Project on National Security Reform

INTRODUCTION:
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Horn of Africa received renewed interest from the United States as a potential front in what would become the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Somalia in particular was positioned as a focal point for American counter-terrorism operations as a result of the country’s prior connections to regional terrorist activities and its perceived status as a safe-haven for al-Qaeda members. The United States responded to the terrorist threat in East Africa by establishing Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2003. U.S. counter-terrorism operations in Somalia and East Africa have been guided by a unique interagency GWOT strategy combining defense, diplomacy, and development. This approach has seen had positive results although, according to some, military operations continue to dominate U.S. activities.

STRATEGY:
U.S. counterterrorism strategy in the Horn is articulated at multiple levels. Within the broader context of the GWOT, objectives are shaped by the “Four D’s framework” in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: “defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit, and defend U.S. citizens and interests at home and abroad.” Although the Bush administration has established a clear counterterrorism strategy for the GWOT, individual requirements in the Horn of Africa are addressed in an ad hoc manner to allow flexibility and swift responses to events in the field. On an operational level, CJTF-HOA articulates its strategy as a combined “Three D” counterterrorism approach, emphasizing defense, development, and diplomacy. Scholars define major objectives in the Horn to include regional stabilization through humanitarian aid, capacity building, and support of foreign agencies; strengthening ties with allies in the Horn to facilitate the implementation of counterterrorism policy; and improving Washington’s ability to identify and collect intelligence on regional terrorist threats and responding to such threats when necessary. Framing each objective broadly has allowed DOD and DOS to act with fewer restrictions and to adjust tactical responses as needed.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Cooperation between the DOS and DOD has been sporadic and the 4D/3D approaches only haltingly integrated. However, integration has improved steadily and the presence of DOS and USAID representatives in the CJTF-HOA Command Element has aided in coordination. DOD and USAID personnel have facilitated the completion of hundreds of humanitarian projects throughout the Horn. Military-to-military training has helped secure borders which Somalia shares with Kenya and Ethiopia, while DOS has managed to improve U.S. diplomatic relations with allies in the Horn. However, CIA operations in the region have been criticized for operating autonomously and without consideration for long term U.S. interests or strategies.

EVALUATION:
The strengths of the U.S. response are rooted in the multiagency approach and articulation of a national counterterrorism strategy and a compatible regional strategy. At the presidential level, a broad counterterrorism plan is articulated in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and reflected in the 4D/3D strategy. The multiagency approach facilitates cooperation between the Departments of State and Defense, and USAID, and encourages even individual agency responses to be carried out in the context of broader U.S. objectives in the region. A critical weakness in the American strategy is that aid does not always reach the areas in most need. Another weakness is an over-reliance on military tools and responses. Also, interagency cooperation still suffers due to organizational rivalries and disparities in resources. Additionally, U.S. agencies active in the region have been hindered by a shortage of personnel with knowledge of local languages and cultures. Lastly, security issues have limited the activities of aid agencies, diplomatic missions, and human intelligence operatives in Somalia itself, demonstrating that U.S. government organizations have trouble operating in failed state environments.

RESULTS:
Analysts and scholars have noted that U.S. involvement in the Horn of Africa has led to closer cooperation and coordination with allies in order to stabilize and increase the overall security of the region. U.S. operations have resulted in the elimination of extremists in Somalia (including members of al-Qaeda), thus denying terrorists a safe haven and transit point. However, American involvement in Somalia and Washington’s focus on kinetic military operations have become a rallying cry for global Jihadist movements, and triggered an increasingly negative view of the United States among Muslims in Somalia and Eastern Africa.

CONCLUSION:
Rear Admiral Bob Moeller, head of the Department of Defense’s Africa Command (AFRICOM) transition team, noted in June 2007 that the CJTF-HOA model will be replicated across Africa with the formation of the new combatant command. Given this, it is important to consider the successes of CJTF-HOA, which should be duplicated, and the shortcomings hat should be addressed. Overall, the 4D/3D framework for U.S. operations in the Horn has encouraged cooperation between U.S. agencies. The approach is intentionally flexible to allow rapid response to changing conditions. This strategy appears effective in part due to the stabilization of the region: there has been a noticeable drop in HOA terrorist attacks and armed insurgencies since U.S. policy implementation. However, cooperation remains imperfect, resources unbalanced, and some accuse the CIA of working outside of the framework of the overall U.S. strategy for the Horn of Africa, undermining the good-will work done by other agencies.

