Project on National Security Reform

INTRODUCTION:
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared on July 26, 1956 that he would nationalize the Suez Canal to raise funds for the planned Aswan dam. The canal had been co-owned by France and Great Britain since the late 1870s and served as a vital conduit for oil shipments to the West. The British and French governments were convinced that only the removal of Nasser and his replacement with a pro-western leader could defend their economic and political foothold in the Middle East. Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) considered Nasser’s pan-Arabic nationalism a threat to westbound oil shipments and western military bases in the region, they advocated logistical, political and military support for Great Britain and France. However, President Dwight Eisenhower, who personally chartered and directed American policy, believed that Egypt had a legal right to exercise the right of eminent domain within its own territory. In an attempt keep good relations with Great Britain and France yet avoid pushing African nations into the Soviet sphere of influence, the United States supported the idea of international operation of the canal. However, once Israel attacked Egypt and a joint British-French operation seized the canal, the Eisenhower administration chose to dissociate itself from its NATO allies.

STRATEGY:
Eisenhower gathered his closest advisers at the White House the day after Nasser announced his intention to nationalize the canal. The attendees agreed to dispatch Robert Murphy, the Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, to London to discuss the situation with the allies. Wishing to keep his options open, Eisenhower instructed Murphy to avoid any statements that might later tie the president’s hands. The president was against any ultimatum threatening the use of force against Egypt and consistently urged his European counterparts to avoid resorting to war until every peaceful means had been thoroughly explored and exhausted. Throughout negotiations to defuse the crises the United States advocated a solution that safeguarding the interests of those states dependent on the canal as well as recognizing Egypt’s legitimate rights.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
When Israel attacked Egypt on October 29, the United States was caught off guard. The open hostilities dealt a blow to Eisenhower’s efforts to preserve peace in the Middle East, hedge against Soviet influence in the region, and maintain the solidarity of NATO. Days later an Anglo-French task force occupied the canal. The United States was in a delicate position. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ principal concern was that American support of NATO partners would alienate North Africa’s newly independent states, pushing them to embrace the Soviet Union. The JCS, who argued that the nationalization of Suez endangered U.S. economic, military and political interests, were inclined to back their NATO partners. The course taken was to continue to support Egypt’s rights, as well as advocating for free international use of the canal. Immense pressure was put on London and Paris through U.S. efforts at the United Nations as well as State Department activities and Treasury Department threats. This aggravated the British and French, but the end of combat operations enabled the eventual negotiation of a permanent peace agreement.

EVALUATION:
Notably, the Suez dispute coincided with Eisenhower’s efforts to earn a second term in the Oval Office, thus the president kept tight reins on crisis management. Eisenhower’s meticulous approach to strategy development, which concentrated all decision-making concerning Suez in his own hands, enabled a coherent, consistent approach to the crisis. The president also held frequent ad-hoc meetings with an intimate circle of advisers. However, a weakness of the U.S. approach was that while the JCS participated actively in strategy development at early stages of the conflict, the NSC monopolized the decision-making beginning in September. In addition, several experts question Dulles’ effectiveness as a Secretary of State during the Suez crisis, largely due to his propensity for fiery rhetoric, which may have misled the British into thinking that the United States would back their decision to attack Egypt. Henry Kissinger deplored Dulles’ approach, which reduced American peace initiatives to mere stalling tactics, angered the allies, and failed to prevent the war. Lastly, Eisenhower strengthened Nasser’s position by publicly disavowing the use of military force against Egypt.

RESULTS:
On April 24, 1957, Egypt submitted a unilateral declaration (registered as an international treaty under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter) to the U.N. Secretary General, pledging an uninterrupted navigation of the Suez Canal for all nations. In a manner, this satisfied some of Eisenhower’s objectives. However, the Eisenhower administration failed to achieve its goal of preserving amicable relations with Nasser. Also, some claim that Washington’s inconclusive posture in Suez encouraged the Soviet Union to entrench itself not just in the Middle East but also in Europe. NATO also suffered from the fallout of the Suez Crisis, as France became convinced it could not rely on its allies and pulled back from involvement in the alliance.

