Project on National Security Reform

INTRODUCTION:
The forces of international financial crisis can inflict real damage on societies, contributing to uncertainty, instability, and disruption. One need look no further than the current global economic crisis for a reminder of how quickly the deep fear and anxiety associated with volatile financial markets can sap a society’s sense of well-being. In such situations, the power of unilateral policy is limited. Financial crises require a highly coordinated and well-designed international economic response. Accordingly, an analysis of Washington’s response to such an international emergency, the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, offers an illuminating test case for the efficacy of U.S. interagency processes and valuable insights for the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).

STRATEGY:
The lead U.S. agency during the Asian financial crisis was the Treasury Department. In August 1997, during the initial weeks of the crisis, Treasury appears to have viewed the emergency as limited—a garden-variety balance of payments (BOP) crisis with an Asian twist. Blame was laid at the feet of the Thai government and Washington refused to contribute to the August International Monetary Fund (IMF) support package for Thailand. The continued U.S. push for financial market liberalization in subsequent months suggests Treasury did not fully appreciate the financial linkages among Asian economies, the potential for a systemic banking crisis, and the role played by short-term capital flows. Further, because the bulk of foreign lending in the region involved European and Japanese banks, Treasury was relatively unconcerned about the direct effects of the crisis on U.S. financial firms.

Washington entered a new phase of policy formulation when the crisis enveloped South Korea and Hong Kong in mid-fall 1997. At this stage, Treasury’s public arguments supported the use of multilateral loans (through the IMF) conditional on local country policies that raised interest rates, reduced government spending, and reformed the financial sector. As the systemic nature of the crisis emerged, the IMF took the lead in responding to the crisis, although the U.S. Treasury remained highly influential through its voting power on the IMF Executive Board.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
With Treasury clearly in charge, other U.S. agencies played largely supporting roles during the crisis. The perspective of the national security community does not seem to have influenced the Treasury’s initial set of responses to the crisis. The State Department’s overseas offices provided an immediate platform for policy discussions with country officials as well as for monitoring reports on regional political developments. The Department of Defense tracked the implications for regional security, reported on availability of U.S. naval resources in the Pacific, and conducted visits with key Asian partners. However, broader discussions taking place at the Departments of State and Defense were largely divorced from the economic prescriptions being developed by Treasury and the IMF. Though the New York branch of the U.S. Federal Reserve disbursed U.S. bilateral aid as Treasury’s fiduciary agent, the Fed as a whole assumed only an advisory role. Congressional engagement was also limited; however, legislators’ reluctance to finance the IMF conflicted with the Treasury approach and contributed to mixed messages being sent by the U.S. government to the Asian nations and international financial markets.

EVALUATION:
Though U.S. influence was inherently constricted by the nature of the crisis, to the extent which American policy was capable of affecting outcomes, Washington’s management of the Asian financial crisis was a mixed success. The ad hoc nature of interagency relations weakened the potential for whole-of-government policy that might have better supported the promotion of U.S. strategic interests regionally and globally. Treasury’s ideological bias toward financial market liberalization and its close relationship with the White House, an advantage in some ways, tended to mute other agency perspectives. State and Defense entered discussions relatively late in the process and critics of the IMF’s austerity measures were largely ignored. For its part, Congress demonstrated little to no capacity to work with international financial agencies and allies in forging a coordinated economic response.

However, in the clear emergence of the Treasury as the lead agency and in the skill and dedication of its leadership, Washington performed fairly well. Treasury, in cooperation with the IMF and other foreign governments, restored stability and largely protected the U.S. economy and American commercial interests. Treasury’s internal organization, with a well-staffed and managed International Affairs Office, in addition to its oversight of the IMF and its good working relationship with the Federal Reserve and the White House, ensured a level of success.

RESULTS:
Economic losses from the crisis were large and irrefutable across Asia and growing economic insecurity made the governments of nearly every country in the region untenable in the short-term. Nevertheless, the economic ills of the crisis swept through the region within about two years, after which economies slowly recovered. The United States and the developed world felt few long-term financial effects. At the same time, IMF/U.S. conditions placed on governments seeking assistance likely imposed unnecessary hardship and poverty on millions. Resulting resentment and distrust lingers. Furthermore, clashes between the Clinton administration and Congress over IMF funding and other issues, in addition to the financial focus of the response, began to raise doubts regarding the credibility of U.S. security commitments to its Asian allies. Overall, the narrow U.S. focus on the financial aspects of the crisis overshadowed national security concerns to the detriment of long-term American interests in the region.

