to the Saudi monarchy.

EVALUATION:
Despite the engagement of multiple government agencies and the employment of various tools of national power, the Saud strategy failed because it ignored predominant political realities in Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East. This fundamental flaw resulted from individual errors in judgment and interagency weaknesses, including entrenched world-views and an unbalanced cabinet. In contrast, the clear authorities of the administration and the President’s individual initiative accounted for the relatively unified implementation of the policy.

RESULTS:
Though the Middle East remained free of Soviet domination and the administration made some progress in moving Saud into alignment with the West, King Saud never emerged as an effective leader or counterweight to Nasser. Instead, Saud led Arab opposition to Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba, rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine, and supported an anti-American, nationalist government in Syria. In the longer-run, the failure of King Saud to emerge as a pro-West leader dealt a blow to American aims and influence in the Middle East and led to further policy misadventures in the region. The failure of its regional policies also cost the administration an invaluable opportunity to capitalize on political capital accrued in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis.

CONCLUSION:
The House of Saud endeavor illustrates that, even within the highly organized interagency processes instituted under President Eisenhower, impromptu policy could flourish. The inception of this strategy additionally demonstrates the potential problematic effects of an unbalanced cabinet and widely-held, inaccurate world-views within an interagency. Yet, the Saud policy highlights positive elements of the U.S. national-security decision-making processes as well. For example, the steadfast promotion of the Saudi leader in 1957 shows that, with clear authorities and presidential leadership, U.S. Government agencies can achieve relative unity of effort in executing national security policy.

INTRODUCTION:
In late 1992, the United States intervened in Somalia to prevent fractious warlords from hindering the distribution of international food aid in the midst of widespread drought and economic collapse. U.S. forces performed admirably (as part of UNITAF) and ensured food distribution. After United Nations forces took over (UNOSOM II) and pursued a more ambitious reconstruction agenda, they ran into stiff armed resistance. Following several months of low-level conflict, the United States sent U.S. special operations forces to Somalia to neutralize the most troublesome warlord. The mission ended disastrously on October 3, 1993, when U.S. special operations forces were pinned down in a protracted engagement. After inflicting close to a thousand casualties on the enemy and losing eighteen soldiers, a UN relief force extracted the special operations forces . Shortly thereafter, the U.S. military withdrew from Somalia. The failed intervention had momentous consequences at home and abroad. The Somalia intervention also allows an examination of the U.S. government’s ability to integrate its instruments of national power, as represented by the multiple national security organizations involved.

STRATEGY:
Prior to and during UNITAF’s humanitarian operations, the National Security Council (NSC) operated without a strategy and on an ad hoc basis. The intervention was driven more by the president’s personal feelings than by sober calculations of national interest. The NSC was able to generate alternative courses of action, and to align its objectives with the means necessary to achieve them, but absent a controlling strategy the basic mission and resource issues were addressed in an ad hoc manner. Even so, the senior U.S. civilian and military representatives in Somalia developed a strategy for achieving the Bush Administration’s objectives without exceeding the available resources. By contrast, the Clinton Administration’s formal, coordinated and explicit policy for UNOSOM II was codified in a presidential decision directive that obscured the contradiction between Clinton Administration objectives and resources.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Ambassador Robert Oakley and Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston judiciously combined diplomacy and military power, never failing to keep open lines of communication and limiting the application of force to that which was necessary to ensure the delivery of aid. They integrated force with civic action and information campaigns to reassure the public that the UNITAF presence was ultimately benign. Unfortunately, the United States was not able to closely integrate the elements of national power well in crafting policy for the follow-on UNOSOM II mission. The interagency decision making system repeatedly failed, both in Washington and in the field. Interagency decision bodies were not able to develop common and iterative assessments of the resources required to execute U.S. policy. Neither could they develop common assessments of risks nor effective risk mitigation plans to hedge against undesirable outcomes.