CONCLUSION:
While the Suez crisis did not lead to a general war between the Soviet Union and the United States, it had immense impact on the nature of the Cold War. NATO suffered, Moscow was emboldened, and the Middle East fell into a Nasserite era that hurt the U.S. position there. For good and ill, the Suez crisis marked Washington’s full ascension into world leadership as Great Britain pulled back and the United States filled its place. This necessitated a new, multi-faceted strategy for dealing with the volatile Middle East. Thus, in January 1957, Congress approved the Eisenhower Doctrine, a Middle East program of economic aid, military assistance, and protection against communist aggression. The doctrine set the stage for Washington’s future military interventions in the region.

INTRODUCTION:
The energy crisis of the 1970s was rooted in America’s increasing dependence on foreign oil. OPEC’s 1973 decision to halt oil shipments to countries supporting Israel in the ongoing Yom Kippur War, including the United States, turned a difficult situation into a disaster. The embargo lasted five months, but its effects lingered for the remainder of the decade. A second oil crisis began in 1979, during the Iranian Revolution, which halted that country’s oil production. Most analysts, however, are reluctant to blame America’s energy ills of the 1970s entirely on exogenous forces. These problems might have been surmountable if Washington had not hobbled itself with poor organization and years of ineffective policy. Instead, the federal government’s attempt to manage the changing energy environment proved ruinous. This study confirms the conclusion of John Clark that “It is well-nigh impossible to find a scholarly analysis that answers… affirmatively” to the question “Did the United States respond effectively to the energy crises of 1973?”

STRATEGY:
In the early 1970s, the U.S. government was not organized in a manner that allowed the creation of a coherent and integrated energy plan. Of particular note, there were five separate fuel policies in lieu of one comprehensive strategy. Once the first oil shock hit, the system proved incapable of producing ad hoc responses to alleviate shortages. Strategy development was particularly difficult because responsibility for energy policy was distributed among eight cabinet departments, as well as numerous agencies, offices, and commissions. There was little coordination among this pantheon of government agencies or with state authorities. An integrated plan in such an environment proved impossible and reorganization difficult. There appears to have been some improvement in organization and policy creation by 1980, but many analysts believe the changes were partial fixes.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The U.S. government agencies and departments involved did not collaborate well to create an integrated strategy prior to the crisis nor was an ad hoc response possible once the oil shortage occurred. As the crisis approached, Nixon pressed for the establishment of a new energy department to integrate the U.S. energy policies, but negotiating such a large organizational change through Congress’s embedded and partisan power structure was cumbersome. Thus, the government structure that existed when Nixon assumed office was generally the one that would confront the crisis of 1973. At the onset of the embargo, additional organizations were created to supplement the existing institutions. This included the creation of the Federal Energy Administration (FEA), which was to be responsible for all energy policy operations and functions relating to petroleum programs. However, none of these efforts mitigated the crisis.

EVALUATION:
Nonintegrated policy, jurisdictional confusion, poor economic advising, lack of coordination between states and the federal government, bureaucratic indifference, and the sheer number of actors involved in energy policy gridlocked the system. As a result, the response to the energy shortfall was a series of mismatched and ill-advised policies that further exacerbated the crisis.

RESULTS:
The absence of a coherent energy strategy through the 1970s and failure to craft an even marginally effective ad hoc response to the oil shocks worsened economic conditions and contributed to energy price inflation, strengthening OPEC’s power, and increasing America’s vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the energy market.

CONCLUSION:
In the early 1970s, the U.S. government was not organized in a manner that facilitated the creation of a coherent and integrated energy plan. With five separate fuel policies and a division of responsibility among eight cabinet departments, numerous agencies, offices and commissions, an integrated policy was impossible. The system also complicated any ad hoc responses to alleviate shortages after the oil embargo began. Proposals for change, reorganization and response too often turned into power struggles. This case resonates today, as energy challenges, such as those of the 1970s, have become increasingly likely due to shrinking international oil reserves and increasing energy use. In addition, the responses of the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations to the crisis involved the creation of new committees, agencies and departments, a commonly prescribed antidote to contemporary national security challenges.