CONCLUSION:
The economies of developed states depend on diffuse market forces for generating dynamic growth and national wealth––forces which are difficult to harness for the sake of meeting a national foreign policy goal. Yet, such aims have important long-term effects on U.S. national and economic security. With limited recognition of these realities and absent robust collaboration in Washington during the Asian crisis, the U.S. government found it difficult to achieve more skilled and effective leadership in the international financial crisis.

INTRODUCTION:
The pretext for the Persian Gulf War and the formulation of the global coalition against Iraq was the decision made by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invade the neighboring state of Kuwait. Arguably the first case of unilateral state aggression since the end of the Cold War, the August 2, 1990 invasion and subsequent annexation of Kuwait by Iraq threatened key U.S. interests on a number of fronts. American policy makers began to build an international coalition against Iraq immediately after reports of the invasion reached Washington. By the end of August, Washington had assembled an unprecedentedly broad and diverse coalition to defend Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield and subsequently liberate Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm. Though the Gulf War coalition narrowed the military options of the Bush administration, it was instrumental in assisting the United States achieve the primary Gulf War goal: the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty.

STRATEGY:
The Bush administration refrained from over-utilizing existing security institutions such as NATO to build the coalition because such organizations were not sufficiently diverse to provide the United States the level of international legitimacy it deemed necessary to move against Iraq. While the administration did use the United Nations as a tool for diplomacy and relied heavily on its historically strong relationships with key Security Council members to support its agenda, a large portion of the coalition was built from scratch and had little or no precedent. Since the Bush administration assembled the coalition for the expressed purpose of mollifying both global and domestic opposition to American military engagement, the coalition formed was broad, rather than politically congruous. While this provided the intended legitimizing effect, conflicts of interest between coalition members eventually led to the constraint of military options and U.S. objectives.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Bureaucratic and interagency conflict was sparse and did not prevent Washington from developing a unified, comprehensive, and cohesive strategy to build and maintain the coalition against Iraq. The National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA worked well with the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury to formulate policy objectives, coordinating with one another through formal and informal groups. The multi-agency Deputies Committee was highly coordinated, responsive, and served as a coalition crisis management team. During the course of the coalition building process and the war, the Deputies Committee proved to be highly effective in this role, particularly in managing the response to President Hussein’s launching Scud missiles into Israel.

EVALUATION:
High level dialogue, cooperation, and trust between administration officials led to the formulation of diplomatic policies and strategies which uniformly supported the agenda of President Bush and ultimately contributed to the success of the coalition. After years of working together in the upper echelons of American government, President Bush and his national security team had both the expertise and the “chemistry” necessary to quickly formulate and execute a strategy in response to the crisis, even while operating in a virtual policy vacuum. Importantly, they also operated within the framework of informal groups which best suited the direct leadership style of the President but also gave team members the ability to operate and communicate with relatively high level of independence. However, while the administration was highly successful diplomatically, the design of the coalition could not accommodate all U.S. objectives. This oversight can primarily be attributed to the lack of specific American policies in regard to Iraq prior to Iraq’s unanticipated invasion of Kuwait. With the crisis demanding a swift response and action from the administration, the Bush team did not have time to adequately evaluate all potential objectives before formulating and executing their strategy in response to the invasion.

RESULTS:
The success of the coalition building effort gave the United States both the domestic and international legitimacy it required to accomplish the Bush administration’s primary objective of ending the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. However, the coalition also hampered the United States ability to complete stated goals and ruled out adopting more ambitious objectives. Coalition induced tactical errors and the necessity to maintain coalition consensus prevented the U.S. military from completely destroying the retreating Iraqi Republican Guard, an important goal of the President and his national security team. It also eliminated the option for the United States to pursue to removal of Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime in Iraq, a goal which some analysts assert was seriously considered by the administration.

CONCLUSION:
In contrast to the current war in Iraq, which has been undermined from the outset by the relative absence of international support, the conduct of the U.S. government before and during the Persian Gulf War reveals how the national security system can successfully build and leverage a coalition. While the limits imposed by the coalition were burdensome, no scholar has persuasively outlined an alternative strategy which would have enabled the United States to achieve all possible objectives without greatly increasing the political and/or military losses for Washington. However, had a comprehensive long-term policy in regard to Iraq been available, the Bush administration may have had the freedom to undertake a more calculated strategy and been better prepared to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each policy option against long-term goals in the region.