EVALUATION:
The NSC, as well as other U.S. government assessment and decision making bodies, repeatedly papered over a fundamental mismatch between objectives and resources. Hope was a persistent but poor substitute for clear analysis as the U.S. government stumbled into a high risk, military-centric strategy, ignoring one warning after another that UNOSOM forces and special operations forces could not accomplish their assigned objectives. The decision making system did not respond nimbly to evolving circumstances or effectively coordinate its own policy decisions well, particularly with regards to managing the inherently complex and difficult two-track policy of pursuing military and political initiatives simultaneously. The national security apparatus could only digest and act on this reality slowly and incompletely--and as it turned out, too late to avoid being overtaken by events that should have been assessed as increasingly likely and prepared for accordingly much earlier.

RESULTS:
Washington’s failure to integrate elements of national power effectively produced a debacle that cost the United States a great deal besides lost lives. It created deep policy divisions in Washington and increased tensions between senior civilian and military leaders. Somalia effectively ended the Clinton Administration’s policy of assertive multilateralism and Les Aspin’s short career as Secretary of Defense. The failure disinclined the United States from intervening elsewhere, including in Rwanda where horrific internecine tribal conflict led to mass murder. In addition, the defeat undermined the credibility that the United States had acquired from the successful Gulf War the previous year. Arguably, Somalia also encouraged America’s enemies to challenge U.S. interests. Just as the most powerful Somali warlord bluntly told Ambassador Oakley that American failures in Vietnam and Beirut proved the United States did not have staying power, Osama Bin Laden and others similarly concluded from Somalia and other events that the United States lacked the will to protect its interests.

The United States initially approached the intervention in Somalia with ad hoc decision making, but leaders in the field were able to impose their own strategy and integrate the elements of national power well. As the Clinton Administration took responsibility for the mission, it formally coordinated a strategy that was unclear and which failed to reconcile expansive objectives with limited means. Typical interagency structures and processes were inadequate. They tended to restrict the flow of information and generate compromise rather than clear alternative courses of action. The result was a severe failure with long-term repercussions for U.S. security interests.

INTRODUCTION:
U.S. planning for the occupation of Japan after WWII is an example of successful integration of the government's military and civilian assets to create a practical strategy for reform and reconstruction of an occupied territory. The approach to planning between 1941 and 1945 evolved from ad hoc responses to crisis into a formal and forward looking interagency organization. Though constant tension existed between military and civilian officials, the immensity of the nation-building task convinced all involved of the need for cooperation. The case is important to the Project on National Security Reform because the way in which the U.S. Government planned for the political and economic transformation of Japan illustrates how military and civilian agencies can create cohesive, effective and flexible strategy.

STRATEGY:
The interagency strategic and tactical approach was conceived by an organization known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), the authoritative policymaking organ for postwar reconstruction projects. The interagency deliberative process was vested with the authority of the president and relevant secretaries, and relied on information transparency and close working relationships at all levels. In the rare instances when SWNCC could not reach a consensus, cases advanced to the President for a final decision, leading to a unified policy emerging from the agencies and fully sanctioned by the White House.

During this period, Secretary of State Hull had been given primary responsibility for all postwar planning, and under Roosevelt's orders, State began considering the problem of occupation just weeks after Pearl Harbor. The process reached its full scope and depth over the next several years. On 28 December 1941, the president established an Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy. However, a lack of senior level agreement as to the Committee's mission meant pieces of the plan were being developed in a variety of government offices. There was no strategic architecture that might have permitted the creation of practical and actionable policies endorsed by the entire government. Without integration, it was inevitable that parochial interests (turf, budget, careers) would present problems.

RESULTS:
In reviewing the interagency process during World War II, one analyst points out three key features: "senior leader involvement, sustained interaction, and thorough integration" of policy at or below the level of Assistant Secretary. Planning for the occupation of Japan using the SWNCC was successful because it provided a forum for the formation of interagency relationships, incorporated experts from across the government, and integrated their outputs into sanctioned national policy. The quality of the interagency process during this period is demonstrated by the fact that of the 750 issues considered by the SWNCC before the National Security Act of 1947, only 6 cases were forwarded to the President for final resolution.