INTRODUCTION:
From the late 1960s until the 1990s Northern Ireland experienced “the Troubles”—a period of sectarian tensions and violence between loyalist Protestant and republican Catholic paramilitary groups. In 1972, the British government instituted direct rule over Northern Ireland and organizations such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged, calling for the unification of the North with the Republic of Ireland, by violent means if necessary. Although U.S. policy historically viewed the issue as a British domestic matter, the Clinton administration took a more active stance and committed sustained American attention to resolving the conflict. This involvement contributed to the brokering of the Good Friday Agreement, which allowed Northern Ireland to decide its own future and unofficially marked the end of the Troubles. While the bulk of the peace process—from 1993 to 1998—occurred during the Clinton administration, the Bush administration has continued U.S. involvement.

STRATEGY:
President Clinton’s Northern Ireland policy consisted of a clearly articulated strategy to foster peace in the region by actively facilitating the negotiation process. While Clinton had a personal interest in the issue, the President also made the matter a top priority of his administration. Clinton tasked his principal White House advisors with policy towards Northern Ireland, opened channels of communication to Sinn Féin (the political wing of the IRA) and appointed Senator George Mitchell as the U.S. Special Envoy to Northern Ireland. In contrast, the Bush administration’s Northern Ireland strategy has been more ad hoc and has generally focused on combating terrorism.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Clinton’s strategy involved both economic and diplomatic initiatives. Agencies and departments collaborated to implement economic initiatives, but for most diplomatic actions, the Clinton administration conducted Northern Ireland strategy directly from the White House. Additionally, in Northern Ireland, both Senator Mitchell and U.S. Ambassador to Ireland Jean Kennedy Smith had been in close contact with President Clinton and enjoyed wide latitude in the conduct of negotiations with governmental and other key regional leaders.

EVALUATION:
Timing was crucial to the success of the Clinton efforts as internal changes in the United States, United Kingdom and Ireland at the time put leaders in place who were inclined to pursue the peace process. Once embraced, the Clinton administration’s strategy was streamlined by the transfer of Northern Ireland policymaking from the State Department to the White House. The empowerment of the special envoy and the Ambassador to Ireland, as well as the creation of an independent commission with the authority to tackle tough issues, also made it easier to engage with paramilitary groups in exchange for concessions towards peace. Meanwhile, President Bush’s approach, which has resulted from the strategic context of the Global War on Terror and less Presidential attention to the issue, has undermined follow-up on the peace accord.

RESULTS:
Most importantly, the Good Friday Agreement brought peace to Northern Ireland, ending decades of violence and promoting economic gains. In doing so, the U.S.-led initiative also helped lead the IRA, a highly trained terrorist network that acted within Northern Ireland and exported its knowledge, to abandon its armed struggle. In recent years, the Bush administration has not devoted the same measure of attention to Northern Ireland. While some strides towards peace have been made, most significantly on a power-sharing agreement in 2007, dissatisfaction among the parties remains and violence between the Catholic and Protestant communities has recently increased.

CONCLUSION:
There is general consensus among the authors that U.S. efforts were vital to securing a peace deal, and continue to be important to the future of Northern Ireland. Evaluating the Clinton administration’s strategy development and implementation for the Northern Ireland peace process can serve as an important resource for decision-making when facilitating political reconciliation in the future. Most importantly, committed presidential initiative proved essential in placing the issue high on the agenda, putting continued pressure on the outside parties, and paving the path to a successful resolution. So too, strong, empowered diplomatic envoys had a valuable impact in bringing together and building enough trust from the parties to begin positive momentum on the peace process.

INTRODUCTION:
Struggle over territorial control of Nagorno-Karabakh has proven one of the most intractable and longstanding conflicts stemming from the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. The enclave has a long and volatile pre-Soviet history. When the Soviet Union collapsed and its republics proclaimed their independence, the Nagorno-Karabakh legislature decided to establish itself as an independent state. As a result, by 1992, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh (backed by Armenian troops and other military support) were engaged in full-scale war. In 1994, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh signed a Russia-brokered ceasefire but no final settlement has been reached. In the first 10 years after the independence of the Soviet Republics, U.S. policy toward the Caucasus was marked by a distinct lack of direction. Once the United States located strategic interests in the region, the guiding principle in the U.S. strategy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became the preservation of peace and prevention of military hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, U.S. efforts to broker a lasting peace through the OSCE Minsk Group, the only acting international mediator of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, have continued without success.

