INTRODUCTION:
In 1956, U.S. policy makers saw American objectives in the Middle East foundering in the face of Arab nationalism and Soviet influence. To resuscitate the government’s agenda, President Eisenhower looked to Saudi Arabia and spearheaded an effort to make King Saud a preeminent leader and ally in the Middle East. Though overshadowed by the Suez Crisis and the promulgation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, this endeavor was a notable part of the U.S. regional security strategy and also marked a critical turning point in Washington’s relationship with the House of Saud. For these reasons, Eisenhower-era policy making towards Saudi Arabia is an interesting case for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR). Furthermore, an analysis of the King Saud strategy also offers insight into the much-debated Eisenhower national security apparatus while illustrating lessons on interagency strategy development and implementation in a challenging, yet critical, theater for U.S. national security policy.

STRATEGY:
By 1956, U.S. officials had become disillusioned with the political leadership of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and generally frustrated by the failure of U.S. strategies in the Middle East. In this context, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed reorienting U.S. regional policies, which the President endorsed in March 1956. Dulles’ approach established the basis of the administration’s policy towards the Saudi government, but Eisenhower himself directed the Department of State to consider promoting King Saud to regional leadership. In subsequent months, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, Israel’s invasion of Egypt, and other difficulties confirmed the President’s commitment to promoting the Saudi leader’s status. Ultimately, Eisenhower hoped King Saud would lead the Middle East away from anti-American currents of Arab nationalism and toward the Western camp.

The Saud strategy thus began, and would continue, as a casual presidential strategy. Political necessity and world views equating religiosity and guardianship of the Muslim holy places with natural leadership potential underpinned Eisenhower’s identification of King Saud as the administration’s key ally in the Middle East. From the outset, the policy suffered from a flawed foundation. In particular, the strategy discounted regional political imperatives.

INTEGRATION OF ALL ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
To advance Saud’s regional clout and friendly alignment, the President directed the Department of State to delineate ways of building up and currying favor with the King. To this end, the administration integrated the elements of national power relatively well. Over the course of 1956-1957, Eisenhower dispatched two ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, engaged in extensive personal diplomacy with the King, and solicited a National Security Council report on how Islam could be used to further American Cold War aims. Dulles enlisted the support of regional embassies and information agencies in boosting Saud. The Department of State also hosted a Saudi state visit. Furthermore, under Eisenhower’s authority, the Department of Defense renewed its lease of Dharan airfield in Saudi Arabia, the International Cooperation Agency granted the Saudi kingdom economic assistance, and officials in diverse agencies coordinated a substantial sale of armaments to the Saudi monarchy.

EVALUATION:
Despite the engagement of multiple government agencies and the employment of various tools of national power, the Saud strategy failed because it ignored predominant political realities in Saudi Arabia and the greater Middle East. This fundamental flaw resulted from individual errors in judgment and interagency weaknesses, including entrenched world-views and an unbalanced cabinet. In contrast, the clear authorities of the administration and the President’s individual initiative accounted for the relatively unified implementation of the policy.

RESULTS:
Though the Middle East remained free of Soviet domination and the administration made some progress in moving Saud into alignment with the West, King Saud never emerged as an effective leader or counterweight to Nasser. Instead, Saud led Arab opposition to Israel in the Gulf of Aqaba, rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine, and supported an anti-American, nationalist government in Syria. In the longer-run, the failure of King Saud to emerge as a pro-West leader dealt a blow to American aims and influence in the Middle East and led to further policy misadventures in the region. The failure of its regional policies also cost the administration an invaluable opportunity to capitalize on political capital accrued in the immediate aftermath of the Suez Crisis.

CONCLUSION:
The House of Saud endeavor illustrates that, even within the highly organized interagency processes instituted under President Eisenhower, impromptu policy could flourish. The inception of this strategy additionally demonstrates the potential problematic effects of an unbalanced cabinet and widely-held, inaccurate world-views within an interagency. Yet, the Saud policy highlights positive elements of the U.S. national-security decision-making processes as well. For example, the steadfast promotion of the Saudi leader in 1957 shows that, with clear authorities and presidential leadership, U.S. Government agencies can achieve relative unity of effort in executing national security policy.