INTRODUCTION:
Examining the dynamic between U.S.-Pakistani relations and the American response to Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions offers valuable lessons in long-range planning and balancing strategic objectives. The Pakistani nuclear weapons program has been undertaken over a span of more than fifty turbulent years, during which time Islamabad’s relations with the United States have varied widely. Today, the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear relationship remains critical to international security as Pakistan’s nuclear potential is intertwined with issues of regional stability and Islamic terrorism. Moreover, study of the U.S.-Pakistani nuclear dynamic illustrates how a lack of overall direction and interagency planning impede U.S. policy effectiveness and continuity.

STRATEGY:
U.S. reactions to Pakistani nuclear developments have been largely ad hoc, a pattern that extends from the administration of Richard Nixon to that of George W. Bush. As a rule, other American strategic priorities (e.g., engaging the Soviet Union, strengthening global stability, or waging the Global War on Terror) eclipsed nonproliferation concerns in Washington. When U.S. officials considered Pakistan an essential ally, proliferation considerations were de-prioritized. At these times, the United States government had leverage with Pakistan but it was reluctant to use it. Several administrations were thus willing to publicly accept official Pakistani claims that there was no weapons program, that Islamabad was unaware of systematic sales of nuclear technology, or that nuclear sales had been stopped.

When Pakistan was not considered an essential ally, ties between Washington and Islamabad were often dismal, stemming from U.S. (especially congressional) objections regarding human rights, democracy, and weapons activities in Pakistan. American non-proliferation efforts at these times usually emphasized the cessation of U.S. aid to Pakistan. This course of action was ineffective and may have done more harm than good by pushing Pakistan’s military leaders to tighten internal controls and expand nuclear sales programs.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The presidency rarely galvanized the national security apparatus to combat proliferation in and stemming from Pakistan. Interagency cooperation, as well as cohesive interagency policy development, suffered as a result. For much of the period in question, the problem was not with individual rivalries between agencies, but at the top, where an absence of high-level leadership effectively minimized nuclear concerns. Indeed, several interagency intelligence and working groups effectively tracked Pakistani proliferation activities. The only significant area where differences in organizational culture played a role in cross-departmental activities was with sensitive intelligence information. Conflict over the use of intelligence––to expose nuclear traffickers, for example––was due to the differing priorities of intelligence agencies, which required information secrecy, and law enforcement and/or diplomatic agencies, which demanded varying degrees of transparency.

EVALUATION:
The most striking aspect of fifty years of U.S. relations with Pakistan is that the relationship has been almost totally transactional. Prioritization of other objectives has meant that Pakistan has seen a regular rotation between being the essential ally of the moment and being an outcast. The U.S. response to Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities has been rendered correspondingly inconsistent. Absent long-range, integrated U.S. planning on the Pakistani nuclear question, Washington proved generally ineffective at minimizing the risks posed by Islamabad’s nuclear program.

RESULTS:
Washington halted neither the development of a Pakistani nuclear bomb nor the dissemination of nuclear technology from Pakistan. In early years, the American approach did not check the steady advance of Pakistani nuclear development. In the 1980s, Pakistan created its first nuclear weapons, acquired delivery systems, sold nuclear technology, and helped bring the threat of nuclear war to South Asia. In the 1990s, Pakistani proliferation expanded, with major sales of equipment and technology to Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea. Meanwhile, the legacy of fluctuating U.S. support for Pakistan reinforced the image of the United States as a fair weather friend lacking real commitment to the well being of Pakistanis.

In the past decade the United States scored several victories against Pakistani proliferation. U.S. intelligence brought about the neutralization of A.Q. Khan and his nuclear black market. Additionally, Islamabad’s acceptance of U.S. security assistance for Pakistani nuclear sites marked an important achievement. Unfortunately, these gains have been overshadowed by decades of setbacks. Furthermore, the current nuclear crises with Iran and North Korea, as well as the threat of Islamic terrorists acquiring nuclear materials within Pakistan, have been exacerbated by the past failure of U.S. nonproliferation activities vis-a-vis Pakistan.

CONCLUSION:
The American approach to the Pakistani nuclear program illustrates the difficulties the United States government encounters in crafting long-range strategy and in balancing competing policy objectives. An absence of long-term planning on the Pakistani nuclear question resulted in little policy continuity between administrations and a general failure to address underlying drivers of the nuclear threat, such as Indo-Pakistani-Chinese rivalries and the Pakistani military’s ties with radical Islamic groups. The costs of these shortcomings continue to undermine U.S. national security.