INTRODUCTION:
On April 11, 2002, top Venezuelan military commanders removed President Hugo Chavez from power in a classic coup d’état. Businessman Pedro Carmona assumed the presidency on April 12, but his support fragmented and he was forced to resign on April 13. By noon on April 14, Chavez had returned to power. The Venezuelan coup transpired over the course of just four days. The urgency of the narrow timeframe forced U.S. government agencies to respond immediately and instinctively, ultimately revealing that the national security establishment was prepared neither to properly anticipate nor react coherently to a crisis within its own hemisphere. Whether Washington supported or opposed the coup remained unclear throughout the crisis. The result was predictable: the U.S. government was accused of orchestrating the coup, on the one hand, and ridiculed for the coup’s failure, on the other.

STRATEGY:
Before the April coup, U.S. government officials consistently voiced their opposition to any “undemocratic and unconstitutional means” of removing Chavez from power. At the same time, agencies and organizations funded by the U.S. government operated in support of anti-Chavez democratic opposition groups and civil society efforts. In short, Washington hoped for a Venezuela without President Chavez, but was willing to wait.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
While various U.S. agencies and departments worked together reasonably well before the coup, they handled the actual crisis poorly. Some agencies issued statements implying recognition to and support of the Carmona government, despite the fact that Carmona had seized power through “undemocratic and unconstitutional” means. Later, these statements were reversed, but the damage to U.S. prestige and credibility had already been done.

EVALUATION:
The lack of coordinated strategy enabled American officials at different agencies to issue conflicting statements. Despite the Intelligence Community’s clear and consistent warnings of the potential for a coup, the State Department, the White House, and in-country officials had not agreed upon a shared plan of action in the event the forecasted coup materialized. Notably, at the time of the coup senior policy makers were distracted by other high-profile events, including counterterrorism actions and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

RESULTS:
The bungled U.S. response to the coup provided fuel to conspiracy theorists who believe that the Central Intelligence Agency operates as a nefarious force in the world, overturning regimes its masters dislike. Incoherent American statements helped bolster Hugo Chavez’s position in Venezuela by raising the specter of foreign interference in domestic affairs. Chavez further enhanced his standing by painting himself as a fearless leader willing to stand up, on behalf of Latin America, to perceived imperialist aggression. Finally, the American response allowed opponents of the United States to portray American foreign policy, with its commitment to democracy and the rule of law, as hypocritical.

CONCLUSION:
In April 2002, the U.S. government dealt ineffectively with the coup in Venezuela. It seemingly abandoned prior policy against extra-constitutional seizures of power with statements implicitly recognizing the new government, ignoring intelligence estimates that the coup would fail. When the coup fell apart, the U.S. government quickly condemned the plot, but the reversal could not undo resultant damage to American credibility. Clearly, the rapid events of the coup, and the fact that it occurred over a weekend, contributed to confusion. However, though a coup had been anticipated, no U.S. contingency plan was in place. Exacerbating the flawed response, intelligence was ignored and officials did not coordinate their agencies’ respective responses.

INTRODUCTION:
On November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Iran was attacked by a student mob that seized 53 hostages. The prisoners would be released 444 days later but not before a disastrous U.S. rescue attempt. Preparation for a possible military option aimed at freeing the hostages began two days after the crisis began. However, the secretive and disjointed nature of the planning—including the bypassing of existing structures that could have facilitated the process—led to an overly complicated, compartmentalized operation that had little chance of success. The mission failed to rescue the hostages and resulted in the loss of eight U.S. servicemen, seven helicopters, an Air Force EC-130, numerous classified documents and equipment, and American prestige.