STRATEGY:
The early response of the U.S. government to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was ad hoc. However, by the end of 1990s and early 2000s, the approach became more systematic as Washington began to identify clear American interests in the region, ranging from oil in the Caspian to offsetting Russia’s influence. This led to more integrated and in-depth cooperation between U.S. government agencies and the formulation of a more coherent regional strategy. Under the Clinton administration this strategy aimed primarily at developing energy cooperation with Azerbaijan. However, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 reshuffled foreign policy priorities; the Caucasus became more geostrategically significant and the U.S. government began to conduct more aid programs, deliver more assistance and make more frequent attempts at the conflict resolution.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The first decade of American involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh and U.S. strategy to resolve the conflict was marked by an absence of interagency cooperation within the U.S. government. In the late Clinton administration, due to increased U.S. oil interests in the region, policy implementation was concentrated in the Departments of State and Energy. This stage was marked by closer cooperation of U.S. agencies working primarily in energy related programs. Despite Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which denied Azerbaijan American aid, the U.S. government endorsed major funding for oil exploration in the Caspian, which directly benefited the government of Azerbaijan. Section 907 was waived only in 2002 by President Bush, and has since been waived on an annual basis every year. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, cooperation was again suffering due to a failure to integrate political, economic, and security goals with those of conflict resolution. It was not until the last five years that interagency cooperation proved to be more successful.

EVALUATION:
A lack of awareness about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the region at large was a major reason for the weakness in early U.S. policy planning. Strategy development was particularly difficult due to insufficient knowledge of the history, ethnicities, and religion of the region’s people. Moreover, fierce bureaucratic squabbling over jurisdictions in combination with efforts of domestic interests and lobby groups to push their own South Caucuses agendas led to a divided U.S. regional policy. About a decade ago, however, the U.S. response began to acquire more coherence and direction. The major strength of the U.S. response to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict today is its perceived impartiality (in contrast to Russia and France, who are seen as more pro-Armenian). This neutrality is expressed in the style of American mediation efforts, in the equal provision of U.S. financial aid and assistance to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in the balance and cooperation between the U.S. Congress (seen as pro-Armenian) and the State Department (seen as pro-Azerbaijani). Congress has acquired its Armenia preferences in part because substantial numbers of congressmen have large Armenian populations in their respective states. Meanwhile the State Department tends to support the Azeri position because of Azerbaijan’s geostrategic importance and oil wealth.

RESULTS:
The absence of a coherent strategy in the early stages of the conflict and mixed political and strategic U.S. priorities confused the parties to the conflict and the countries of the region about the true American position. As a result, instead of bringing the countries of the region together, Washington contributed to their division. Improved strategy and greater engagement after 9/11 has facilitated more productive cooperation with regional states: including socio-economic initiatives, and democracy promotion programs. This has proven significant in staving off the possible resumption of military hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh.

CONCLUSION:
The United States was not ready to develop a coherent or coordinated strategy for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the region at large in the early- and mid-1990s. Even after Washington prioritized vested energy and strategic interests in the region, policy development and implementation remained insufficiently integrated. While the U.S. strategy is more coherent today than any point since the end of the Cold War, successes have been tactical and not strategic. Overall, U.S. economic, energy, and security goals are undermined by continuing instability in the region, something Washington has not been able to advance.

INTRODUCTION:
On December 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the west coast of the Banda Aceh region of Indonesia, percipitating a tremendous tsunami that devastated communities across Southeast Asia and the eastern coast of Africa. Populations were most affected in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and Thailand, where over 175,000 people died and tens of thousands more went missing. A global humanitarian response was launched to relieve the suffering of the countless individuals whose families and homes lay in ruins. The United States government contributed a comprehensive force to the relief effort, involving multiple government agencies and a massive military presence to assist host nations with recovery and reconstruction initiatives. The success of the U.S. response largely resulted from the thorough integration and flexibility of the involved government organizations, which allowed for the development of ad hoc mechanisms within a broad strategic framework. The aftermath of the tsunami additionally demonstrated that the provision of relief assistance can be a key instrument of national power.

STRATEGY:
The inevitability of natural disasters demands formal response strategies to catastrophic events worldwide. To this end, regulations and protocols exist for the activation and deployment of various government agencies to provide humanitarian aid. However, because disasters differ greatly and require varying activities, what constitutes humanitarian assistance remains undefined and agencies are given flexibility and authority to devise aid mechanisms specific to each emergency. In the case of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State, and the Department of Defense (DOD) adhered to standard strategies in deploying personnel and aid to the affected region. On the ground, relief workers acted in a tactically ad hoc manner but within broad strategic guidelines, addressing immediate issues in an integrated fashion.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
The established response mechanism effectively provided for the rapid deployment of humanitarian assistance. After U.S. Ambassadors and USAID initiated the response, other U.S. agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Bureau for Land Management, soon joined the relief effort. The Defense Department deployed military and logistical assets in support of the USAID-led relief operations. U.S. embassies provided diplomatic coordination to ensure smooth cooperation among the multitude of governments involved. Agencies which collaborated in tsunami-affected areas exhibited great adaptability in order to achieve a common goal. USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams on the ground received equipment and expertise from outside agencies, while ad hoc interagency task forces and working groups, such as the DOD-led Combined Support Force, were established to address disater-specific needs. In particular, USAID and DOD personnel cooperated throughout all organizational levels—from the field to strategic policy-making—in an effort to maximize coordination and streamline the U.S. response.