INTRODUCTION:
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States has sought to engage the newly independent Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in three main areas: security, energy, and democracy promotion. Ultimately, an investigation of this effort is important to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) because it demonstrates the difficulties involved in interagency policy planning towards developing and unstable regions. The study specifically highlights the importance of balancing policy priorities and properly assessing the needs, fears, and expectations of our foreign partners.

STRATEGY:
Towards the end of the George H. W. Bush Administration and during the early Clinton years, the United States did not have a clear plan for implementing its objectives in Central Asia. The region was not a top priority of U.S. policy planning and U.S. government agencies largely considered Central Asia a strategic backwater. By the mid- to late-1990s though, Washington had identified three enduring objectives—energy, security, and democracy promotion—and would pursue them in that order, with varying degrees of success, until 2001. After 9/11, Central Asia’s strategic importance rose considerably as both a staging ground for operations in Afghanistan and a front line in the greater Global War on Terror. Security had become a chief U.S. priority in 2001. By 2003, however, another shift in Bush Administration policy saw democracy and human rights assume preeminent positions in policy planning, to the detriment of Washington’s other goals.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
During the Clinton Administration, U.S. policy was not well integrated. Responsibilities for the Central Asian region were divided between a number of agencies and departments. Various competing views of Central Asia existed and policy largely concentrated on neighboring countries, especially Russia, China, and Iran. This approach continued during the beginning months of the first George W. Bush administration, which focused its foreign policy on great power politics. After September 11, however, the United States became more deeply involved in the region. During the post-9/11 period, planning was largely split between the Departments of State and Defense. The U.S. Congress also complicated the decision making process by pressuring the executive branch to advocate for human rights and democratic reforms in Central Asia.

After successfully removing most Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction and related infrastructure from Central Asia, U.S. policy planners in the mid- to late-1990s saw few pressing security threats or great opportunities in the region. American planning thus focused on keeping Central Asia outside of great-power competition. This policy was successful, but created a regional security vacuum that Washington would have to manage when the U.S. presence increased considerably during the Bush Administration. Energy objectives were also partially successful as they achieved gains for US companies investing in Central Asia and agreement on the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Yet, plans stalled for a Trans-Caspian pipeline and the Caspian Pipeline Consortium’s pipeline has succeeded in further linking Central Asia to Russia. Democracy promotion initiatives remained a low priority during this period.

After 9/11, the United States signed base agreements with both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan and established a strong military and political presence in the region. Soon after signing partnership agreements with Uzbekistan, Washington’s relationship with Tashkent began to unravel. Unfulfilled expectations, State Department and congressional insistence on upholding U.S. human rights objectives in the wake of the Karimov government’s May 2005 crackdown at Andijan, combined with mixed messages from the Departments of State and Defense all contributed to a rupture in U.S.-Uzbek relations and the subsequent eviction of U.S. troops from the Karshi-Kanahbad military base.

RESULTS:
U.S.-Central Asian engagement has produced mixed results. Successes in some areas have coexisted with failure or neglect in others. The Clinton Administration achieved most of its nonproliferation goals and many of its energy objectives. Yet, the administration failed to make much progress on political reform issues, and its policies helped promote a regional security vacuum. During the Bush administration, U.S. officials were initially highly successful in securing Central Asian government support for U.S.-backed security initiatives, including backing for the intervention in Afghanistan. Washington’s democracy promotion strategy proved less successful, engendering suspicion and resistance from regional governments.

INTRODUCTION:
The Iran-Contra affair resulted from two separate operations: the sale of arms to Iran in hopes that American hostages in Lebanon would be released and the supply of covert military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras waging an insurgency against the anti-American Nicaraguan government. While the diversion of profits from the arms deals to the Contras garnered the most attention at the time, the operations themselves represented a larger failure of the national security system. This study is important to the goals of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) in that it does not seek to assign blame or focus on the diversion of money, but instead aims to examine how lapses in the national security policy process resulted in two operations of dubious legality and efficacy.