STRATEGY:
President Carter’s vision upon assuming office included establishing a more streamlined NSC structure. To this end, the Carter Administration created two working committees within the NSC, the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC, tasked with crisis management, coordinated U.S. government (USG) policy toward Iran during the hostage crisis. However, the debate between the State Department and the interagency with regard to courses of action to free the prisoners impinged upon the effectiveness of the SCC. The State Department focused on diplomatic solutions and held that any military attempt to free the hostages would damage relations with U.S. allies and ties with Iran. In addition, the Department of Defense’s organization, planning, and execution of the rescue mission were decidedly ad hoc. As a result, many assets of other agencies, primarily the CIA and the State Department, were underutilized or ignored altogether.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Tensions between the State Department and the National Security Council (backed by the Defense Department) limited effective cooperation on a variety of issues and contributed to the differences of approach to freeing the hostages. In planning and executing the rescue mission, the expressed need for secrecy not only precluded the possibility of an integrated response, but prevented agencies from collaborating entirely. For example, the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency, and the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research possessed extensive information on Iran but were forbidden to share this knowledge with those tasked to carry out the rescue mission. In addition, agencies responsible for implementing punitive measures against Iran, as directed by the President, acted in an independent and unresponsive manner; not only were they unable to coordinate relevant activities, in some cases departments even failed to execute Presidential guidance.

EVALUATION:
Differing organizational perspectives, poor relationships, and the inability of the NSC/SCC to unite pertinent agencies and departments resulted in a lack of a unified vision on how best to rescue the hostages. This was a key reason for failure. The absence of unity of effort was exacerbated by the overarching (indeed, crippling) desire for secrecy emphasized by high-level officials. The resultant ad hoc structures further weakened the military response. Finally, many existing processes within the federal government were simply not utilized.

RESULTS:
The failure of the rescue mission immediately undermined American prestige. The diplomatic cost was also high, resulting in a hardening of the Iranian position and a further nine-month delay in the release of the hostages. Nevertheless, the failed operation benefited the Department of Defense because lessons were discerned and resulting calls for reform were heeded. The botched action provided impetus for what would become the Goldwater-Nichols Act which empowered joint military operations. However, the rest of the interagency felt no such momentum for reform in the aftermath of the event.

CONCLUSION:
In examining the performance of a NSC structure that had undergone dramatic reorganization under President Carter, this case study offers insight into the ramifications of institutional shifts within the NSC. In addition, the text investigates what some experts consider Washington’s first encounter with radical Islam. Furthermore, the analysis demonstrates the detrimental role personalities can play in decision-making within government departments and agencies that are not statutorily bound to a chain of command. In the end, the differences in approach between Brzezinski and Vance, Carter’s indecisiveness, and the overly secretive nature of the hostage rescue mission planning and execution, which sidestepped critical processes, almost guaranteed failure.

INTRODUCTION:
At roughly 10:30 a.m. on August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda terrorists detonated, almost simultaneously, large vehicular bombs outside the United States embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Two-hundred twenty-four people were killed, including 12 Americans and 32 Foreign Service National employees. Approximately 4,000 people, mainly Kenyan and Tanzanian civilians, were injured. This case study examines the policy and intelligence failures prior to the bombings, the immediate U.S. response (largely medical), and Operation Infinite Reach, the U.S. military response to the terrorist attacks, which targeted suspected al-Qaeda facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan. Most analysts agree that institutional failures occurred before and after the attacks, with shortfalls prior to the bombings being more numerous and consequential.

STRATEGY:
At the time of the attacks, intelligence and policy officials had yet to fully appreciate the threat posed by loosely-organized transnational terrorist networks; namely, Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. This was largely due to the inability of intelligence and policy officials to perceive this information as representing an increasingly capable and far-reaching threat. This absence of understanding meant that the U.S. was systemically unprepared to pre-empt, prepare for, or respond to terrorist attacks akin to the simultaneous bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Following the attacks, the USG quickly mobilized response resources. However, numerous elements of the response were ad hoc due to the lack of adequate contingency planning for a mass-casualty incident abroad. Furthermore, the occurrence of multiple and simultaneous crises had never been contemplated. The decision to retaliate for the embassy bombings by utilizing Tomahawk cruise missiles in concurrent strikes against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan and terrorist training camps in Afghanistan on August 20, 1998 was also ad hoc.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The failure of the policy community to recognize the emergence of a new strategic environment resulted in part from the failure of policy-making and intelligence officials to communicate, cooperate, and share vital information within and between departments and agencies. More specifically, this compartmentalization of information inhibited officials from thinking outside of entrenched national security worldviews. During the response efforts, coordination and cooperation was necessary across the USG, as responsibilities and assets were (and remain) widely dispersed. Though the overall response was considered a relative success, disjointed liaising between agencies resulted in coordination and logistical difficulties. Lastly, an extremely small number of top government officials were involved in the initial planning stages of the retaliation and reservations regarding the selection of the al-Shifa plant as a target were largely ignored.