EVALUATION:
The successful implementation of the U.S. disaster relief effort was the result of established agency protocols, clear authority vested in USAID, organizational flexibility, strong interagency relationships fostered by past experiences, deference to expertise offered by a range of organizations, generous congressional support, and a shared mission. The few inefficiencies can be attributed to weak communication and information-sharing capabilities as well as differences in the organizational cultures of civilian and military actors.

RESULTS:
Inefficiencies in communications and coordination, while clearly impeding the effort, did not severely effect the overall success of the mission. The U.S. response helped mitigate loss of life, provide for communities’ basic needs, and initiate the rehabilitation and reconstruction phases of recovery. Additionally, the U.S. government, in demonstrating goodwill to the affected populations, improved its reputation among the largely Muslim areas of the region. This outcome benefitted U.S. national security objectives, especially in the context of the Global War on Terrorism.

CONCLUSION:
In response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, several U.S. government agencies united to accomplish a common goal: to save lives and provide basic services for affected populations. Leaders also sought to improve the U.S. image overseas by providing assistance and displaying the compassion of the American people. Successful interagency coordination materialized due to established protocols as well as flexible strategies that were created to deal with the specific effects and unique context of the disaster. Agency leaders, outside analysts, and members of Congress unanimously agree that U.S. government coordination was critical to the success of the tsunami relief effort.

INTRODUCTION:
After absorbing many years of cross border attacks from Lebanon by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Israel invaded its neighbor in 1982. Recognizing the repercussions the evolving situation in Lebanon could have on the Middle East and the Cold War balance of power, the United States felt compelled to respond. President Ronald Reagan immediately sent Philip Habib, his special Middle East envoy, to broker a cease-fire and later ordered U.S. troops to Lebanon as part of a Multi National Force (MNF). However, the MNF operation quickly fell apart when terrorists attacked the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut. The attacks brought about the departure of U.S. forces from Lebanon, leaving the country in chaos and U.S. interests significantly damaged.

STRATEGY:
At the time of the 1982 Lebanon crisis, the administration viewed the Middle East in terms of containment of Moscow. Despite the urging of regional analysts and leaders, the White House gave little attention to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The events of 1982 in Lebanon, for the most part, took Washington by surprise. The U.S. government responded with an ad hoc policy which highlighted the fact that the Reagan administration did not have a clear set of policies or objectives when it came to the Levant. The United States initially responded by taking part in the MNF which was deployed to oversee the evacuation of PLO guerillas from Beirut. Later, the United States took on a much larger role that included attempting to broker a peace deal between Lebanon and Israel, securing the withdrawal of Syrian and Israeli forces from Lebanon, and rebuilding and strengthening the Lebanese central government in an attempt to stabilize the country and end its civil war.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
There was no consensus on the position the United States should take towards Israel in response to the invasion or on whether or not U.S. troops should be sent into Lebanon as part of the MNF. Disagreements among departments, secretaries, and presidential advisors on the proper course of action were due to different cost-benefit calculations. While the Department of State (DOS) looked forward to the potential political benefits of success in Lebanon, the Department of Defense (DOD) did not want to put troops in harm’s way. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger’s view was that Lebanon was of no strategic importance to the United States and thus not worth the price of involvement. The Pentagon was also concerned about deploying troops without a clear mission or objective. The National Security Council (NSC) as a whole, favored the DOS perspective and convinced President Reagan to go ahead and send in peacekeepers.

EVALUATION:
Institutional tensions between DOS and the White House and between the State and Defense departments, in particular between the secretary of state and the secretary of defense, contributed to disagreement over political-military strategy in Lebanon. The administration’s interagency process did not resolve these conflicts. As a result, the military deployment to Lebanon was not part of a coherent strategy. The United States had set what may be considered adequate political goals: withdrawal of all foreign forces, strengthening the government of Lebanon, and momentum for larger Middle East peace negotiations. What was not clear, however, was how the military was going to be used as an effective instrument of foreign policy to achieve those stated goals. There was also a disconnect between high- and mid-level officials within the foreign policy establishment, unclear authority in the Reagan foreign policy decision making structure, and a lack of foreign policy experience and knowledge of the Middle East among decision makers.

RESULTS:
The only tangible achievement of the U.S. response was supervising the successful evacuation of PLO guerillas from Beirut. In contrast, the costs of the failure for the United States were high. In the short-term, the loss of 258 American lives and the financial burden of the military deployment were the most significant costs. In the long-term, the United States lost prestige in the Middle East and, more dangerously, the premature withdrawal from Lebanon gave terrorists like Osama bin-Laden the impression that the United States government would “cut and run” whenever it encountered American casualties.

