At present, Congress has limited interaction with the national security system because of its placement in the Executive Office of the President. This chapter will examine the continued appropriateness of that approach. Congress appears to inhibit interagency collaboration and reinforces interagency divisions by its exclusive focus on the authorities and budgets of departments and agencies. Although Congress will remain the key oversight component, this working group will examine other oversight mechanisms. These might include internally (such as inspectors general), judicially, and through Congress (i.e., Government Accountability Office).

In the process of meeting its objectives, the Congressional Oversight Working Group must examine the history and underlying assumptions of the current national security system’s oversight to determine how it took its current form. In so doing, the working group will be able to identify problems with the current system, their causes, and their consequences. From this point, the working group will move to identify prerequisites for a successful system of national security oversight, isolate critical impediments for success, and develop a full range of alternative solutions. From this process, the Congressional Oversight Working Group will derive its recommendations regarding the creation of a fully functional and improved national security system.