EVALUATION:
The pre-attack failures of the USG largely can be ascribed to excessive reliance on tactical intelligence when formulating threat assessments, institutional cultures which discouraged cooperation and free dialogue within and between agencies, a collective incapability to accept new strategic paradigms, and a lack of funding for sufficient embassy security. Disjointed liaising between agencies was responsible for the flawed planning and logistical deficiencies during the immediate response to the bombings. Lastly, it is likely that image politics encouraged a rush to military action after the attacks. The Clinton administration’s failure to include more officials in the initial planning stages of Operation Infinite Reach, as well as his decision not to heed the advice of the Pentagon and other dissenting voices within the administration, accounted for the shortcomings of the retaliatory missile strikes in Sudan and Afghanistan.

RESULTS:
The loss and injury of American, Kenyan, and Tanzanian lives were the most obvious and tragic costs of USG failures. As for the attempt at retaliation, many government officials deemed the Tomahawk missions “very expensive failures.” There was no evidence at the time of the attacks that al-Shifa was linked to Osama bin Laden, and post-strike data indicate that the plant was not involved in chemical weapons manufacturing. The strikes on the al-Shifa, furthermore, damaged American prestige.

CONCLUSION:
When analyzing the performance of the U.S. government prior to and immediately following the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, one finds that the inability of the intelligence and policy communities to recognize and properly assess the new strategic environment of the late 1990s—despite possessing the information to do so—was the root cause of the strategic failure to anticipate and adequately prepare for terrorist attacks on U.S. interests in East Africa. This inability was rooted in the lack of cooperation and information-sharing within and between government agencies. Though the U.S. response to the bombings was considered a relative success, planning and logistical failures caused by a lack of pre-event preparation and disjointed interagency liaison prevented a timely response to the attacks and the deployment of effective resources. Also, retaliation for the embassy bombings was not planned or vetted by many government officials. Hasty decisions in the face of insufficient evidence resulted in the ineffective and costly missile strikes of Operation Infinite Reach.

SUMMARY:
Our future national security structure must not only meet the traditional state-to-state military threats, but it must also address the non-state actor threats that include terrorist cells and organized crime. This paper examines the 35-year and interagency (civilian and military) response to illicit drug trafficking. It not only offers unique insights into the problems and tensions in responding to non-state actor threats, but it also offers successful interagency organizational mechanisms that can tactically meet non-state actor threats and leverage them for strategic gain. Please note that the opinions and conclusions expressed in this case study and presentation are those of Mr. Klun and do not necessarily represent the views of either the Drug Enforcement Administration or any other governmental agency.

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INTRODUCTION:
In 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered that Iran’s nuclear program was far more advanced than even U.S. intelligence had expected. Since then, a variety of diplomatic groups have sought Tehran’s assurance that Iranian nuclear research is peaceful in nature. The George W. Bush administration supported, but did not directly participate in, most of this diplomacy. Towards the end of the administration, U.S. engagement focused on containment of Iran and became more proactive. After January 2007, President Bush spearheaded three sanction-imposing resolutions in the United Nations Security Council. The administration also sought to increase its projection of military and intelligence power in the Persian Gulf. However, the Bush White House was unable to resolve the standoff, leaving the Obama administration to grapple with the specter of a nuclear armed Iran.

STRATEGY:
The Bush administration generally acted in an ad hoc manner in response to the Iranian nuclear issue. The While House reacted to developments in negotiations between the EU-3 (Great Britain, France, and Germany) and Iran, and failed to formulate a coherent, purposeful strategy. Senior administration officials concede that Iran policy was not formally established at the end of the first Bush term. In an implicit recognition of the inadequacy of existing national security structures, the administration established the Proliferation Security Initiative in 2003. The initiative was an ad hoc yet proactive global framework which sought to integrate counterproliferation resources. In March 2005, the administration publicly endorsed the EU-3 negotiations and in May 2006 U.S. officials offered to enter into talks on the basis of Iranian suspension of uranium enrichment. Iran rejected the deal. In January 2007, President Bush indicated that the administration would henceforth focus on containment, involving a military build-up in the region, increased military aid and intelligence sharing with Persian Gulf states, and further isolation of Iran in international financial markets. The president maintained that military options against Iran’s nuclear facilities would remain “on the table.”

