INTRODUCTION:
On November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Iran was attacked by a student mob that seized 53 hostages. The prisoners would be released 444 days later but not before a disastrous U.S. rescue attempt. Preparation for a possible military option aimed at freeing the hostages began two days after the crisis began. However, the secretive and disjointed nature of the planning—including the bypassing of existing structures that could have facilitated the process—led to an overly complicated, compartmentalized operation that had little chance of success. The mission failed to rescue the hostages and resulted in the loss of eight U.S. servicemen, seven helicopters, an Air Force EC-130, numerous classified documents and equipment, and American prestige.

STRATEGY:
President Carter’s vision upon assuming office included establishing a more streamlined NSC structure. To this end, the Carter Administration created two working committees within the NSC, the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC, tasked with crisis management, coordinated U.S. government (USG) policy toward Iran during the hostage crisis. However, the debate between the State Department and the interagency with regard to courses of action to free the prisoners impinged upon the effectiveness of the SCC. The State Department focused on diplomatic solutions and held that any military attempt to free the hostages would damage relations with U.S. allies and ties with Iran. In addition, the Department of Defense’s organization, planning, and execution of the rescue mission were decidedly ad hoc. As a result, many assets of other agencies, primarily the CIA and the State Department, were underutilized or ignored altogether.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Tensions between the State Department and the National Security Council (backed by the Defense Department) limited effective cooperation on a variety of issues and contributed to the differences of approach to freeing the hostages. In planning and executing the rescue mission, the expressed need for secrecy not only precluded the possibility of an integrated response, but prevented agencies from collaborating entirely. For example, the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research possessed extensive information on Iran but were forbidden to share this knowledge with those tasked to carry out the rescue mission. In addition, agencies responsible for implementing punitive measures against Iran, as directed by the President, acted in an independent and unresponsive manner; not only were they unable to coordinate relevant activities, in some cases departments even failed to execute Presidential guidance.

EVALUATION:
Differing organizational perspectives, poor relationships, and the inability of the NSC/SCC to unite pertinent agencies and departments resulted in a lack of a unified vision on how best to rescue the hostages. This was a key reason for failure. The absence of unity of effort was exacerbated by the overarching (indeed, crippling) desire for secrecy emphasized by high-level officials. The resultant ad hoc structures further weakened the military response. Finally, many existing processes within the federal government were simply not utilized.

RESULTS:
The failure of the rescue mission immediately undermined American prestige. The diplomatic cost was also high, resulting in a hardening of the Iranian position and a further nine-month delay in the release of the hostages. Nevertheless, the failed operation benefited the Department of Defense because lessons were discerned and resulting calls for reform were heeded. The botched action provided impetus for what would become the Goldwater-Nichols Act which empowered joint military operations. However, the rest of the interagency felt no such momentum for reform in the aftermath of the event.

CONCLUSION:
In examining the performance of a NSC structure that had undergone dramatic reorganization under President Carter, this case study offers insight into the ramifications of institutional shifts within the NSC. In addition, the text investigates what some experts consider Washington’s first encounter with radical Islam. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates the detrimental role personalities can play in decision-making within government departments and agencies that are not statutorily bound to a chain of command. In the end, the differences in approach between Brzezinski and Vance, Carter’s indecisiveness, and the overly secretive nature of the hostage rescue mission planning and execution, which sidestepped critical processes, almost guaranteed failure.