CONCLUSION:
Given the continued conflict in Lebanon and across the Middle East, it is important to understand why the United States acted as it did and what the short-term and long-term effects of these actions were on America’s prestige and influence. The U.S. government response to the crisis in Lebanon was dictated by systemic/structural flaws in the Reagan administration which produced an incoherent, ad hoc response to the crisis. Notably, there was a disconnect between high- and mid-level officials within the national security system, ambiguous lines of authority in foreign policy decision making, and a lack of regional experience on the part of decision makers.

INTRODUCTION:
While lacking a dedicated combatant command, Africa had long been relegated to a tangential interest by U.S. military planners. As a result, although military engagement in Africa escalated after the end of the Cold War, it was often sporadic and lacked an overarching strategy. The result was a number of strategic failures on the continent. By the end of the 1990s, there was broad consensus that U.S. military activities in Africa had and might continue to fall outside the boundaries of traditional security missions, thus necessitating close interagency coordination. However, military strategists, policy makers and academics were not in agreement that a dedicated African command was part of the solution. Following nearly ten years of debate, on February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the creation of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). AFRICOM was established as a sub-unified command under U.S. European Command (EUCOM) on October 1, 2007 and reached full operational capacity (FOC) as a unified command one year later. U.S. officials envision an AFRICOM capable of facilitating effective interagency engagement and a coherent military approach across Africa.

STRATEGY:
Historically, U.S. strategy in Africa has been inconsistent and military activities have been ad hoc. As Africa has increased in strategic importance, civilian and military DOD officials have sought a more coherent strategy on the continent through a new combatant command poised to address unique security challenges. In December 2006, Secretary Rumsfeld recommended that President Bush establish AFRICOM. The President announced the command’s formation in February 2007. AFRICOM aims to unite ongoing DOD activities, previously administered by separate combatant commands, and facilitate military coordination with Africa missions conducted by other U.S. government agencies and departments.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
While experts generally agree that Africa’s challenges require a calibrated approach utilizing all elements of national power, past interagency engagements in Africa have often failed to promote interagency coordination. Details of AFRICOM’s interagency component are still forthcoming, but academic and military observers cite the need for an organization with a large interagency component while simultaneously expressing hesitancy about DOD’s expanding role in non-traditional activities (i.e. infrastructure development and humanitarianism).

EVALUATION:
A number of factors are responsible for past failures in African engagements by Washington and DOD specifically that, if left unaddressed, may inhibit the success of AFRICOM. The most prominent concerns are: poor relationships with African stakeholders who have expressed unease about the militarization of U.S.-African relations; ineffective interagency coordination caused by divergent organizational cultures, ineffective coordination mechanisms, and civilian capacity shortfalls; resourcing deficiencies for DOD AFRICOM personnel; insufficient area expertise among U.S. Africa military planners and analysts; and DOD expansion into non-traditional activities that is at times compromised by an enduring emphasis on kinetic military operations.

RESULTS:
Past ineffective military and civilian engagement in Africa has led to less than successful counter-terrorism initiatives and a counterproductive emphasis on military activities above development, which many analysts argue have threatened long-term security in Africa. AFRICOM may yield benefits, although these remain speculative and likely dependent on the ability of the command to serve as a true interagency coordination mechanism.

CONCLUSION:
This case study highlights weaknesses of past U.S. military engagement in Africa, offers insight into the ability of AFRICOM to meet Africa’s complex challenges, and warns against pitfalls that may jeopardize achieving the command’s mission. The evidence indicates that while AFRICOM rightly reflects the new strategic prominence of Africa in U.S. interests, its success depends on adequate funding and staffing to include a robust interagency component. To achieve its objectives in Africa, the United States must integrate of all elements of power. In the past, the United States government has favored the use of military might to the exclusion of diplomacy and development in Africa. While AFRICOM holds the promise of reversing this trend and enabling truly joint civil-military operations, it is also in danger of following the models of unsuccessful past U.S. counter-terrorism efforts that have relied excessively on kinetic operations.

INTRODUCTION:
The Cold War was characterized by distrust, arms races, and competing ideologies. Therefore, the world was surprised in March 1967 when Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and President Lyndon B. Johnson announced their joint intention to halt the U.S.-Soviet arms race and impose limits on various offensive and defensive weapons in their respective arsenals. External events intervened, however, and the first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) was delayed. The SALT I negotiations eventually began in November 1969 under President Richard Nixon. Following two and a half years of negotiations, the talks ended in May 1972 at a summit in Moscow, which produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and an Interim Agreement committing both sides to future negotiations regarding limitations on offensive weapons. There is a general consensus among secondary sources that interagency cooperation on foreign policy (including SALT I) during the presidency of Nixon was poor or virtually non-existent. Instead, Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, preferred to bypass the bureaucracy and control the national security process themselves. The result, according to some, was a sub-optimal outcome to the SALT I negotiations.