In part, the strategy was a direct result of the struggle between the executive and congressional branches of government over authority to determine foreign policy. In 1982, Congress passed the Boland Amendments, which prohibited the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or any other government agency from providing military aid to the Contras. The White House viewed this as an attempt to limit its constitutional right to determine foreign policy and sought to bypass the legislation. To this end, Reagan shifted operational control of Contra policies from the CIA and DOD to the NSC staff, since the latter were not subject to formal congressional oversight and technically did not fall under the amendments’ restrictions.

Those agencies with the proper knowledge and skills to manage the operations in both Iran and Nicaragua—the CIA, the Department of State (DOS), and the DOD—were purposely bypassed because they were subject to congressional oversight. In addition, infighting prevented NSC principals from cooperating to form policy. DOS opposition to the arms deals and DOD’s refusal to run the Contra operation thus failed to influence actual events. The Secretaries of State and Defense remained outside the decision-making process and informational loop until the Iran-Contra affair was revealed in the press.

EVALUATION:
The conflict between the White House and Congress over control of foreign policy was the root cause of the Iran-Contra affair. This struggle resulted in the executive branch circumventing congressional controls to implement what it deemed were essential operations. Unfortunately, the means chosen—the operationalization of the NSC staff—proved ineffective. The NSA strictly controlled information about the administration’s policies regarding Iran and Nicaragua. While this approach allowed for greater secrecy and quicker decision-making, it did not facilitate improved decision-making or an appropriate level of debate about the policies to be implemented. As a result, policy implementation proved as problematic as policy formation. The NSC staff and NSA lacked the resources, capacity, or expertise to conduct Reagan’s foreign policies in Iran and Nicaragua independent of the other elements of the national security structure.

RESULTS:
The bypassing of the interagency decision-making structure led directly to the ill-advised operations in Iran and Nicaragua. By empowering only a few individuals with operational authority, a vital layer of discussion and open debate within the NSC was eliminated. This process allowed select actors to monopolize decision-making. They made errors in judgment and showed weakness in management.
The resulting policies worked at cross purposes. For example, trading arms for hostages undercut the State Department’s support for arms embargos against state sponsors of terrorism. The excessive role of the NSA and NSC staff also confused other U.S. government agencies as to who exercised authority over U.S. foreign policy. Such confusion allowed individuals to exploit the prestige of the White House to expand their authority far beyond their positions.

CONCLUSION:
The failure to properly debate the Iranian and Nicaraguan operations within the existing national security structure—which normally includes considerable congressional involvement—led to ad hoc and uncoordinated policies. This lack of integration directly contributed to the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran and allowed for continued covert assistance to the Contras despite congressional prohibitions and substantial opposition within the executive branch. Nevertheless, the Tower Commission, established to probe the Iran-Contra affair, ignored the larger implications of the scandal and did not recommend sufficiently comprehensive changes to the national security system.

INTRODUCTION:
From 1918 to 1919, a particularly virulent strain of influenza struck the United States, quickly becoming the most destructive pandemic in human history. The total number of deaths attributed to the outbreak range from 40 to 100 million. The United States alone suffered 675,000 deaths out of a population of 105 million. An examination of the U.S. government’s management of the epidemic for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) highlights Washington’s failure to conduct an effective, coordinated response to one of the most important public health crisis in the United States.

STRATEGY:
Due to Washington’s preoccupation with the First World War, the U.S. government proved unable to create a strategy for combating the epidemic. Instead, federal officials typically devolved almost all liability for organizing the response to state and local governments. The federal agency nominally responsible for managing such emergencies, the U.S. Public Health Service, lacked the resources and authority to do so. The U.S. government did not develop a method to track the disease, nor did it implement effective quarantine and containment procedures. Media censorship during the war precluded press coverage of the epidemic and discouraged Washington from pursuing a public education campaign. In the absence of government assistance, state public health departments which lacked adequate funds and other resources, were quickly overwhelmed by the volume of sick and dying.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWERS:
Rather than coordinating a comprehensive response to the pandemic, federal agency priorities remained focused on the production of food, fuel, funding, industry, weapons or soldiers for the war effort. In 1918, the federal government dedicated only 180 public officials and 44 quarantine stations to combat the disease. Some U.S. military officers as well as state and local civilian authorities undertook their own response initiatives, but these were too limited in scope to have much effect.