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The literature analyzing the U.S. approach uniformly attests to the inadequacy and incoherence of the plans, processes, and organizations which sought to counter Iran’s nuclear ambitions, at least for the first five years of the Bush administration. The common narrative suggests that “hawkish” figures, particularly in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and on the vice president’s staff, promoted regime change in Iran, but were constrained by Iraq policy. More “liberal” elements of the administration, typically identified as State Department officials, pushed for stronger engagement in bilateral diplomacy on specific issues, such as security in Iraq and Afghanistan. After a protracted period of drift and disorganization, the administration mobilized various agencies, departments, foreign governments, and the Congress around a strategy of containment. This approach has been characterized by improved integration of national power and interagency cooperation.

EVALUATION:
Plagued by bureaucratic in-fighting, conflicting interagency cultures and ideologies, poor decision making mechanisms, and the absence of an overarching, coherent policy, the U.S. government surrendered the lead on Iran to the EU-3 for much of the Bush administration. Institution-specific values, particularly at the State Department, dominated policy making leading to incremental, ad hoc, and ineffective courses of action. The president’s inability or unwillingness to enforce consensus on national security policy and to dedicate sufficient attention, resources, and energy to the problem established an unhelpful and misleading disconnect between the content of American rhetoric and the substance of U.S. policies.

RESULTS:
Failing to pursue a unified and disciplined approach, the U.S. government allowed Iran additional time to develop its nuclear program and damaged relations with U.S. allies. Contradictory gestures such as conferring legitimacy on Iran by offering to enter into negotiations while also hinting at regime change, undermined U.S. credibility and leverage. Nevertheless, at the end of the Bush administration, international diplomatic and financial pressure made some progress in constraining Iran’s nuclear capacity.

CONCLUSION:
The realization of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions would advance Iran’s expansionist regional ambitions, constitute an existential threat to Israel, and threaten U.S. forces and allies in the region. Possession of a nuclear capability would strengthen the existing regime and reduce the prospect of democratic reform. An Iranian atomic bomb would also increase the likelihood of nuclear material falling into the hands of terrorist groups and possibly trigger a nuclear arms race in an already volatile region. Iran’s willingness to conceal the extent of its nuclear program, combined with its resistance to conventional forms of diplomatic pressure, indicates that successful resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem without premature use of military force by the United States and international community will likely require the use of a wide and integrated set of national and international security tools.

INTRODUCTION:
In the summer of 2003, Liberia was unraveling. Since an intermittent civil war began in 1989, Liberia had been the “eye of the regional storm” in West Africa. The conflict claimed over 200,000 lives, and eventually spilled over into neighboring states, most notably Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. The death toll continued to mount and the number of refugees and internally displaced persons was approaching 500,000. To stabilize the situation and counter a looming humanitarian disaster, the Bush administration participated in a limited intervention and supported Nigerian peacekeepers under the umbrella of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In preparation for the intervention, the U.S. offered ECOWAS diplomatic, logistical and financial support and ordered the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group to Liberia. In August, under Operation Sheltering Sky, about 200 of the 2,100 military personnel aboard the ready group deployed in Monrovia. The minimal American military operation ended on October 1, 2003 when the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) assumed responsibility. In the eyes of Colonel Blair A. Ross, then Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Task Force Liberia, “the U.S. military mission in Liberia was an unqualified success.” The International Crisis Group (ICG), which had been otherwise critical of the U.S. approach to Liberia, likewise acknowledges that “The U.S. did play a useful role…” Today, according to the ICG, Liberia seems to be on a delicate path to peace: “Everything is aligned for potential success but the situation, as shown by the post-election riots [of 2005], remains fragile.”

STRATEGY:
During the crisis, major policy differences, mainly between the Departments of Defense and State, could not be resolved for over a month. This failure in the decision-making process led to an ad hoc approach to the Liberian humanitarian emergency. The deployment of a Humanitarian Assessment and Security Team was illustrative of this. The Team did little to help develop a strategy, as its initial report was blocked by the Pentagon for offering policy advice. A decision to endorse a small-scale U.S. intervention in support of a larger peacekeeping force manned by ECOWAS was eventually reached.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Delayed decision-making did not translate into mission failure. Once a strategy was identified, the departments responsible for planning and implementing the operation exhibited a strong response characterized by good interagency coordination and situational awareness. As a result, the ad hoc intervention was a success.