STRATEGY:
The U.S. government acted largely in an ad hoc manner with regard to the SALT I negotiations. Prior to the initial talks with the Soviets in Helsinki, there were no planning meetings between U.S. agencies to develop a clear, cohesive strategy for negotiating with Moscow, although there was a degree of preparation within the White House. Nixon and Kissinger formulated policy and developed contingencies among themselves, voluntarily bypassing other agencies. This process resulted in the absence of a clear, definite negotiating position and subsequently, the U.S. delegation departed for the initial SALT I meeting at Helsinki without specific direction from the White House. This practice was repeated throughout the negotiations, while real progress occurred in the back channels.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
In 1969, the Nixon administration in 1969 was characterized by a tendency toward blatant exclusion of various U.S. government entities. In contrast to President Johnson, who often gathered his top advisors for Tuesday lunch meetings, Nixon preferred a more centralized approach, making foreign policy decisions based almost entirely on his own views and with Kissinger’s recommendations. This close professional association and decision-making naturally disregarded other government agencies and a general atmosphere of interagency discord became the norm.

EVALUATION:
Interagency discord and distrust were strongly linked to ineffective cooperation between the White House and the executive agencies throughout the SALT I process. This was also evidenced by the lack of communication between key agencies, whose input is normally solicited in the policy-making process and may have been valuable to the negotiations at hand. Moreover, Nixon allowed his personal animosity for some agencies, such as the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, to limit the development of an effective strategy. The back channel approach to diplomacy, established to circumvent the State Department and other agencies, exacerbated the ad hoc nature of Nixon’s approach to SALT I. On occasion, information from the back channel developments would be leaked to the formal U.S. delegation, which fostered the negotiating team’s suspicion of the White House. Yet, in some ways, the back channel approach proved useful during the SALT I process in that it allowed Nixon and Kissinger to communicate quickly and bypass the sometimes cumbersome, policy-making bureaucracy.

RESULTS:
The SALT I negotiations ended with mixed success. The two sides eventually were able to agree to terms of two important arms control documents, the ABM Treaty and an Interim Agreement regarding offensive weapons. However, many in the government considered the Interim Agreement a suboptimal achievement, since the document failed to include concrete freezes on Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRV). The negotiations also exposed the dysfunctional communication of the U.S. national security apparatus. This brought not only international embarrassment upon the U.S. delegation, but cast a shadow on the United States’ image as an example of democratic decision-making.

CONCLUSION:
During the SALT I negotiations, interagency disagreement on the U.S. side was a recurring theme. There was a regular disconnect between developments in the formal negotiations and the back channel discussions. This case illustrates that if important foreign policy making processes are confined to one person, or even two close friends, as was the case with Nixon and Kissinger, then valuable viewpoints and perspectives are often left out and the foreign policy apparatus is not allowed to function to its full potential. Nixon and Kissinger’s barring of the bureaucracy in SALT I harmed U.S. government interagency relations and their attempts to reach breakthroughs in weapons limitations that may have included controlling the deployment of the MIRV Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles.

INTRODUCTION:
The anthrax attacks during September and October 2001 caused widespread panic across the United States. Still recovering from the attacks of 9/11, the fragile American public became increasingly fearful of the threat of terrorism in the United States. As public anxiety grew, so did the number of suspicious reports, which only hampered response efforts. Conflicting reports from within the government regarding the Anthrax attacks provoked this sense of fear. With over 20 federal agencies having a role in responding to the public health and the medical consequences of a bioterrorist attack, there was a great deal of confusion and uncertainty surrounding the necessary response. Thus, the U.S. government faced the daunting task of not only managing an increasingly fearful public, but also developing and implementing new protocols in an effort to respond to these unprecedented attacks. A majority of analysts characterize the anthrax response effort as both a failure and a valuable learning experience.

STRATEGY:
Although some pre-existing relationships between federal, state, and local public health plans contributed to a state of semi-readiness, the response to the 2001 anthrax attacks required venturing into unfamiliar territory for many public health and law enforcement officials. Because of this, planning was done mid-response and typically executed in an ad hoc manner, including the formation of two new organizations, the Mail Security Task Force and the Unified Incident Command Center, to assist in managing the response to the anthrax attacks.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Bureaucratic tensions (mostly between the public health agencies and the criminal investigative authorities) created some instances of shortcomings in strategy development and implementation. For example, while public health agencies tend to have an inductive approach to investigations, law enforcement follows a deductive approach. This caused frustration on both sides, especially pertaining to evidentiary issues and a lack of information sharing. While bureaucratic conflict often obstructed components of the response effort, the implementation of new ad hoc organizations such as the Unified Incident Command Center (UICC) showed the willingness of many U.S. government actors to pool their resources to create a more fluid response.