EVALUATION:
The U.S. government had several opportunities to respond to the outbreak, but failed to take appropriate action. When the disease was first reported to the U.S. Public Health Service, officials neither offered advice nor acted on the information. The disease subsequently infected thousands of men at a U.S. Army training camp, but the Army did not notify the U.S. Public Health Service, nor did it quarantine the post. As the first wave of the flu spread overseas, Washington remained preoccupied with winning the war in Europe rather than developing and implementing an effective response to the crisis.

A second, more lethal, wave of influenza hit the United States in the summer of 1918. Domestic censorship and the limited scientific knowledge that existed about such diseases existed at the time hindered public awareness regarding the disease and impeded local officials from effectively responding to the crisis. The executive and congressional responses to the escalating crisis were always too little and too late.

The third wave of the disease arrived in the United States after the campaign in Europe had ended. Even without the war effort to overshadow domestic concerns, Congress paid little attention to the outbreak. The absence of anyone in charge, the lack of a coordinated strategy, and undeveloped and ineffective interagency decision-making structures prevented organizational learning from improving the U.S. government response.

RESULTS:
The U.S. government’s failure to develop an integrated strategy had a number of negative consequences, both militarily and economically. Soldiers who contracted the flu as trainees were moved from post to post, infecting others and virtually halting combat training. Shipping sick soldiers overseas impeded offensive operations in France. The economy was crippled as businesses and factories operated at a reduced capacity. In raw numbers, the disease killed more people than any other in human history.

CONCLUSION:
During the 1918-1919 pandemic, the U.S. government failed to recognize the importance of employing an effective interagency response to a threat that transcended traditional departmental and federal jurisdictions. Washington never mounted an integrated effort to decrease the number of sick and dying Americans. The federal government lacked strategic vision to conduct national operations and never issued sufficient guidance to states. In the absence of direction, local leaders were left to combat the disease using inadequate staff and resources. The deeply flawed response to the pandemic demonstrates the importance of ensuring shared situational awareness in responding to a crisis, not only for informing top-level decision-makers, but also for distributing knowledge to empower decentralized coordination and execution at the local level.

INTRODUCTION:
After the voters of East Timor overwhelmingly voted to separate from Indonesia in a referendum on August 30, 1999, anti-independence militias linked to the Indonesian government launched a campaign of terror. Initially, U.S. officials looked to Indonesian authorities to halt the violence, but it soon became clear that the Indonesian government could or would not do so. Although the Australian and American governments both endorsed deploying an international peacekeeping force to restore order in the territory, the allies were initially unable to agree on an acceptable bilateral division of labor. In the end, the U.S. government contributed limited but important transportation, intelligence, communications, and logistics assistance as well as a modest number of American military personnel to the peacekeeping force, the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET). This contingent deployed in late September and rapidly restored peace to the territory.

The case of East Timor is an example of successful international peacekeeping achieved with a minimal commitment of U.S. assets. The American government’s response to the events in East Timor also serves as a useful study of Washington’s difficulties in developing coherent strategies in situations where U.S. national security interests are considered minimal.

Washington first encountered difficulties developing a cohesive strategy due to a lack of attention to the issue by senior U.S. leaders, which made it difficult to unify the agency response. As a result, the Australians received discordant messages from their American interlocutors. After the Australians made clear their dissatisfaction with the lack of clear U.S. support regarding an issue that they perceived as of vital interest for their country, President Clinton and his key advisers established a clear strategy—combining pressure on Indonesia with support for Australia—and effectively mobilized the bureaucracy behind it.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
During the pre-crisis period, U.S. government agencies pursued disparate agendas based on their varying core missions and areas of focus. The State Department was preoccupied with ensuring Indonesia’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy, the Department of the Treasury attempted to promote economic reforms in the country and manage the concurrent Asian financial crisis, while the Defense Department continued focus on improving relations with the Indonesian military. After the President and other senior U.S. leaders developed a coherent strategy, however, the diplomatic, military and economic bureaucracies proved effective at implementing it. In particular, the agencies pursued a successful integrated effort to compel a reluctant Indonesian government to permit the deployment of INTERFET on its territory and provided sufficient, though limited, assistance to the Australian-led military intervention.