INTRODUCTION:
On March 8, 1985, an explosion rocked the Bir al-‘Abd quarter of Beirut near the home of Ayatollah Mohammed Hussayn Fadlallah, the “spiritual guide” of Hezbollah. Though Fadlallah escaped unharmed, more than 80 persons were killed and 200 wounded. The assault was carried out by local operatives recruited by Lebanese intelligence, but it also took place in conjunction with an evolving American preemption counterterror program. This initiative took shape within the National Security Council (NSC) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after the U.S. embassy annex building in West Beirut was attacked September 20, 1984. An analysis of this assassination attempt and the organizational dynamics which underpinned it warrant review because similar dynamics could influence more contemporary counterterror practice choices.

STRATEGY:
It remains unclear whether or not the choice of Fadlallah as a target and the specific plan to kill him originated in the White House or with local operatives in Lebanon, as accounts vary. Evidence does suggest, however, that there was no dispassionate American analysis of the role Fadlallah played in Hezbollah’s tactical decisions. In reaction to watershed terrorist assaults on U.S. interests, officials sought to craft an American firewall in Lebanon without proper consideration of the inherent nuances and intricacies associated with such a project. As a result, the approach was not guided by a carefully reasoned set of counterterror measures consistent with American foreign policy interests in Lebanon and other areas of the Middle East. Instead, the program revolved around ad hoc counterterror practices with an almost singular focus on hard-line actions to confront Islamic terrorist assaults. Importantly, there was no known, proactive effort to gauge Fadlallah’s day-to-day involvement with the operational side of Hezbollah. This omission likely led American officials to focus almost singular attention on Fadlallah rather than on chief tacticians such as Imad Mughniyah and Hussayn al-Musawi.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
An absence of consensus among high-level foreign policy officials about the preemption program, and possibly the plan to kill Fadlallah, contributed to the overall ineffectiveness of U.S. counterterror activities. There appears to have been unresolved conflict between groups of elite policy makers across the CIA, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State over the legality, necessity, and wisdom of the initiative. In some cases, disagreements about the utility of counterterror assassination existed within those organizations as well. Consequently, there was extremely poor interagency planning and coordination for the program. In particular, tactical oversight and management responsibilities—which ultimately failed to prevent local operatives from undertaking the assasination mission on their own—were not helped by broader bureaucratic strains and tensions over U.S. involvement with the Fadlallah attack.

EVALUATION:
U.S. Lebanon policy—including the counterterror program—set unrealistic objectives given the realities of Lebanese politics. Interagency conflict played no small part in creating these mismatched goals. The corrosive effects of bureaucratic politics were aggravated by the ideological fervor of certain major players, making the prospect of consensus even more remote. A dysfunctional decision making system prevailed, where small groups of political advisors to President Ronald Reagan competed for presidential approval. There were also notable organizational inefficiencies associated with the U.S. National Intelligence Officer (NIO) structure. For example, a rigid set of guideposts instituted by the NSC essentially prevented the CIA from delving into the policy recommendation side of analysis. This resulted in unsatisfactory ties between nuanced analysis conducted by indidivduals with local knowledge and policy decisions.

RESULTS:
The extent of U.S. government involvement in the Fadlallah assasination attempt was and remains debated. Nevertheless, apparent U.S. complicity besmirched an already badly tarnished U.S. reputation and improved the standing of Hezbollah and other anti-Western elements throughout the Middle East. Moreover, the assassination attempt put into even sharper relief the distance between American pronouncements about democracy and fair play and the reality of the Reagan administration’s strong support for the heavy-handed Lebanese Maronite Christian government. The Fadlallah affair generally undermined the physical security of Americans and U.S. allies, and served as a contributing factor to additional terrorist assaults against U.S. interests.

CONCLUSION:
The Fadllah episode illustrates the inherent problems associated with preemptive counterterror practices and demonstrates how interagency conflict can reduce an initiative’s coherency, legitimacy, and effective implementation. It underscores the negative effects of policy disconnects and the structural deficiencies, misguided assumptions, and ideological fervor which help bring them about. As the United States tries to confront complicated terrorist structures similar to those found during the 1980s, it is crucial that lessons be learned from the U.S. counterterror strategies and activities related the Fadlallah affair.

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