EVALUATION:
The variables that most significantly affected the response efforts in a negative manner were a lack of a clear authority; the presence of conflicting and inconsistent information; a lack of personnel, equipment, and funds; and surrounding legal issues, such as the lack of contractual authority. Other variables that weakened the U.S. government response included the inability to use certain resources due to the lack of a declared national emergency, and the challenge of adressing conflicting views from the public health community and the criminal investigation authorities. While there were many weaknesses in the response, there were some strengths as well. These include agency ingenuity and flexibility in creating new ad-hoc organizations with sufficient authorities to have a significant impact, and ad hoc UICC cooperation where agencies proved willing to use their expertise to advise others in impromptu policies.

RESULTS:
While the literature does not emphasize the economic cost of insufficient interagency coordination during the response, it is clear that such costs arose due to a lack of communication between agencies. For example, additional costs were caused by duplication of efforts and an unnecessary directed focus from organizations who should not have had a role in the response activities. Indirect expenses also included the filling of unncesseary antibiotic prescriptions for the uninformed public. Insufficient coordination also led to the inability to calm fear, and additional coordination may have prevented unnecessary loss of lives. However, while insufficient coordination caused a multitude of problems in the months and years after the anthrax attacks, it also led to significant reform-oriented legislation such as The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response Act of 2002, and to the establishment of new strategic plans for a variety of involved organizations.

CONCLUSION:
The necessity of planning and coordination, the importance of effective communication (both among responders and the general public), and the critical importance of a strong public health infrastructure to serve as the foundation for bioterrorism response efforts can all be seen in this case study. Overall, the U.S. government was not prepared for the extent, pace, and complexities of the the 2001 anthrax attacks. This lack of preparation caused unnecessary confusion and panic in an already difficult situation. However, often neglected federal, state, and local health agencies routinely worked at the limits of their capacity with admirable results. These public health professionals and individual clinicians were able to provide much needed services throughout the anthrax scare.

INTRODUCTION:
Since their 2002 formation in Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been at the forefront of U.S. efforts to coordinate civilian and military power. PRTs, organizations composed of 50-100 military personnel and a small number of civilians, have performed a variety of tasks from reconstruction projects, such as rebuilding schools and roads, to political and security initiatives, such as advising local government officials or training indigenous police forces. Yet, as of late 2008, the PRT strategy and doctrine continue to evolve and success remains confined largely to a tactical level.This case study analyzes the effectiveness of PRTs as a tool to facilitate unity of effort between civilian and military organizations in America’s counterinsurgency campaigns. The study focuses primarily on U.S. operations in Afghanistan; however, the text also analyzes the evolution of the PRT concept with the deployment of teams to Iraq.

STRATEGY:
PRTs represent a field-based attempt by the United States government to integrate civilian and military elements of national power on a small scale. The creation of PRTs in Afghanistan appears to have been an ad hoc response designed to enhance local security, reconstruction, and the authority of the central government. However, the literature suggests that the concept has not been well-integrated with larger U.S. strategy. Initial efforts to deploy PRTs in Iraq also seem to have been similarly reactive. However, with the implementation of President Bush’s “New Way Forward in Iraq,” the number of PRTs in the country has been greatly increased and their activities have been better integrated into the larger U.S. approach.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
Despite the ad hoc nature of PRT deployment, the teams were often able to effectively coordinate civilian, military, and NGO efforts in the field. In Afghanistan, PRTs were vital in promoting coordination between civilian and military activities through Provincial Development Councils—meetings between PRTs, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, NGOs, provincial governors, and tribal leaders. However, cooperation was sometimes marred by confusion concerning the responsibilities of agency representatives within the PRT. Similar interdepartmental conflicts emerged in Iraq over differences regarding the provision of logistical support and security.

EVALUATION:
The PRTs’ ill-defined and limited mandate often hampered coordination and unity of effort. In addition, unclear responsibilities and authorities frequently prevented effective interagency cooperation. Scarce, disproportionately distributed resources and limited training (especially among civilian agencies) also frequently hindered coordination and led to an overrepresentation of the military in field-based decision-making. Finally, differing organizational cultures at times produced tensions between civilian, military, and non-governmental personnel participating in PRT activities. Nonetheless, PRTs often fulfilled valuable functions in Iraq and Afghanistan and continue to do so due to the flexibility of the approach and the development of good interpersonal relationships between civilian and military personnel, which has occurred on some teams.