EVALUATION:
U.S. government decision-making structures generally functioned efficiently only after senior leaders became engaged and took charge of the bureaucracy by empowering their key subordinates. Limitations on resources and capabilities, and a preoccupation with crises elsewhere (especially Kosovo), explain the initial U.S. hesitancy to intervene in the East Timor crisis. In this case, neither U.S. civilian nor U.S. military agencies suffered from inadequate resources, authorities, and operational capabilities, primarily because Australia took charge of the military response and the United Nations as well as other countries made important contributions. This multidimensional effort meant that Washington had to provide only modest support. Although members of Congress initially resisted allocating money and troops to quell violence in East Timor given its seemingly peripheral concern to core U.S. security interests, congressional leaders, like their executive branch colleagues, eventually rallied behind the intervention after Australian officials had defined the issue as a decisive test of the U.S.-Australian security alliance.

RESULTS:
Washington’s original reluctance to commit heavily to a military intervention in East Timor resulted in a short-term deterioration in U.S.-Australian relations and perhaps led to a greater level of post-referendum violence than might otherwise have occurred. Despite initial difficulties, the U.S. strategy regarding the East Timor crisis was largely successful. U.S. government agencies effectively mobilized diplomatic and economic pressure against the Indonesian government and subsequently provided vital support for Australia’s lead role in INTERFET. These policies ended the civil strife in East Timor, facilitated the territory’s transition to independence, and ultimately strengthened U.S.-Australian ties.

CONCLUSION:
Four key conclusions emerge from the analysis of U.S. policy making toward the East Timor crisis. First, U.S. government agencies initially encountered difficulties developing a coherent preventive strategy, which caused needless confusion in Australia. Second, implementation proceeded smoothly after President Clinton and other senior U.S. government officials decided on an integrated strategy and empowered subordinates to carry it out. Third, both the early weaknesses and the ultimate strengths that characterized the U.S. response resulted primarily from the fact that the American interests and resources engaged in East Timor proved to be modest. Finally, U.S. credibility and American-Australian security relations experienced short-term deteriorations but sustained no significant lasting damage.

In the summer of 1994, President Clinton delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly calling for the eventual elimination of anti-personnel landmines (APLs). At the time, he had bi-partisan support in Congress and the backing of the leadership in the Departments of State and Defense. Yet, mismanagement of the interagency process in developing and implementing a diplomatic strategy resulted in the United States being demonized, sidelined and isolated as 122 other nations negotiated and subsequently signed the “Ottawa Treaty” to ban landmines. This case is important for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) as it reveals how adherence to Cold War processes and structures is often ill-suited to provide the speed and flexibility needed to meet today’s diplomatic challenges.

STRATEGY:
The U.S. Government lacked an agreed position on APLs throughout the Ottawa Process, making a strategy all but impossible to formulate. This problem largely resulted from the lack of unified policy development within the interagency or even within departments. Perhaps most damaging to the process was the extended debate within the Department of Defense on the military necessity of APLs. The department was divided between pro-ban members of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) on one side and service representatives in the Joint Staff (JS) on the other. This dispute, compounded by a lack of clear signals from the White House, made it difficult for the Department of State to formulate an effective diplomatic strategy.

As the process became muddled, high ranking members of the Clinton administration strove to create a new policy. Eschewing in-place mechanisms, partly because of constant press leaks and partly out of a sense of urgency, they devised a policy in support of a limited ban. The revised decision was promulgated by Presidential Decision Directive 48, designed to establish interagency roles and missions relating to APLs. Despite the tone of the directive, finality of decision and unity of purpose had not been achieved within the U.S. Government. Most telling, the document asked the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), NSC, and Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs each to provide separate implementation options for review by the Principals. The administration eventually decided to pursue the APL limits through the regular arms control venue of the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD). This approach was known to be arcane, slow, and very deliberate, but it was a process with which many officials felt comfortable and which others thought appropriate. Unfortunately, this implementation strategy proved unable to keep abreast of the accelerated pace of modern diplomacy.