EVALUATION:
Disinterest during the early stages of the crisis, lack of information sharing, long-term inattention to the Liberian situation and policy drift due to diverging preferences on a course of action were partially responsible for decision-making failure. However, once the mission was ordered, the response was highly effective. Early recognition of operational demands was central to mission success. Experience in coordinating humanitarian operations allowed the European Command to appreciate the complexity of interagency processes in such contingencies. Coupled with advanced technology, this recognition contributed to the mission’s success.

RESULTS:
The operation achieved all identified mission objectives: the intervention abated the humanitarian crisis, supported ECOWAS in securing Monrovia and paved the way for UN peacekeeping forces, thus putting Liberia on the road to peace. Nevertheless, decision-making gridlock led to unnecessary loss of life in Liberia; a wavering approach made it harder to convince regional players to assume the lead; and unwavering adherence to the mission statement resulted in a risky transition phase.

CONCLUSION:
The Liberia operation is an example of a successful U.S. intervention in Africa, where U.S. military engagement has been especially scarce since the ill-fated 1992-1993 Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Major policy differences in the NSC resulted in early decision-making paralysis and an ad hoc approach to the Liberian crisis but this did not lead to a failure of the intervention. Instead, once the choice was made to intercede on a small scale, the proper resources were brought to bear and the operation achieved all the goals identified by the administration. The nature of the complex humanitarian operation and Liberia’s operational environment necessitated strong interagency efforts and lessons learned may facilitate the strengthening of the new African Command.

INTRODUCTION:
On September 11, 2001, the terrorist group Al-Qaeda carried out a series of coordinated suicide attacks on the United States, which resulted in the deaths of nearly 3,000 people. These attacks represented “an event of surpassing disproportion,” highlighting the inability of the U.S. intelligence agencies to identify and prevent terrorist acts on American soil. The bipartisan National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—also known as the 9/11 Commission—was established to investigate the attacks. It concludes that the intelligence community’s “most important failure was one of imagination,” noting there was “uncertainty” in the community, “as to whether this was just a new and especially venomous version of the ordinary threat the United States had lived with for decades, or it was indeed radically new.” The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks spurred an effort to reform the U.S. intelligence system. To this end, the 9/11 Commission called for the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with wide authorities to oversee the Intelligence Community (IC), replacing the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) as the IC’s helm. While the position was codified into law under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) on December 17, 2004, it was granted more limited authority than originally envisioned by the commission.

STRATEGY:
Before 9/11, attempts to integrate the efforts of Intelligence Community under the DCI were ad hoc. After 9/11, however, the government began a fast-tracked effort to better coordinate intelligence by creating the position of DNI, as well as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to better centralize information. Implementation of this goal progressed despite pushback from agencies and some resistance in Congress. Since its creation, the DNI has supported several additional reforms to strengthen its position, but momentum for further intelligence restructuring appears to have stalled.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Pre-9/11, intense interagency rivalry existed between the CIA and FBI. In addition, the Clinton administration’s effort to better coordinate the intelligence process created antagonism between the agencies and the White House and sometimes stifled information from getting to the right consumer due to rivalries. While the effort to create a DNI proceeded post-9/11, opposition from agencies in the IC and some legislators in Congress, as well as ambivalence from the White House, worked to weaken the authorities of the DNI in the final legislation. While this has hindered the DNI’s ability to end interagency rivalries, there have been key improvements to enhance information sharing.

EVALUATION:
Specifically, the weaknesses of the pre-9/11 IC were a lack of centralized authority, an absence of political will to reform the IC, and poor information sharing between agencies, as well as unchecked rivalries, in particualr between the FBI and CIA. The pressure exerted by the 9/11 Commission on the U.S. government to implement its recommendations helped spur reform, which resulted in the creation of the DNI. Since its creation, however, a number of variables, including continuing agency hostilities, myopic organizational cultures and information sharing problems, as well as increased bureaucracy, have complicated the development and implementation of the DNI strategy. The limited authority of the DNI, combined with the ambiguousness of its powers and increased bureaucracy have complicated the intelligence process. Plus, as the IC structure has become more centralized in response to past criticisms, the dangers of overcentralization have come to light, particularly the fear that the IC might put too much focus on a single risk.

RESULTS:
The failures prior to 9/11 culminated with a terrorist attack on the homeland that cost more than 3,000 American lives. Since the passage of the IRTPA in 2005, the effort to reform the Intelligence Community—and the role of the DNI in that effort—has made progress, but significant obstacles linger. Allowing these obstacles to remain increases the risk of another large-scale terrorist attack, given the importance of intelligence to counterterrorism efforts.