RESULTS:
A final assessment is not possible at this time but lessons have already been learned and the impacts of PRT work are evident. Yet overall, PRTs appear to have made a positive contribution to Afghanistan and Iraq and to the effective coordination of American civilian and military efforts. However, success has been partial, and many fear that Provincial Reconstruction Teams are insufficient to deal with the issues facing both countries.

CONCLUSION:
Provincial Reconstruction Teams are one of the only existing institutions designed to improve U.S. civilian and military cooperation and expand U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite varying assessments of overall effectiveness of PRTs, a degree of consensus has emerged that PRTs have improved coordination between the military and civilian sectors of government; however, experts generally find this coordination to be ad hoc and incomplete. While the core concept of PRTs appears good, further definition of the functions and responsibilities of these organizations has proven difficult and some worry such description might constrain the flexibility of PRTs. Finally, differing institutional cultures and insufficient training and resources frequently led to interagency tension, although many disputes were eventually resolved amicably.

INTRODUCTION:
From the end of the Second World War until the Revolution of 1978/79, Iran was a key American ally in the Middle East, serving as a counter to Soviet influence, a supplier of oil to Israel, and a regional military hegemon capable of intervening in neighboring states on behalf of U.S. interests. However, the U.S. national security process proved unable to manage the events in Iran during 1978/79, from the escalating crisis, through the revolution, and into the post-revolutionary regime consolidation period until the collapse of the Provisional Government and rise of the Islamic state in November 1979. During this period, the U.S. employed a one-option policy of unflinching support for the Iranian regime which left the American government incapable of undertaking rapid emergency action when the Iranian state slipped into chaos.

STRATEGY:
The United States did not possess a long-term strategy towards Iran. Policy more closely resembled faith, an absolute and unquestionable belief in the Shah as the best option for Iranian governance and for U.S. interests, a conviction which ironically became stronger when faced with the Shah’s increasing weakness. America’s approach to Iran thus often ceded to the desires and attitudes of the Shah himself, who had tremendous influence over U.S. policy towards his own state through his extensive network of contacts in Washington who believed that the Iranian ruler possessed superior knowledge of the Iranian domestic situation and the regional political environment. In November 1978, once the American government recognized the existence of a crisis in Iran, ad hoc decisions were made in the absence of unifying strategic guidance. These reactive approaches by various agencies and organizations often clashed, for instance simultaneously calling on the Shah to use repression and make concessions, and were thus ineffective.

INTEGRATED ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER:
There was a failure to integrate the U.S. government’s efforts in order to maintain the Shah’s regime. This was evident in the lack of a unifying strategic approach and in the power struggles between agencies, again exemplified by the State Department-White House staff conflict, which resulted from undefined areas of authority and responsibility. In the absence of clear authorities, there was insufficient interagency communication and information sharing within the U.S. government. In fact, the response was integrated only when the Iran desk of the State Department was responsible for all elements of policy due to the absence of interest by other agencies. During this time, the Iran desk focused on rapid normalization of relations irrespective of the radically altered context.

EVALUATION:
A lack of a successful U.S. policy and differing organizational cultures inhibited an effective response to the escalating crisis in Iran and contributed to the eventual collapse of the Shah’s regime. Each U.S. government agency tended to interpret events according to its particular culture and its unique understanding of what supporting the Shah meant and promoted. These divergent organizational cultures were further divided by the lack of communication and information sharing which was spurred by interagency power struggles. Attempts at a lead agency approach and the use of informal decision making mechanisms failed outright or were initiated too late to be effective. Finally, a lack of high-level policy attention also contributed to the weak response.

RESULTS:
The U.S. response to the Iranian Revolution resulted first in the loss of the Shah as a U.S. partner and the subsequent loss of the Iranian state as an ally. In losing Iran, the U.S. was deprived of one of its most valuable partners in the Middle East. Calculating the long-term strategic costs of this miscalculation involves much speculation, but the failure likely contributed to numerous regional problems, including the contemporary conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in addition to the present-day Iranian nuclear stalemate. Short-term military losses amounted to billions of dollars of abandoned equipment. Economic costs were in the tens of billions of dollars, including direct asset losses and an equal amount of cancelled contracts.

CONCLUSION:
The U.S. management of the eroding position of the Shah in Iran is an example of how poor long-term strategy development affected Washington’s ability to respond to an acute crisis by discouraging American officials from asking the right questions, failing to heed unfavorable intelligence, or to develop a range of policy options. Such high-level shortcomings filtered down to department and agency staffs. The ensuing tension at all levels within the American bureaucracy decreased interagency trust and communication as the crisis escalated, leading to a rare case of “virtual policy paralysis.” This facilitated the loss of Iran, not only as an American ally and for American interests, but also as a modernizing (even if imperfect) state trending down the path of democratization and thus toward more freedom for its citizens.