The Joint Staff was virtually impervious to contrary views put forth by OSD. This was because the JS did not require OSD approval for an issue to rise to the chairman’s level and then cross over to the Secretary of Defense, whereas OSD officials could not move an issue up to the Secretary if they did not have agreement from the Joint Staff. This resulted in an antagonistic relationship. Some members of the OSD employed political guerrilla tactics in support of viewpoints. Compounding the situation, there were two teams undertaking APL policy work within the Pentagon, with little sharing of conclusions and findings. This bifurcation of policy work between mid- and high-level officials existed in many interagency processes. Middle managers at State, OSD, and even the JS attempted to steer their own course since the results of the Principals and Deputies meetings were seldom provided nor were there opportunities for mid-level staff to move ideas up to the higher levels. Defense and State’s inability to integrate policy kept negotiators in a constant state of frustration and often forced them into stony silence.

EVALUATION:
The U.S. Government was not prepared for the direction the Ottawa Process would take. The lack of speed and flexibility demonstrated by the interagency was the natural culmination of a confused process. In the end, the negotiating team lacked a clear goal, a strategy to achieve that goal, or the authority to pursue that strategy. A lack of leadership contributed to the failure to develop a coherent APL policy. The early abstinence on this issue by senior officials made consensus hard to achieve, new positions difficult to craft, and negotiations all but impossible to pursue. The decision to stick with the hide-bound arms control protocols of the CD also slowed down the U.S. responses to the nimble efforts of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

INTRODUCTION:
In 1964, an earthquake struck Alaska that measured 9.2 on the Richter scale, the most severe ever recorded in North America. Transportation networks and critical infrastructure were almost entirely decimated, crippling Alaska’s feeble pre-oil economy. Nevertheless, federal, state and local bureaucracies rapidly and effectively collaborated to maintain Alaska’s viability as a state in the aftermath of the disaster. The case is of particular interest to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) due to the Johnson administration’s successful coordination of federal and state agencies in managing the relief and recovery efforts.

STRATEGY:
No recovery organization had existed prior to 1964. The Johnson administration therefore confronted the task of integrating national resources in an ad hoc fashion. The President created the Federal Reconstruction and Development Planning Commission for Alaska, a cabinet-level agency that developed a rehabilitation strategy and managed its implementation through an effective division of labor among the agencies most engaged in the recovery efforts.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Backed by presidential authority, the Commission expedited both policy and operational decision-making, encouraging cooperation among scores of government agencies. Eventually, virtually every government agency became involved in the Commission.

The many specialized task forces supplemented the activity of the first responders in the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) rather than attempting to supplant it. This non-hierarchical approach was essential to convincing the OEP to collaborate with the new Commission.

EVALUATION:
Several variables explain the development and implementation of a successful recovery operation. At a decision making level, it was important that no single agency had clear authority over peer agencies. This approach facilitated the conceptualization of a unified strategy, while maintaining incentives for individual agencies to employ their resources most effectively. The simplicity of the organization and management approaches used by the Federal Reconstruction and Developing Planning Commission for Alaska not only allowed a high degree of flexibility in the implementation of broad federal objectives, but in combination with the unprecedented emphasis on rapid action, it also minimized the level of financial investment necessary for the recovery effort. Reliance on experienced career personnel to lead the execution of Commission policies also turned out to be crucial. The decision to involve the Alaskan populace actively in the recovery process also facilitated success during the implementation phase. Rather than retarding progress, involving affected Alaskans, as well as state and local agencies in the federal decision making inspired trust in the actions of the federal government, and saved both time and money.