CONCLUSION:
The case of the failure of the IC to detect the impending terrorists attacks on America and the subsequent creation of the DNI illustrates a concerted attempt to centralize the nation’s intelligence structure after a massive failure. This attempt sought to rectify entrenched organizational rivalries that have been institutionalized in the IC since the 1947 National Security Act. This case illustrates the level of bureaucratic opposition many reforms face and the difficulty of avoiding past faults within new organizations. Consensus exists that the mere creation of the DNI, for a variety of reasons, has not in itself instigated the kind of intelligence reform needed to fully address the threats facing the United States.

INTRODUCTION:
Training an indigenous police force has been one of the seminal challenges of the Iraq War. The success of the police-training mission in Iraq is of critical importance as a competent, humane police force—dedicated to protecting the citizen’s person and rights—is essential for the establishment of a viable democracy. However, in the absence of coherent pre-war planning and reliable intelligence, the United States has conducted the training mission, with the support of its coalition partners, in an almost entirely ad hoc manner. As with so many other aspects of the war, the burden of police training has fallen to the U.S. military. While the U.S. armed forces’ ability to adapt to new and challenging tasks is impressive and encouraging, the necessity of the military’s involvement speaks to shortcomings on the part of other federal agencies and departments.

STRATEGY:
A preponderance of U.S. war planners were decidedly optimistic in their expectations for post-conflict Iraq, assuming that Saddam’s Iraq would fall as a fully functioning state with its institutions intact. Under such presumptions, limited police training would be needed. Three weeks before the invasion, General Jay Garner, head of Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA), met with senior National Security Council (NSC) officials. At the meeting, he unveiled a detailed plan for police training that had been developed by Richard Mayer, a Department of Justice (DOJ) affiliated member of ORHA. Mayer’s plan called for 5,000 American and foreign advisers to help train Iraq’s police. NSC officials preferred a lighter footprint in line with post-war assumptions and the Mayer plan was not executed. Ad hoc planning became the mainstay of strategy: The U.S. approach was in constant flux as trainers attempted to make up for past mistakes and resource shortcomings.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Since the United States did not have a large training capacity in either the Department of State (DOS) or DOJ, various contracts were issued to provide civilian law enforcement training and mentoring of Iraqi police. However, given the poor security situation, the U.S. government had difficulty hiring enough International Police Liaison Officers (IPLO). This provoked a change in U.S. strategy, iterated in National Security Presidential Directive 36 which was issued on May 11, 2004. The directive vested responsibility for the training of all Iraqi security forces to the Department of Defense (DOD), though DOS was to be tasked with control at an undetermined future point. Thus, U.S. soldiers and Marines administered ad hoc training. While considerable improvements have been made in police training, there are still not enough or IPLOs to cover all of Iraq’s needs.

EVALUATION:
In the planning stages of the war, there was a lack of cooperation between U.S. agencies. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) consistently prevented Pentagon representatives from attending CIA exercises regarding the “day after” Saddam’s fall, for example. In the midst of interagency disconnects, post-war possibilities for Iraq were not given sufficient consideration. The resultant ad hoc operations contributed to inefficiency in the police training process. In addition, DOS and DOJ exhibited difficulty projecting a strong presence in the unstable environment of post-war Iraq. Reliance on contractors severely limited these two agencies’ capacity for operating effectively in dangerous or unstable environments. Due to simple necessity, the DOD with its vast resources has come to dominate contributions to police training. The military’s ability to adapt to this expanded and unfamiliar mission has been impressive, even if it has resulted in training that leans more toward counterinsurgent capabilities than community policing.

RESULTS:
The first month of any nation building effort is the most important. Unfortunately, the coalition’s decision to turn a blind eye to looting and to take its time starting the police training mission laid a poor foundation in Iraq. Since then, U.S. missteps and failures in police training, often excused because of the unstable security situation in Iraq, fed instability. Ad hoc decision making has been cumbersome at times and outright injurious at others. While some progress has been made, training remains slow and far below required levels.

CONCLUSION:
An understanding of the long and circuitous route that the United States has taken in training Iraqi police yields important lessons for national security policy in future nation-building environments. Effective and humane policing is essential to the vitality of the new Iraq. However, the U.S. training mission has been almost entirely ad hoc. Incomplete post-war plans and civilian capacity shortfalls led the U.S. military to assume the responsibility of training, further taxing its already strained resources.