RESULTS:
The earthquake imposed major costs on many Alaskans, but the effective recovery efforts obviated the need to activate the last-resort strategy of relocating much of the Alaskan population to other parts of the United States. The rehabilitation efforts allowed the state’s economy to survive the ordeal. These successes demonstrated how the federal, state and local governments can profitably collaborate with businesses and nonprofit groups as an integrated team even in the dace of a catastrophic disaster. Although each community faced unique challenges, the unprecedented management strategies adopted by the Commission provided a framework under which diverse and timely solutions could be implemented very rapidly.

CONCLUSION:
Reconstruction efforts following the 1964 Alaskan earthquake showcased effective and swift collaboration between federal, state, and local agencies tasked with responding to a catastrophic natural disaster. Vesting officials with the ability to respond rapidly compressed most critical reconstruction into the first few months after the Alaska earthquake, minimizing the economic impact of the damage and allowing residents to remain in the state.

INTRODUCTION:
After two failed attempts at interagency coordination during the Vietnam War, President Lyndon Johnson decided to intervene directly to improve the management of U.S. support to pacification in South Vietnam. The resulting initiative, known as CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support), created an interagency headquarters that streamlined U.S. efforts in support of the South Vietnamese government and the fight against Viet Cong insurgents. The case of CORDS is critical to the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) as it exemplifies an interagency structure that effectively integrated elements of national power in pursuit of U.S. counter-insurgency, nation-building, and governmental capacity building efforts in South Vietnam.

STRATEGY:
Prior to the inception of CORDS, the U.S. pacification assistance mission in South Vietnam was run by the United States Mission offices in Saigon. The State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the U.S. Information Service (USIS) all were responsible for various aspects of this mission. The military advisory effort was run by Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV); however, military assets were outside the direct purview of the embassy. The U.S. Government created CORDS to overcome these organizational and administrative problems and better focus U.S. interagency support behind South Vietnamese efforts at pacification.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
CORDS was unique in that it placed nearly all civilian and military interagency assets involved in the pacification struggle under one civilian manager—and then subordinated that individual to the military hierarchy as a Deputy Commander of Military Assistance Command Vietnam. This innovative structure provided the pacification effort nearly unfettered access to enormous military and civilian resources. By centralizing planning and management in one headquarters, and subsequently replicating the identical management structure at every level of the South Vietnamese government (military region, province, and district), CORDS established an effective interagency body. It blended civilian and military personnel and improved U.S. pacification support to all levels of the South Vietnamese government.

EVALUATION:
One variable that explains CORDS’ ultimate success at mitigating interagency tension was the decision to put military commanders in charge of civilians and vice versa. This innovative mixed structure demonstrated to CORDS staff that agencies would reward personnel based on their skills, abilities, and mission performance and not on previous agency loyalty. Furthermore, CORDS was comparatively well-resourced, allowing its elements to accomplish objectives quickly and completely. Finally, CORDS emphasized creating a working relationship with the South Vietnamese to generate more comprehensive pacification plans that would ensure U.S. and Vietnamese military and civilian resources worked together. The Vietnamese pacification planning apparatus would grow in size and capacity as it slowly came to embrace all aspects of its mission.

RESULTS:
CORDS was, on the whole, effective in establishing viable military and civilian aid initiatives in conjunction with the South Vietnamese, efficiently managing those programs and measurably improving the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese security forces in the countryside. However, CORDS’ major, if inherent, weakness was that the organization had to partner with the deeply flawed South Vietnamese government. Although CORDS mobilized and integrated U.S. military and civilian pacification initiatives in support of South Vietnam, it could only achieve a limited success in that, by itself, it could not ensure the viability of an independent South Vietnam.

CORDS assisted the American pacification effort in South Vietnam by reducing interagency bickering, creating a unified pacification effort under a single manager, placing that manager’s headquarters inside the military structure, and thereby allowing it to gain access to vast human, financial and organizational resources in implementing an integrated program at the provincial, district, hamlet, and village level. Despite these achievements, which required the allocation of enormous resources, the effort proved insufficient in itself to sustain the South Vietnamese government against its numerous internal problems and foreign enemies.